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1. Introduction
This book discusses the important issue of how firms can profit from knowledge and capabilities 
from other organizations in order to improve their innovation performance. In recent years, 
innovation has become essential for the competitive advantage of firms in a growing number 
of industries (Christensen et al., 1998; Hult et al., 2004). Due to the fast development of 
technologies, changing customer demands, shortening of product life cycles, increased global 
competition and changing regulations, modern firms constantly have to look for new ways to 
prosper in this very dynamic business environment (Fagerberg, 2004; Porter, 1985; Teece et 
al., 1997). Increasingly, innovation is regarded as the driver for economic change by national 
and international governments. Since in 2000 leaders of the European Union (EU) set out in 
Lisbon to build the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable 
of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, innovation 
has become a prominent topic on EU and national policy agendas (European Commission, 
2000, 2005; Kok, 2004). For example, in 2003, the Dutch government established the 
InnovatiePlatform with the aim of shaping better conditions, and making new connections in 
order to boost innovation and entrepreneurship (Innovatieplatform, 2008).
The importance of innovation has also been acknowledged by business. In the 2005 innovation 
survey initiated by the American Management Association (AMA) including 1,396 executives 
of large multinational firms in North America and Europe it was concluded that business 
regards innovation as crucial for the long-term survival of firms ( Jamrog, 2006). However, 
innovation is associated with high failure rates as well (Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1968; 
Hollander, 2002; Van Poppel, 1999), because many ideas for new products and processes 
do not enter the market or do not lead to commercial success once they enter the market. To 
put it more plainly, innovation is still a major challenge for firms. Therefore, an important 
management question is how a firm can renew its core technologies, products and processes 
as a basis for competitive vitality (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Sirmon et al., 2007; Teece et 
al., 1997). 
It is perhaps therefore not surprising that modern firms treat the management of innovation as 
one of the basic business functions (Burgelman et al., 2009; Janszen, 2000; Tidd et al., 2005; 
Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). The management of innovation is concerned with monitoring 
the implementation of innovation projects from idea generation, development, and pilot 
testing all the way to industrial scale introduction. These innovation projects may entail 
improvements of existing products and processes, also referred to as incremental innovations, 
but also the development of radically new products and processes, that in turn may make 
existing ones obsolete (Christensen, 1997). Although it may be extremely difficult and take a 
lot of time to develop a radically new product, the rewards may be enormous, as it may lead 
to bring new competitive advantages and an upswing in turnover (Christensen et al., 1998; 
Utterback, 1974; Utterback et al., 1988). 
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Over the years innovation has received a lot of attention in a great number of academic 
disciplines, ranging from (business) management, economics, sociology and psychology, 
political sciences, to technical sciences (Gopalakrishnan and Damanpour, 1997). These 
disciplines offer different sets of research questions, use different units of analysis, and represent 
a wide range of meanings of the word ‘innovation’. Even within the literature on innovation 
management, many different perspectives, different suppositions and approaches exist (Nieto, 
2003). In the context of this book, innovation has been broadly defined as ‘the exploitation of 
new ideas into new products, processes, services or business practice’ (Pittaway et al., 2004).
It has become generally acknowledged in the innovation management literature that firms 
do not innovate in isolation (Chesbrough, 2003b; Gilsing, 2003; Lundvall, 1992; Powell et 
al., 1996; Teece, 1986; Von Hippel, 1988). Instead, firms increasingly look for ways to profit 
from knowledge in other organizations, like supply chain partners, universities and research 
institutes, and even competitors (Gemunden et al., 1996; Granstrand et al., 1992; Laursen and 
Salter, 2006; Omta, 2002). Firms may choose from several strategies for external knowledge 
acquisition (also referred to as governance modes), such as inter-organizational cooperation, 
venture capital investments, outsourcing of Research and Development (R&D), or licensing-
in (Granstrand et al., 1992; Hagedoorn, 1990; Tidd and Trewhella, 1997). Chesbrough 
(2003) introduced the ‘open innovation model’, which emphasizes that the innovation process 
should be flexible and may cross organizational boundaries, so that it enables the transfer 
of knowledge and capabilities from and to other independent organizations (Chesbrough, 
2003). According to the open innovation model, firms should not only consider internal, but 
also external knowledge, capabilities and paths to market. 
In this book we concentrate on a number of knowledge acquisition strategies that can be 
regarded as types of open innovation, such as licensing-in of knowledge and technologies, 
and inter-organizational cooperation. Licensing-in is the purchasing of (product or process) 
technology, designs or marketing expertise, which are readily available in the market 
(Lowe and Taylor, 1998; Tidd and Trewhella, 1997). In inter-organizational cooperation 
different partners pool their resources and capabilities for the purpose of collaborative R&D 
(Hagedoorn, 2002; Nooteboom, 1999b; Sampson, 2007). In innovation networks, for 
instance, different organizations such as small firms and research organizations work together 
with the aim of developing a new product, process, or business practice. In addition to open 
innovation, firms can also merge with or acquire other firms in order to profit from external 
knowledge (Chakrabarti et al., 1994; Coff, 1999; Graebner, 2004; Granstrand et al., 1992; 
Hitt et al., 1996). Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) should be regarded as the situation where 
independent firms combine their operations into a consolidated firm. Whereas licensing-in 
and inter-organizational cooperation can be regarded as dedicated modes (i.e. the prime 
objective of such a mode is innovation or knowledge transfer), M&As involve other resources 
and business functions as well. In addition, the prime reason for M&As is often not to enhance 
the innovative potential, but to open new markets, or gain extra market share in existing 
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markets (Bakker and Helmink, 2000; Chakrabarti et al., 1994; Chakrabarti and Souder, 1987; 
Gerpott, 1995).
If firms try to acquire external knowledge, they will face several management challenges 
(Barney, 1999; Van de Vrande et al., 2006). Several empirical studies have indicated that 
sourcing external knowledge can be time consuming, expensive and laborious (e.g. Katila and 
Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006). Moreover, the management of inter-organizational 
cooperation is associated with complex issues such as appropriation concerns, motivational 
problems, leakage of sensitive information, and partner dependency (Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Nooteboom, 1999b; Omta and Van Rossum, 1999). In the case of M&As, firms are faced 
with the additional complex process of integrating two different organizations, as they may 
face challenges of integrating different corporate cultures, resistance among personnel, and 
compromising ongoing work (Bakker and Helmink, 2000; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; 
Schweiger, 2002). 
Therefore, an important question for managers is whether external knowledge acquisition 
really contributes to innovation. Do the different knowledge acquisition strategies indeed lead 
to better innovation performance? And how is the process of acquiring external knowledge 
successfully managed? In this respect, the management of innovating firms should not only 
strategically consider which knowledge acquisition strategy is to be preferred if they want 
to profit from knowledge developed elsewhere, but they should also consider carefully how 
to manage their external knowledge acquisition processes. This book tries to address these 
management challenges. The main objective of this book is therefore as follows.
To analyze how firms can profit from external knowledge using different knowledge acquisition strategies.
In order to realize this objective, four empirical studies are carried out. The first two studies 
are presented in Part I of this book and are primarily concerned with the relevance of different 
strategies for acquiring external knowledge (such as licensing-in, outsourcing and cooperation), 
using a quantitative approach. Both studies use longitudinal data of industrial firms from 
Dutch Community Innovation Surveys (CIS, 1994-2004), which explore the innovation 
process inside firms. In Part II two qualitative studies are presented that concentrate on 
specific management challenges of two different knowledge acquisition strategies, namely 
inter-organizational cooperation and M&As. The first study provides in-depth information on 
innovation brokers orchestrating innovation networks of Small and Medium sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) in the agri-food sector, in different European countries. The second study provides 
in-depth information on the integration processes of the R&D function, following large 
(medium) high-tech M&As in life sciences sectors.
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1.1 Part I: quantitative analyses
Part I of this book consists of two quantitative studies, which are concerned with the relevance 
of different knowledge acquisition strategies. The first study concentrates on the occurrence 
of different strategies to acquire external knowledge over time. In particular, the study 
concentrates on external knowledge acquisition strategies associated with open innovation. 
Next, the second study in Part I complements the first study by analyzing whether the different 
knowledge acquisition strategies are effective in improving the innovation performance. 
1.1.1 Adoption of open innovation
Chapter 2 studies the extent to which firms use various strategies to acquire external knowledge. 
In particular, this study concentrates on the adoption of knowledge acquisition strategies 
that are associated with open innovation. As said, Chesbrough (2003) coined the term open 
innovation to introduce a model for managing innovation in large R&D-intensive firms. This 
model builds on the premise that if a firm wants to innovate successfully in the current highly 
dynamic business environment, the innovation process should get a more flexible structure, 
enabling the transfer and combination of external knowledge and capabilities. According to 
the open innovation model external innovative ideas and paths to the market are as important 
as internal ones, whereas in the ‘closed innovation model’ firms mainly generate their own 
ideas, carry out all innovation activities in-house, and develop and market all new products 
themselves (Chesbrough, 2003b). Several knowledge acquisition strategies have been 
associated with the open innovation model, such as licensing-in, outsourcing, venture capital 
investments, and cooperation (Chesbrough, 2003b; Chesbrough et al., 2006; Van de Vrande, 
2007). These knowledge acquisition strategies can imply relationships with different types 
of organizations, such as cooperation with suppliers, customers, competitors, and research 
organizations.
Yet, despite the recent emphasis on open innovation by innovation management scholars, 
the empirical evidence of its relevance to innovating firms has so far been limited to a small 
range of firms (Chesbrough, 2006). Most of the empirical evidence on the relevance of open 
innovation (e.g. Christensen et al., 2005; Dittrich and Duysters, 2007; Fetterhoff and Voelkel, 
2006) comes from high-tech industries, such as pharmaceutical, information technology and 
computers. Only anecdotal evidence suggests that open innovation can be beneficial for low-
tech industries as well (e.g. Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006). Still, it remains an open question 
whether the concepts of open innovation also apply to lower-tech or more mature industries 
(Chesbrough, 2006: 4). In addition, whereas the relevance of open innovation is shown for 
a number of large firms, it remains unclear to what extent open innovation is also relevant 
for SMEs. Finally, much of the empirical evidence on open innovation, like the pivotal work 
by Chesbrough, is taken from US-based firms. The relevance of open innovation to companies 
outside the US remains to be demonstrated (Chesbrough, 2006: 5). 
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Given that a number of studies (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003b; Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006; 
Chesbrough et al., 2006; Dittrich and Duysters, 2007) pointed at the importance of the open 
innovation model, there is a clear need for assessing its external validity. Therefore, in Chapter 
2 we try to answer the question as to what extent innovating firms have adopted an open 
innovation strategy, by analyzing over an 11-year time period (1994-2004) the occurrence of 
different knowledge acquisition strategies, such as licensing-in, outsourcing, and cooperation 
among different types of firms. 
Research Question 1 (RQ1): To what extent do different types (size and technology classes) of innovating 
firms pursue an open innovation strategy?
1.1.2 The impact of knowledge acquisition strategies on innovation performance 
In addition to getting insight into the extent to which innovating firms pursue open innovation 
strategies, it is also important to know whether firms really profit from it. The management 
of innovating firms can choose between a variety of knowledge acquisition strategies, but 
which strategies are in fact effective? Is open innovation, as suggested by many scholars, really a 
successful strategy for firms? Or can firms just as easily rely on in-house innovation? Moreover, 
are knowledge acquisition strategies favorable for incremental improvements of existing 
products (incremental innovations) as well as completely novel innovations that are new to 
the market (radical innovations)? In addition to open innovation, M&As can also be regarded 
as a way of acquiring external knowledge in order to improve the innovation performance 
(e.g. Barney, 1999; Granstrand et al., 1992; Van de Vrande et al., 2006). However, are M&As 
really beneficial for innovation? These issues are central in Chapter 3. More specifically, the 
question is addressed as to how different knowledge acquisition strategies contribute to the 
performance of incremental and radical innovations. And what is the time frame within which 
performance effects can be expected?
So far, numerous empirical studies have investigated the impact of a single strategy for 
external knowledge acquisition on innovation performance, especially of inter-organizational 
cooperation (e.g. Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Negassi, 2004; Sampson, 2007; Stuart, 2000), 
or to a lesser extent M&As (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Hagedoorn and 
Duysters, 2002a). Whereas studies on the relationship between cooperation and innovation 
tend to find a consistent positive relationship, studies on the relationship between M&As 
and innovation show mixed results (De Man and Duysters, 2005). Apparently, negative side-
effects of M&As may dominate this relationship, e.g. job uncertainty, resistance to change, and 
clashing business cultures, all harming ongoing innovation trajectories. Some authors found 
a positive relationship between M&As and innovation performance in specific situations, for 
instance in the case of technology motivated M&As in high-tech industries (Ahuja and Katila, 
2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). The relationship between more market-based acquisition strategies 
for external knowledge acquisition, most notably licensing-in, and innovation performance 
has received much less attention. An exception is Tsai and Wang (2007), who found a positive 
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relationship between licensing-in and innovation performance for firms that possess sufficient 
R&D to absorb the acquired knowledge. 
Only a few studies have investigated the impact of different external knowledge acquisition 
strategies on innovation performance in an integrated way (Fey, 2005; Keil et al., 2008; 
Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Van de Vrande, 2007). However, these studies, like most of the 
studies within the inter-organizational context on innovation, focused exclusively on high-
tech industries. As innovation is also important to other industries, it would be interesting to 
analyze the impact of different external knowledge acquisition strategies in industries other 
than high-tech as well. Therefore, Chapter 3 presents a statistical analysis of cross-sectional 
Dutch Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data that is concerned with the impact of different 
strategies for acquiring external knowledge on innovation performance. More specifically, we 
analyze the relationship between different strategies for external knowledge acquisition on the 
short- and long-term performance of incremental and radical innovations in innovative firms. 
Consequently, Chapter 3 focuses on the following research question.
Research Question 2 (RQ2): What is the impact of different external knowledge acquisition strategies on 
the short-term and long-term innovation performance of innovative firms?
1.2 Part II: qualitative analyses
Whereas in Part I a large dataset of Dutch industrial firms is analyzed to identify trends with 
respect to how firms profit from external knowledge, in Part II the objective is to analyze this 
phenomenon more in-depth. The first study in Part II concentrates on inter-organizational 
cooperation in SME innovation networks. Innovating in a network can be particularly 
challenging for SMEs, which often lack cooperation experience and have a limited absorptive 
capacity. More specifically, the study is concerned with the question how innovation brokers 
orchestrate SME innovation networks. In the second study the attention turns to how 
corporations in life-science industries profit from external knowledge acquired by means of 
M&As. M&As can be considered as the most far-reaching knowledge acquisition strategy in 
terms of organizational integration, and the integration of large firms with substantial R&D 
functions can be particularly difficult, especially in large firms with different business cultures 
and organizational systems. In addition, it is often stated that large firms lack the agility of 
SMEs and are as a consequence less well equipped to conduct (radical) innovation (Kemp 
et al., 2003). While a merger or acquisition increases size, both arguments led us to make an 
in-depth study of the impact of different integration processes on the innovation potential in 
large-scale M&As. Therefore, the study concentrates on how innovation synergies are realized 
in terms of integration mechanisms and resource re-allocations in the case of the integration 
of two large firms following a merger or acquisition.
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1.2.1 Orchestrating SME innovation networks
Chapter 4 deals with the management challenges that come with inter-organizational 
cooperation in innovation networks. Once a firm decides it will cooperate with other 
organizations to innovate, managers will face important questions, such as how to establish 
an innovation network of complementary actors? How to manage the cooperation between 
organizations with divergent interests and different cultures? How to ensure a fair balance 
in costs and benefits with the other partners in the network? And how to prevent leakage of 
sensitive information through the network? 
Furthermore, SMEs in particular face several obstacles when they want to profit from 
external knowledge, such as limited absorptive capacity, and lack of joint research experience 
(Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001; Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2002; Van Gils and Zwart, 2004). 
Nevertheless, SMEs often lack the essential resources and capabilities to successfully innovate 
in-house (Narula, 2004; Nooteboom, 1994), making inter-organizational relationships 
essential to them.
Intermediary organizations, also referred to as innovation brokers or network orchestrators, have 
emerged to assist SMEs to innovate in networks (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Howells, 2006; 
Nooteboom, 1999b; Smits and Kuhman, 2004; Winch and Courtney, 2007). For instance, 
innovation brokers may support SMEs by identifying their innovation needs, articulating 
their knowledge demands, setting up partnerships and managing the inter-organizational 
cooperation processes (Howells, 2006). Within the literature on open innovation, innovation 
brokers are mentioned as important actors as well (Chesbrough, 2006: 10; Sousa, 2008). 
However, empirical knowledge on how innovation brokers operate successfully, and under 
which conditions, remains scarce (Boon et al., 2008; Sapsed et al., 2007; Winch and Courtney, 
2007). In addition, it can be expected that innovation brokers are a rich source of information 
on how to successfully manage an open innovation network. Therefore, in Chapter 4 we want 
to answer the question as to how innovation brokers orchestrate SME innovation networks 
in the agri-food sector.
Research Question 3 (RQ3): How do innovation brokers orchestrate SME innovation networks in the agri-
food sector?
In tackling this question, we apply an in-depth case study approach to analyze the network 
orchestration processes of four innovation brokers in the agri-food industry, in different 
European countries. The agri-food industry is an interesting setting in which to study network 
orchestration, because it has a high share of SMEs, and agri-food firms face substantial 
constraints when it comes to innovation. Studies concluded that economic considerations 
and insufficient innovation competencies are important barriers to innovation in the agri-food 
sector (Batterink et al., 2006; Garcia Martinez and Briz, 2000). Moreover, Costa and Jongen 
(2006) pointed at some general barriers to agri-food innovation, such as a lack of concrete 
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knowledge on how to organize the innovation process, especially in an inter-organizational 
setting. Innovation brokers can therefore potentially play a crucial role in SME innovation 
networks in the agri-food sector (Dons and Bino, 2008; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008b; 
Vanhaverbeke et al., 2007).
1.2.2 Realizing innovation synergies in large M&As
Chapter 5 deals with the challenges that arise when firms want to profit from external 
knowledge and capabilities through mergers and/or acquisitions (M&As). We have already 
stated that, next to open innovation, firms can choose to merge with or acquire another firm 
in order to obtain new knowledge and capabilities. Whereas the knowledge acquisition 
strategies associated with open innovation are flexible in nature and imply that the involved 
firms remain autonomous, M&As should be regarded as a way to get permanent access to 
and full hierarchical control over innovative products, technologies, capabilities and assets 
(Chakrabarti et al., 1994; Coff, 1999; Graebner, 2004; Granstrand et al., 1992; Hitt et al., 
1996). M&As typically involve integrating the processes and resources of two firms, including 
perhaps unwanted resources (Barney, 1999; Gerpott, 1995). Moreover, as mentioned, in the 
case of M&As, the involved firms are faced with (corporate) cultural distance, resistance 
among personnel, and compromising ongoing work. It may therefore be not surprising that 
in general M&As are associated with high failure rates (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; 
King et al., 2004; Mueller, 1985; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Schenk, 2006; Seth, 1990) 
and with high levels of uncertainty when it comes to realizing innovation synergies (Bannert 
and Tschirky, 2004; Chakrabarti and Souder, 1987; Chatterjee, 1986)
Many authors, especially those residing in the organizational behavior stream of research, 
point at the Post M&A Integration (PMAI) process when explaining why M&As succeed or 
not (e.g. Bakker and Helmink, 2000; Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Epstein, 2004; Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991; Schweiger, 2002). Thus, integration and innovation managers alike need to 
ask themselves the following questions: Which specific innovation synergies can be expected 
from M&As? What integration mechanisms and resource re-allocations are required to 
realize these innovation synergies? And which factors contribute to successful integration 
of the R&D function? Surprisingly, however, to date only a few studies have investigated the 
PMI process of the R&D function in depth (e.g. Bannert and Tschirky, 2004; Gerpott, 1995; 
Grimpe, 2007).
In addition, there are a substantial number of characteristics of M&As (M&A context 
characteristics) that may determine whether innovation synergies can be expected or not 
(Gerpott, 1995). For instance, the size of an M&A, and the relatedness between the involved 
firms in terms of technologies possessed may determine the potential for synergy realization 
(Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Prabhu et al., 2005). However, most studies 
concentrating on the M&A context characteristics in explaining post M&A innovation 
performance, e.g. on the role of technological relatedness, consider the process of synergy 
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realization (i.e. through post M&A integration) as a black box (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Cloodt et al., 2006). With this study, we aim to open this black box by concentrating on the 
M&A context characteristics as well as the post M&A integration process. More specifically, 
in line with the study of Cassiman et al. (2005), we link technological relatedness to specific 
R&D integration mechanisms, and subsequently to innovation synergy realization. The study 
presented in Chapter 5 focuses on the following research question.
Research Question 4 (RQ4): What is the role of technological relatedness in realizing innovation synergies 
in M&As? 
In Chapter 5 we try to conceptualize innovation synergy realization in the context of M&As 
by analyzing in-depth the PMI process of large, medium- and high-tech M&As in the life 
science industry. Especially in high-tech sectors, M&As are an important mechanism to acquire 
external knowledge (Cloodt, 2005). Moreover, large high-tech M&As involve substantial 
R&D functions. Thus, even if access to R&D knowledge is not the prime reason for such 
M&As, the integration of the firms is likely to affect the R&D functions (Gerpott, 1995). 
Therefore, in such a setting, it is a clear management challenge to profit from the knowledge 
and innovation capabilities residing in the other firm.
1.3 Outline of the book
The remainder of this book is organized as follows. Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 present four 
separate empirical studies, each addressing one of the research questions that are stated in this 
introduction chapter. 
Part I of this book comprises Chapters 2 and 3, which present quantitative analyses of CIS-data 
from the Netherlands, focused on the relevance of different strategies for acquiring external 
knowledge. Chapter 2 will focus on the trends with respect to the adoption of open innovation 
in low-, medium-, and high-tech sectors, and among small, medium and large-sized enterprises 
in the Netherlands in 1994-2004. Chapter 3 presents a quantitative study of Dutch industrial 
firms that investigates the impact of different external knowledge acquisition strategies on the 
short-term and long-term performance regarding both incremental and radical innovation. 
Part II comprises Chapters 4 and 5 and presents in-depth case studies. Chapter 4 focuses on 
the management of SME innovation networks in the agri-food industry. This study explores 
how innovation brokers manage SME innovation networks to assist the cooperating SMEs 
overcoming their innovation and cooperation obstacles. The study presented in Chapter 5 
includes in-depth case studies of 10 large high-tech M&As in the life-science industry in order 
to understand how innovation synergies are realized in terms of integration mechanisms and 
resource re-allocations. 
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Finally, Chapter 6 draws conclusions from the studies presented in this book, and indicates 
the main contributions to literature. This chapter ends with a discussion on the managerial 
implications for innovating firms.
Part I 
Quantitative analyses
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2.  The adoption of open innovation. A longitudinal 
study of large firms and SMEs, in high-, medium-, 
and low-tech industries in the Netherlands
2.1 Introduction
This chapter was set up to answer the first research question.
RQ1: To what extent do different types (size and technology classes) of innovating firms pursue an open 
innovation strategy? 
As we stated in the introductory chapter, open innovation was introduced as a new model for 
managing innovation in large R&D-intensive firms. Although suggested by several scholars, 
it remains unclear whether open innovation is also relevant for lower-tech or more mature 
industries and for Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). Therefore, to answer RQ1, 
we come up with two sub-questions:
a.  Is there a noticeable trend of innovating firms adopting open innovation strategies?
b.  Do SMEs and firms in low and medium-tech industries pursue open innovation strategies, 
or is open innovation exclusively the domain of large corporations and firms in high-tech 
industries?
In answering these research questions, we aim to arrive at a state-of-the-art view with respect to 
the relevance of open innovation in the Netherlands. In the present study we use longitudinal 
Dutch Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data of industrial firms from five subsequent 
surveys, covering the period 1994-2004, to identify the most recent trends with respect to 
open and closed innovation. As such, this study answers calls for longitudinal, cross-sectional 
research into the developments with respect to open innovation (Chesbrough, 2006; Laursen 
and Salter, 2006; West et al., 2006). As Laursen and Salter (2004) state, until greater research 
is undertaken on the nature of (external) search strategies over time, the full implications of open 
innovation will not be understood. Using Dutch data, this research can also contribute to the 
existing literature by studying whether some elements of the open innovation model, derived 
mainly from (qualitative) research from US firms, are also relevant for EU-based firms (West 
et al., 2006: 292). 
The remainder of Chapter 2 is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a theoretical 
background and elaborates on the innovation process, highlighting the open innovation 
model and different strategies for external knowledge acquisition. Then, in Section 2.3 the 
data and methodology of our study is outlined. This section describes the properties of the 
Dutch CIS’s, how the innovating firms are selected from the 5 subsequent innovation surveys 
and how the resulting samples compare. It furthermore describes how the different knowledge 
acquisition strategies associated with open innovation were measured, and what statistical 
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method was used to substantiate our claims. Section 2.4 reports the findings of the empirical 
analyses on the CIS data. Finally, Section 2.5 contains the conclusions and implications, as 
well as suggestions for further research.
2.2 Theoretical background
2.2.1 The innovation process
The pivotal role of the management of the innovation process is to monitor the implementation 
of innovation projects from pilot testing to industrial-scale introduction. However, when 
tracing the literature on the management of innovation it becomes apparent that the way 
innovation is managed has changed dramatically over the years. The traditional view of 
innovation, especially in large firms, places the primary locus of innovation in the (corporate) 
research and development (R&D) department. This view is in line with the vertically integrated 
perspective on innovation and the importance of economies of scale in R&D (Chandler, 
1990; Teece, 1986). Over the years, however, firms have increasingly spread innovation 
throughout the whole organization, which implies that different business functions, such as 
marketing, purchasing, manufacturing, have to cooperate (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). In 
addition, external organizations are also increasingly included in the innovation process, like 
customers (Baker and Sinkula, 2005; Gassmann et al., 2006; Roussel et al., 1991), suppliers 
(Kamath and Liker, 1990; Petersen et al., 2003; Ragatz et al., 1997), competitors (Hamel et 
al., 1989) or research organizations like universities (Fontana et al., 2006; Mora-Valentin et al., 
2004; Schartinger et al., 2002; Snyder and Blevins, 1986). In fact, successful innovating firms 
draw simultaneously from different external sources to keep up with the rapid technological 
and market developments (Laursen and Salter, 2006). As a consequence, a crucial part of 
the innovation process nowadays involves building and managing linkages with other 
organizations, in order to acquire the knowledge and capabilities residing there (Chesbrough, 
2003b; Powell et al., 1996; Rogers, 1996).
Chesbrough (2003b) coined the term open innovation to introduce a new model for 
managing innovation. Open innovation builds on the assumptions that in the current business 
environment, firms are faced with the increasing speed of technological developments, 
the growing mobility of highly experienced and skilled people, and the growing presence 
of venture capital (Chesbrough, 2003b). These developments, which are also referred to 
as ‘erosion factors of closed innovation’ have led to a diffusion of knowledge among firms 
of all sizes in many industries (Chesbrough, 2003b), so that even the most capable R&D 
organizations must identify, connect to, and leverage external knowledge sources as a core process 
in innovation (Chesbrough, 2006: 2). Therefore, in the open innovation model (Chesbrough, 
2003a, 2003b, 2004; Chesbrough et al., 2006) it is argued that if a firm wants to innovate 
successfully in the current highly dynamic environment, the innovation process should get 
a more open and flexible structure, allowing for the integration of external knowledge and 
capabilities (Chesbrough, 2003b). In this way, innovative ideas and technologies may come 
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from outside the firm and innovative ideas may also be further developed by other firms, if 
it fits their business model better. It was, however, already widely accepted that innovation 
should be regarded as an interactive, cross-disciplinary and inter-organizational process 
(Lundvall, 1992; Von Hippel, 1988), so that in essence the notion of open innovation does 
not signify an altogether new phenomenon (Christensen et al., 2005). The added value of 
the open innovation model is that it offers a more comprehensive and systematic framework 
for the way in which large high-tech firms manage these more externally oriented innovation 
processes (Christensen et al., 2005).
The innovation process in SMEs differs substantially from that of large firms (Hoffmann and 
Schlosser, 2001; Nooteboom, 1994; Rogers, 2004). In contrast to many large firms, SMEs often 
do not have a structured R&D process, nor people working on innovation on a permanent 
basis. Moreover, Nooteboom (1994), for instance, addressed a number of characteristics of 
SMEs that can be considered as special strengths for innovation, such as highly motivated 
personnel, effective internal communication, little bureaucracy and much internal flexibility, 
and a high capacity for customization (Nooteboom, 1994). However, SMEs are traditionally 
confronted with many obstacles to innovation, such as a limited absorptive capacity (Menrad, 
2004), lack of innovation funding (Caputo et al., 2002; Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2002), lack 
of functional expertise, diseconomies of scale and the short-term perspective of management 
(Bessant and Rush, 1995; Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2002; Nooteboom, 1994). To overcome 
such obstacles, SMEs typically establish relations with external actors. Thus, there are specific 
drivers for SMEs to move towards an open innovation strategy, that may be different from the 
drivers towards open innovation in large firms. We will further discuss these issues in Chapter 
4 on innovation brokerage.
2.2.2 Strategies for external knowledge acquisition
As we stated in the introductory chapter, the innovation literature has put forward a diversity 
of strategies, also referred to as governance modes, for connecting and leveraging external 
knowledge sources, such as technology in-licensing, R&D outsourcing, (different forms 
of ) inter-organizational cooperation, corporate venture capital investments, or mergers and 
acquisitions (Granstrand et al., 1992; Hagedoorn, 1990; Pisano, 1990; Tidd and Trewhella, 
1997; Van de Vrande et al., 2006). In the present chapter, we are primarily interested in those 
knowledge acquisition strategies that can be regarded as elements of open innovation. As 
noted earlier, the open innovation model emphasizes the flexibility of the innovation process, 
acknowledging and exploiting semi-permeable organizational boundaries. Implicitly, this 
means that flexible knowledge acquisition strategies in which the focal organizations remain 
autonomous, such as licensing-in, or inter-organizational cooperation, are associated with 
open innovation, whereas mergers and acquisitions imply high levels of organizational 
integration and are associated with closed innovation. Taking this into account and considering 
the possibilities of the CIS data we concentrate on licensing-in, outsourcing and (inter-
organizational) cooperation as elements of open innovation. 
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First, technology or knowledge in-licensing (hereafter referred to as licensing-in) can be 
defined as the purchasing of (product or process) technology, designs or marketing expertise 
(adapted from Lowe and Taylor, 1998). As such, licensing-in is a means for innovating firms 
to exploit the innovation capabilities or intellectual property of another organization, which is 
readily available in the market. Technology licensing primarily enables firms to rapidly establish 
positions in new technological areas (Tidd and Trewhella, 1997). Usually, the licensee pays a 
fee and/or a royalty based on sales or a reciprocal flow of knowledge rights over a specific period 
of time (Lowe and Taylor, 1998). Second, with outsourcing, a particular part of the innovation 
process is carried out by another organization, the sub-contractor - e.g. a research institute, or 
another firm. The sub-contractor delivers particular knowledge or a technology specifically 
developed for, and to be controlled by the focal firm (Granstrand et al., 1992; Hagedoorn, 
1990). We consider that outsourcing does not specifically imply that an innovation (e.g. the 
new product) is completely developed by a third party (the sub-contractor). Outsourcing may 
also entail the development of a single part of a new product, or part of an innovation project. 
Third, cooperation implies that different partners work together and pool their resources and 
capabilities for the purpose of collaborative R&D, crossing organizational boundaries, while 
remaining autonomous organizations (Sampson, 2007). Cooperation may help firms to reap 
economies of scale in R&D and shorten development time while spreading the costs and 
risks of such new developments (Hagedoorn, 2002; Nooteboom, 1999b; Sampson, 2007). 
Thus, with cooperation each party contributes significantly to the innovation process, which 
implies that it does not include relationships involving the purchase of components or simply 
the funding of research (Emden et al., 2006). Potential partners for cooperation include 
supply chain partners such as customers or suppliers, competitors, knowledge institutions 
like universities, or firms from other industries (Omta, 2002; Ritter and Gemunden, 2003). 
The rationale for cooperation can differ amongst the different types of partners. Cooperation 
within the supply chain, for instance, is associated with firms that lack market and technological 
knowledge, whereas cooperation with competitors is associated with exploiting economies of 
scale and reducing individual costs of innovation (Arranz and Fdez. de Arroyabe, 2008; Miotti 
and Sachwald, 2003). Cooperation with universities or research institutes is associated with 
firms that want to be at the technological frontier, targeting radically new products (Miotti 
and Sachwald, 2003). In the current dynamic business environment, innovating firms may 
cooperate with different types of partners simultaneously. 
Given the recent emphasis on open innovation and its inter-organizational context, we expect 
that innovative firms have increasingly pursued open innovation strategies in the period 1994-
2004. Thus, we expect that more and more industrial firms have opened up their innovation 
process by increasing the emphasis on licensing-in knowledge, engaging in outsourcing, 
or jointly developing innovations with other organizations, such as supply chain partners, 
competitors, or research organizations. Concordantly, we expect that a decreasing share of 
innovating firms rely exclusively on in-house innovation.
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2.3 Data and methods
For this study we use data from the structured samples of 5 subsequent Community of 
Innovation Surveys (CIS) in the Netherlands, covering the period 1994-2004, which we 
further restricted to industrial sectors and firms with more than 10 employees1,2. The surveys 
were implemented by Statistics Netherlands, which is the official statistical bureau for the 
Netherlands and which is responsible for collecting, processing and publishing statistics to be 
used in practice, by policymakers and for scientific research (see www.cbs.nl). In the 1990s, 
the CIS was launched by the European Commission to track firms’ innovation activities and 
has been conducted in several EU countries ever since. It is formally based on the OECD’s 
Oslo Manual (e.g. OECD, 1996), which posits definitions for innovation and R&D-related 
concepts. The CIS draws on a long tradition of research on innovation3, and so far CIS data have 
been used in many academic papers. Initially, CIS questionnaires were rather country-specific, 
but since 1996 (starting with CIS-2) the core of the questionnaire has been harmonized over 
the different countries. Moreover, the core of the questionnaire and the survey approach have 
remained the same for the successive CIS. As a consequence, the CIS data has great potential 
for longitudinal analysis. However, access to CIS data is still organized typically through the 
respective national statistics organizations4. Dutch CIS data have the huge advantage over CIS 
data from other European countries that Statistics Netherlands conducts the CIS every two 
years, instead of the standard four years. The additional Dutch editions (referred to as CIS2.5 
and CIS3.5) are to a large extent similar to the 4-yearly European-wide editions, although 
Statistics Netherlands has experimented with new topics. As a consequence, not every item in 
the 4-yearly European-wide CIS is covered by the additional Dutch editions. For this study, 
however, all relevant items are available for the 5 editions, i.e. CIS2, CIS2.5, CIS3, CIS3.5 
and CIS4. 
Dutch CIS data contain innovation data of firms from industry, service, and other sectors such 
as agriculture, utilities, and building and construction. As the study concentrates on industrial 
firms, we excluded services and other sectors from the initial CIS samples. An important 
advantage of CIS data is that the firms include both publicly-listed as well as private firms, 
which makes this research a welcome contribution to the innovation management literature 
that mainly draws from publicly listed firms. 
1 The empirical part of this research was executed at the Centre for Economic Micro data (Cerem) at Statistics 
Netherlands (CBS). The views expressed in this book, however, are those of the author only.
2 The questions in the CIS relate to the preceding three years (e.g. the CIS-4 (2004) relates to innovation activities 
in the years 2002, 2003 and 2004). 
3 Moreover, the reliability, validity and interpretability of the survey were established by extensive piloting and 
pre-testing before implementation within different countries (Laursen and Salter, 2006).
4 Recently there have been attempts to integrate CIS data for the purpose of comparing different countries, but 
analyses of multiple EU countries is still burdensome. As a researcher, one has to contact and contract each national 
statistical office separately and a combined analysis is often impossible, because firm-level data are not allowed to 
leave the secured area of the national statistics offices. 
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For our study, we followed the structured sampling used for CIS by Statistics Netherlands 
(CBS). CIS were postal and voluntary. From firms with 10-49 employees a random sample 
was drawn, whereas all firms with 50 or more employees received a questionnaire. CIS-4 
(2002-2004) was implemented in a similar way, although now a random sample was also 
drawn from the category ‘50-249 employees’. CIS-2.5 and CIS-3 comprise also firms with 
10 employees or less, but for the sake of standardized comparison these firms were excluded 
from the analyses. From each of the surveys, we selected the innovating firms only, i.e. firms 
that indicated having developed at least one new or significantly improved product or process, 
and/or who indicated having a positive innovation budget. Table A1.1 in Appendix 1 provides 
the number of innovating firms in each sample. The samples in the later time periods are 
substantially smaller than samples in the first periods. This is mainly caused by the decrease of 
the shares of innovating firms over the period 1998-2002. Still, all sample sizes are substantial 
enough to allow for longitudinal analyses. 
2.3.1 Measures
In order to assess the adoption of open innovation in different types of firms, we classified firms 
according to technology and size classes. The firms in the CIS database are classified by sector 
according to the Eurostat NACE classification. For our research we classified the distinguished 
industries according to the technological level, following the four OECD categories high-tech, 
medium high-tech, medium low-tech, and low-tech (OECD, 2007). This classification of 
technology classes is provided in Appendix 1 (Table A1.1). 
In line with the size classification by Dutch Statistics, we identified three size classes: small 
(10-49 employees), medium (50-249 employees) and large firms (250 or more employees). 
This classification of size classes is provided in Appendix 1 (Table A1.2).
Furthermore, we concentrated on the following knowledge acquisition strategies, which can 
be regarded as indicators of open innovation: licensing-in, outsourcing, and cooperation with 
several types of partners. First, in the CIS surveys firms were asked to indicate whether they 
licensed-in knowledge or technologies for their innovation process. Second, in the CIS surveys 
firms were asked to indicate whether they outsourced particular parts of their innovation 
activities to other firms. Third, in the CIS surveys firms were asked to indicate whether they 
had cooperated with other organizations, that is, apart from outsourcing. Inter-organizational 
cooperation was defined in the questionnaire as active participation in joint R&D and other 
innovation projects with other organizations (either other enterprises or non-commercial 
institutions). The surveys explicitly mentioned that pure contracting-out of work, where there 
is no active collaboration, is not regarded as cooperation. Furthermore, CIS also provides 
information on the type of partners involved in the cooperation. That enabled us to distinguish 
between different types of partners, like customers, suppliers, competitors, and knowledge 
institutions. Fourth, to trace the adoption levels of open innovation in Dutch industrial firms 
we also calculated the average number of partner types for cooperating innovative firms in the 
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Dutch industry. Note that to do this calculation we selected the cooperating innovative firms 
from the total set of innovative firms (see Appendix 1, Table A1.3 for the number of companies 
in the sub samples). Finally, we calculated to what extent firms combine different knowledge 
acquisition strategies (licensing-in, outsourcing and cooperation) within one period of time 
(see Figure 2.2). 
2.3.2 Validity and reliability
In general, the response rates of industrial firms in the CIS turned out to be relatively high (e.g. 
71% in 1996, 65% in 1998, 54% in 2000, 59% in 2002 and 71% in 2004). This high response 
rate may be due to the good reputation of Statistics Netherlands in the Dutch industry. In 
addition, the response rates for different industries and size classes are considered largely 
consistent with the overall response patterns of the CIS (CBS, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006)5. 
The response may, however, be biased towards innovating firms, because innovating firms may 
be more inclined to respond to a questionnaire specifically dedicated to innovation. Such 
a response bias could be a problem when comparing innovating firms with non-innovating 
firms. However, we only performed the analyses on innovating firms. Moreover, there is no 
reason to believe that firms that pursue an open innovation-strategy are more inclined to 
respond to the survey, i.e. the so-called self-selection bias, as elements of open innovation (e.g. 
concerning cooperation) were only a minority of the many subjects covered by the CIS. In 
sum, it is unlikely that the samples suffer from response bias that would seriously hinder our 
longitudinal analysis.
Since we are interested in longitudinal trends in the adoption of open innovation, it is 
important that the sequential samples are comparable at the level of individual industries 
and technology classes, and at the level of size classes. It should be noted that the constructed 
dataset of innovating firms is not a panel dataset, because creating a panel dataset from the five 
successive CIS would dramatically reduce the number of firms for analyses, and would lead to 
a strong bias towards large firms. Instead we selected all innovating firms from each CIS and 
performed 2-proportions Z and Chi2 tests to check whether the individual samples differed 
significantly in terms of the representation of the individual industries, and in terms of the 
representation of the size classes. 
First, with respect to the representation of the individual industries in the different technology 
classes (i.e. low-, medium low-, medium high-, and high-tech) we compared the sample of each 
time-period with the final sample (CIS-4) and concluded that the samples with 14 industries 
and 5 time-periods differ significantly only on 7 out of 56 items (see Appendix 1, Table A1.1). 
More specifically, the sample of the low-tech industry in CIS-2 (1994-1996) and CIS-2.5 
(1996-1998) contain significantly larger shares of textiles firms than the sample of the low-
5 For a more detailed description of the methodology applied by Statistics Netherlands we refer to the CBS 
publication series ‘Kennis en Economie’ (in Dutch), in which the total results of the CIS are presented.
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tech industry in CIS-4 (2002-2004), whereas in the CIS-4 there are relatively more food 
firms in the low-tech sub-sample than in CIS-2 and CIS-2.5. One explanation may be that the 
textiles sector in the Netherlands has diminished substantially over the past 2 decades, as many 
firms have stopped trading, or moved abroad. Next, the share of pharmaceutical firms in the 
high-tech sub-sample in CIS-2 is significantly smaller than in CIS-4. Finally, the share of firms 
representing ‘automobile and other transportation means’ is smaller in the sample of CIS-
2, compared with the sample of CIS-4. Nevertheless, analysis of the more specific variables 
on open innovation for those industries revealed that these differences in representation of 
technology classes did not affect the conclusions. Altogether, the distribution of industries 
that makes up the technology classes is very similar over the years, so there is no reason to 
believe that this distribution will affect the analysis of the adoption of open innovation. 
The total samples in the CIS-2 up to CIS-3.5 are also comparable to the sample of CIS-4 to 
the extent that they consist of comparable proportions of low-, medium low-, medium high-, 
and high-tech firms. The CIS-3.5 sample, however, comprises a relatively lower proportion of 
low-tech firms compared with the sample of CIS-4, whereas the proportion of medium high-
tech industry in CIS-3.5 is slightly larger than in CIS-4. As we are interested in the adoption of 
open innovation among different technology classes, we also perform the analysis at the level 
of the technology classes, in addition to analyses at the overall industry level. Moreover, the 
small deviation of the sample composition of CIS-3.5 would not alter the conclusions with 
respect to open innovation adoption trends for the full period 1994-2004.
Second, the distribution of firms across size classes is presented in Appendix 2 (Table A1.2). 
With respect to size classes, Chi2 tests revealed that the distributions compare relatively well 
over the years. The samples of CIS-2, CIS-3 and CIS-4 in particular, are not significantly 
different in terms firm size-distribution. The sample of CIS-3.5 (2000-2002), however, 
contains significantly fewer small-sized firms (10-49 employees), and more medium-sized firms 
(50-249 employees) than the other four samples. Furthermore, the sample of CIS-2.5 (1996-
1998) contains significantly more small-sized and fewer large firms than the sample of CIS-3 
(1998-2000). As we may expect that in general large and medium-sized firms are more likely to 
form linkages with other firms than small-sized firms, it is important to analyze developments 
with respect to the adoption of open innovation for different size classes separately.
2.3.3 Methods and data analysis
In the present study we analyse trends in the shares of innovating industrial firms within different 
categories engaged in different governance modes for external knowledge acquisition. Taking 
the indicators for licensing-in, outsourcing, and cooperation (with various types of partners), 
we calculated the share of innovating firms engaged in the respective knowledge acquisition 
strategy. We present the share of innovating firms and distinguish between technology classes 
(low-, medium low-, medium high-, and high-tech) and firm size classes, ranging from small 
(10-49 employees), to medium-sized (50-249 employees), up to large firms (250 or more 
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employees). We performed ‘2-proportions z-tests’ to determine whether the proportion of 
the firms pursuing a particular knowledge acquisition strategy has significantly increased or 
decreased compared with the previous period. The 2-proportions z-test is a statistical test to 
determine whether there is a significant difference between proportions (also referred to as the 
share or percentage) of two different independent samples (Churchill, 1999). In addition, we 
performed the same test to determine whether the proportions of firms pursuing a particular 
knowledge acquisition strategy in 2002-2004 has significantly changed, compared with 1994-
1996. Regarding the case of the number of different types of cooperation partners, we ran an 
analysis using sub-samples of cooperating firms only. With an indicator for cooperating with 
different types of partners within one period, we performed a t-test to determine significant 
changes over time. In doing so, we were able to statistically justify our conclusions with respect 
to the longitudinal trends. In discussing the results of the longitudinal analysis, we focus mainly 
on significant changes over time in the adoption of open innovation.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Adoption of an open innovation strategy
In Section 2 we indicated that there is an increased emphasis on external sources of innovation 
in the innovation literature (Chesbrough et al., 2006), so we expect that the importance that 
firms attach to open innovation has increased in the period 1994-2004. Indeed, Table 2.1 
shows that for the total industry the share of innovating firms that pursued an open innovation 
strategy (i.e. either in the form of licensing-in, outsourcing, cooperation, or any combination) 
in order to obtain access to external knowledge and capabilities has increased significantly in 
the period 1994-2004. This trend is most pronounced for small- and medium-sized firms, 
whereas larger firms were already inclined to pursue an open innovation strategy in 1994-
1996. We derive from this that small and medium-sized firms are catching up with the larger 
firms in adopting an open innovation strategy. Next, as expected in high-tech industries there 
are relatively more firms with external relationships, compared with low- and medium-tech 
industries. Interestingly however, the difference between high-tech and low-tech in the levels 
of adoption of open innovation is decreasing. Table 1 indicates that whereas the difference 
in adoption of open innovation between high-tech and low-tech becomes more significant 
in 1994-2000, this difference becomes insignificant in 2002-2004. From this we deduce 
that in the period 1996-2004 low-tech industries are catching up with high-tech industries 
in adopting open innovation. Nonetheless, even in the period 2002-2004 almost one third 
of all innovating firms rely exclusively on their internal innovation capabilities and develop 
innovations without the help of other organizations (see Table 2.1).
When we switch focus from the general patterns in the adoption of open innovation to 
the patterns in the usage of specific knowledge acquisition strategies, we see that all three 
knowledge acquisition strategies associated with open innovation have been on the rise since 
2000 (see Figure 2.1). Moreover, Figure 2.1 illustrates that innovating firms are more inclined 
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to engage in outsourcing or cooperation than in licensing-in. Whereas outsourcing was for a 
long time the most common strategy for innovating firms, in 2004 cooperation became most 
prominent. In the following sub-sections we elaborate on these trends and consider whether 
they are visible in the different technology and size classes.
Table 2.1. Share of innovating firms using external knowledge acquisition strategies (e.g. licensing-in, 
outsourcing, cooperation).
Size class 
(employees)
1994-
1996
a 1996-
1998
a 1998-
2000
a 2000-
2002
a 2002-
2004
b
Total industry 10-49 39% 43% 37% * 46% ** 57% **
50-249 57% 57% 53% ** 64% ** 71% **
>250 83% 79% 80% 86% 90% *
 Total 54%  55%  52% ** 63% ** 69% **
High-tech 10-49 40% 50% 47% 66% 63% **
50-249 66% 62% 58% 70% 82% *
>250 94% 94% 94% 87% 90%
 Total 58%  61%  62%  73%  76% **
Medium high-tech 10-49 41% 46% 40% * 55% 52% *
50-249 57% 60% 57% ** 68% 74% **
>250 84% 81% 79% 89% 93%
 Total 56%  58%  55% ** 67%  70% **
Medium low-tech 10-49 43% 43% 42% 36% ** 56% *
50-249 61% 58% 51% * 61% * 71% *
>250 89% 86% 86% 88% 89%
 Total 57%  56%  51%  57% ** 68% **
Low-tech 10-49 32% 37% 28% 30% ** 58% **
50-249 51% 51% 47% ** 62% 65% **
>250 78% 70% 71% 84% 88%
 Total 49%  49%  45% ** 60% * 68% **
c *  **  **  **    
a Reports z-test whether the percentage changes significantly between the two periods.
b Reports z-test whether the percentage in 2002-2004 changes significantly from 1994-1996.
c Reports z-test whether the percentage of the high-tech sector differs significantly from low-tech.
* P-value <0.05, ** P-value <0.01.
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2.4.2 Licensing-in
The share of innovating firms licensing-in knowledge and technologies increased significantly 
in the period 1994-2004 (see Appendix 1, Table A1.4). More specifically, whereas the share 
of innovating firms that license-in knowledge or technologies fluctuated between 12% and 
17% during 1996-2002, in 2002-2004 this share jumped to 27%. Taking a closer look at the 
different technology classes, we conclude that the increase in in-licensing firms is significant 
for all classes, except for high-tech. Over the years, the high-tech industries show the largest 
share of licensing firms, although the other technology classes are clearly catching up. It is also 
interesting to note that in the period 1998-2000 there was a small but significant decrease 
in the share of firms engaged in licensing-in, although this decrease turned out to be only 
temporary. When we focus on size classes, we see that in general large firms are more likely to 
engage in licensing-in than smaller firms. However, we find a dramatic increase in the share of 
smaller and medium-sized innovating firms that license-in (all highly significant, except for 
the medium-sized high-tech and small-sized medium high-tech firms), whereas for large firms 
the increase was much smaller (not significant). Apparently, in 1996-2004 the propensity of 
small and medium-sized firms to engage in licensing-in grew to a level almost comparable to 
the propensity of large firms to license-in.
2.4.3 Outsourcing
We also investigated whether the long dominant practice of outsourcing may indeed be 
associated with specific industries, especially those in supplier-dominated industries (Pavitt, 
1984), such as the agricultural and textile industries, and major parts of the service sector. 
Firms in these industries often lack sufficient capabilities to innovate successfully. In such 
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Figure 2.1. Share of firms using different knowledge acquisition strategies.
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industries, technology suppliers are the main source of innovation, by providing the firms 
with custom-made and ‘ready-to-use’ technologies that improve the production processes, or 
improve the product quality. 
In Dutch industry the share of innovating industrial firms engaged in outsourcing increased 
significantly for all size classes in the period 1994-2004 (see Appendix 1, Table A1.5). Whereas 
between 1996 and 2000 the share of innovating firms which outsourced at least a part of 
their innovation activities was about 35-40%, in the last two periods (2000-2002 and 2002-
2004) this share increased significantly to 48%. Interestingly, from 1998 to 2000 there was 
even a significant decrease to 35%, but the subsequent periods showed a significant increase. 
However, despite the significant increase in outsourcing for the total industry, there are only a 
few significant increases in sub-classes. When considering the total period, only the medium 
and large firms in medium high-tech sectors, and the small- and medium-sized high-tech firms 
show a significant increase. In general, outsourcing is less prominent in low- and medium low-
tech industries, compared with medium high-, and high-tech industries. Finally, in each time 
period the absolute shares of firms engaged in outsourcing are much higher for large firms 
compared with medium and smaller firms. 
2.4.4 Cooperation
In several studies, Hagedoorn indicated that the absolute number of cooperative agreements 
increased significantly between the early 1980s and the late 1990s (e.g. 1990; 2002). Here we 
analyze developments with respect to inter-organizational cooperation in a more recent time 
period. We focus on inter-organizational cooperation in general and with different types of 
partners in particular.
Table 2.2 presents the share of innovating firms cooperating for innovation. These firms worked 
together with other organizations to jointly develop new products or processes. Taking the total 
industry, we see a highly significant increase in the share of cooperating firms from 31% in 2000 
up to 53% in 2004, and the increase is present in all size-classes. Obviously, we can conclude 
that cooperation for innovation is becoming more and more common practice for innovating 
firms. Moreover, the share of cooperating firms initially remained more or less constant for 
the period 1994-2000, so we can deduce that the period 2000-2002 represent a turning point; 
there is a sudden and dramatic increase in the share of innovating firms that cooperate with 
other organizations. This trend is visible in all technology classes, although overall the absolute 
shares of firms cooperating for innovation is larger in high-tech industries, compared with the 
other technology industries. Interestingly, in medium low-tech and in high-tech the share 
of large innovating firms engaged in cooperation has not increased significantly. This can 
be explained by the fact that the share of large innovating firms cooperating for innovation 
was already at a high level (71%) in 1994-1996. In the period 2002-2004, 39% of the small, 
53% of the medium-sized, and 80% of the large innovating firms cooperated for innovation. 
Similar proportions were found in the different technology and size classes. Altogether, this 
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is a strong indication that there is a clear relationship between firm size and the propensity to 
cooperate with other organizations for innovation. Our findings with cooperation roughly 
confirm earlier findings (e.g. Arranz and Fdez. de Arroyabe, 2008; Fritsch and Lukas, 2001; 
Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Negassi, 2004) that cooperation is positively associated with firm 
size and firms with relatively high levels of R&D (like in high-tech sectors). Interestingly, 
however, considering the low scores for small- and medium-sized firms in 1994-1996, we see 
that the longitudinal rise in the propensity to cooperate is most pronounced for small- and 
medium-sized firms. 
Table 2.2. Share of innovating firms cooperating with other organizations for innovation.
Size class 
(employees)
1994-
1996
a 1996-
1998
a 1998-
2000
a 2000-
2002
a 2002-
2004
b
Total industry 10-49 19% 18% 18% ** 26% ** 39% **
50-249 31% 30% 30% ** 42% ** 53% **
>250 62% 54% 59% * 70% * 80% **
 Total 32%  29%  31% ** 43% ** 53% **
High-tech 10-49 22% 25% 23% ** 50% 46% **
50-249 40% 40% 39% 56% 70% **
>250 71% 68% 75% 70% 83%
 Total 36%  37%  42% ** 58%  63% **
Medium high-tech 10-49 17% 23% 21% * 32% 37% **
50-249 30% 34% 30% ** 45% 52% **
>250 62% 55% 63% 69% * 87% **
 Total 31%  33%  33% ** 45% * 52% **
Medium low-tech 10-49 26% * 16% 15% 19% ** 39% *
50-249 38% 30% 29% * 41% * 54% **
>250 71% 60% 64% 73% 77%
 Total 37% ** 28%  28% ** 39% ** 51% **
Low-tech 10-49 13% 14% 15% 13% ** 37% **
50-249 27% 21% 29% 35% * 47% **
>250 57% 46% 47% ** 70% 76% **
 Total 27%  23%  28% ** 38% ** 50% **
a Reports z-test whether the percentage changes significantly between the two periods.
b Reports z-test whether the percentage in 2002-2004 changes significantly from 1994-1996.
* P-value <0.05, ** P-value <0.01.
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Cooperation with customers
Taking the total industry, we see that the share of innovating firms cooperating with customers 
increased from 18% in 1998-2000 to 33% in 2002-2004 (see Appendix 1, Table A1.6). Since 
the period 2000-2002 in particular more and more innovating firms work together with their 
customers on innovation. Firms do so to incorporate the user benefits when developing new 
products. In line with the general results, all technology sectors show parallel trends, with 
shares staying more or less steady in 1996-2000, but then increasing significantly in 2002 and 
even further in 2004. When we consider the different size classes, we see that only large firms 
in the medium-high-tech industries significantly increase cooperation with customers in 1994-
2004. The explanation may be that in the period 1994-1996 already, especially in the other 
industries a substantial share of large innovating firms was already cooperating with customers 
(36% for large firms in total industry). In contrast, only 6% of the innovating small-sized 
low-tech firms worked together with customers in 1994-1996, whereas in 2004 this share was 
significantly larger (18%) but still below the 1994-1996 share (36%) for large low-tech firms. 
To conclude this section on cooperation with customers, we found that in Dutch industry 
firms have clearly opened up their innovation processes by cooperating with customers, but 
differences can be found between small, medium and large-sized firms. 
Cooperation with suppliers
During 1994-2000 the share of innovating firms cooperating with suppliers remained steady at 
17%, but this share increased dramatically to 31% in 2002, and to 42% in 2004 (see Appendix 
1, Table A1.7). Obviously, these are not gradual increases, but represent a turning point in the 
period of 2000-2002. A closer look at the data reveals that there are similar trends in each of 
the technology and size classes. Only for large high-tech firms was the increase in cooperation 
with suppliers not significant. Moreover, by 2004 the proportion of large firms cooperating 
with suppliers was substantially larger in medium high-tech and low-tech industries than in 
high-tech industries. Similar to the trend concerning cooperation in general, the results show a 
clear relationship between firm size and the propensity to engage in cooperating for innovation 
with suppliers, with larger firms much more likely to engage in supplier cooperation than 
smaller firms. Finally, the results indicate that cooperating for innovation with suppliers has 
become more common than cooperating with customers. 
Cooperation with competitors
Table A1.8 in Appendix 1 reports the developments with respect to cooperating on innovation 
with competitors. In absolute terms, cooperation with competitors is not as popular as 
cooperation within the supply chain. However, the trend we see in the total industry with 
regard to cooperation with competitors is similar to the trends we identified for cooperation 
within the supply chain (i.e. with customers and suppliers). From 1994 to 2000 the share 
of innovating firms cooperating with competitors remained steady at 9%, whereas in 2002 
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this share increased to 15%. However, instead of increasing even further in 2004, the share 
of innovating firms cooperating with competitors levelled off. Therefore, the increase in 
cooperation with competitors is not as clear as the increase in cooperation within the supply 
chain. Finally, when focusing on individual size classes within different technology classes we 
must conclude that the increase in cooperation with competitors is significant in just a few 
cases, i.e. all classes within medium to high-tech industries and only small-sized high tech 
firms. 
Cooperation with knowledge institutions
In the total industry the share of innovating firms cooperating with knowledge institutions 
increased significantly in 1996-2004. Initially, the share of innovating firms cooperating 
with knowledge institutions remained constant at about 16% in 1994-2000, but increased 
significantly to 24% in 2000-2002 and to 31% in 2002-2004 (see Appendix 1, Table A1.9). 
Similar to the trend with respect to cooperation within the supply chain, but at lower 
levels, there is clearly a turning point in the period 2000-2002. Surprisingly, the increase in 
cooperation with knowledge institutions was significant for each of the four technology classes 
in the period 1994-2004. Nevertheless, this type of cooperation is more common in high-tech 
sectors than in low(er) tech industries. Interestingly, cooperation with knowledge institutions 
has become more popular in low-tech industries than in medium low-tech industries. Similar 
to cooperation with other types of partners, cooperation with knowledge institutions is more 
common for larger firms than small and medium-sized firms. Obviously, large innovating firms 
are more likely to have highly educated employees and technical experts who know how to 
link up, and who have the capacity to absorb the complex knowledge from universities and 
other research institutes. We deduce from this that large firms and firms in high-tech industries 
profit most from the basic and applied research conducted at knowledge institutions. This 
finding is in line with earlier findings of Laursen and Salter (2004) who concluded from their 
study of the CIS-3 data from the UK that large and more R&D-intensive firms are more 
inclined to use universities in their innovation activities than other types of firms.
Cooperation with different types of partners simultaneously
Having focussed in the previous four subsections on developments regarding individual types 
of cooperation partners, we now analyze the average number of cooperation partners per 
cooperating innovative firm. In modern business, innovative firms build linkages with a diversity 
of partners in order to acquire diverse knowledge to suit different parts of the innovation 
process (Chesbrough, 2003b). As such, firms working together with different types of partners 
are considered relatively ‘open’ with respect to innovation (Laursen and Salter, 2006). 
For our subset of cooperating firms the results show that the average number of partner types 
increased from 2.1 in 1994-1996 to 2.6 in 2002-2004 (see Table 2.3). At first glance, this does 
not look very spectacular. However, it implies that there must be a substantial number of firms 
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who incorporate at least 3 different types of innovation partners in their innovation processes. 
Despite the extra coordination costs of handling a large number of partners in the same time 
period, there seem to be many firms who know how to do this. Moreover, we considered 
only five different types of partners in total, which makes an increase from 2.1 to 2.6 rather 
substantial. For all the size classes there is a clear trend showing that cooperating firms include 
increasingly more types of partners in the innovation process. Overall large firms that cooperate 
for innovation do so with more different types of partners than smaller firms. Interestingly, 
the results show further that, when it comes to cooperation with different types of partners, 
there are relatively small differences between the technology classes. Only medium low-tech 
industries stay behind the industry averages. The longitudinal increase is most evident in the 
(medium) high-tech industries, but in the low-tech sectors cooperation with different types 
of partners is quite common as well. This finding suggests that when firms decide to cooperate 
with other organizations, they do this in innovation networks comprising different types of 
actors (see Chapter 4, where we analyze innovation networks).
2.4.5 Using multiple knowledge acquisition strategies simultaneously
Finally, we analysed to what extent firms combine different knowledge acquisition strategies 
(licensing-in, outsourcing and inter-organizational cooperation) within one period of time 
(see Figure 2.2). The results show that each combination of governance modes has increased in 
usage over the period 1994-20046, with the increase setting in from 2000. The most common 
combination of knowledge acquisition strategies is inter-organizational cooperation and 
R&D outsourcing (used by 35% of the innovating firms in the final period). Furthermore, 
we have calculated that there is a clear relationship between firm size and the extent to which 
innovating firms engage in different knowledge acquisition strategies within one period of 
time, similar to what we found for the individual knowledge acquisition strategies. Again, 
large firms have more resources and capabilities to engage in different knowledge acquisition 
strategies simultaneously and to absorb different sorts of knowledge from a wide variety of 
sources. Surprising as it may be, firms in high-tech industries are only a little more inclined 
than firms from the other technology classes to engage simultaneously in different knowledge 
acquisition strategies. However, the increase over time is apparent in all technology classes. 
This is another indication that even firms from low-tech industries are becoming more open. 
6 As with the individual knowledge acquisition strategies we analyzed the significant differences. The increases over 
the total period are significant for each of the technology and size classes. For some sub-classes (e.g. large companies 
in high-tech) the increase was not significant.
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2.5 Discussion and conclusions
2.5.1 Conclusions
In this chapter we tried to answer the question as to what extent firms pursue an open innovation 
strategy. In doing so, we have investigated the adoption of open innovation in large firms 
and SMEs, in high-, medium-, and low-tech industries in the Netherlands. Various scholars 
in innovation management suggest that the innovation process of more and more firms is 
becoming increasingly open (e.g. Chesbrough et al., 2006; Gassmann, 2006). These scholars 
emphasize the importance for innovating firms of building linkages to external organizations, 
so that they can profit from the knowledge and innovation capabilities residing there. 
Different knowledge acquisition strategies may facilitate the process of combining internal 
and external knowledge and capabilities. Our study, using longitudinal data of innovating 
firms in the Netherlands covering the period 1994-2004, provides support for the reasoning 
that an increasing share of innovating industrial firms pursue an open innovation strategy. In 
answering our two research sub-questions (see Section 2.1) we summarize the most important 
findings of this study. 
First of all, the results of the study indicate that an increasing share of innovating firms in 
Dutch industry acquire external knowledge and capabilities through strategies associated 
with open innovation. As such, licensing-in, R&D outsourcing and inter-organizational 
cooperation have all become more common to innovating firms in the period 1994-2004. 
Whereas in the period 1994-1996 outsourcing was most popular to innovating firms, later 
inter-organizational cooperation became the primary governance mode for acquiring external 
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Figure 2.2. Share of firms combining different knowledge acquisition strategies.
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knowledge and capabilities. Although the share of firms engaged in licensing-in increased 
as well, licensing-in remains less popular amongst innovating firms compared to R&D 
outsourcing and inter-organizational cooperation. More specifically, our results showed 
that suppliers have become the most popular partner for cooperation in the period 1994-
2004, followed by customers and research organizations. Supply chain collaboration does 
seem to increase, considering the rise in cooperation for innovations. In contrast, the least 
popular cooperation partners, with less pregnant growth trends are competitors. Seemingly, 
competition negatively influences cooperation for innovation. We also identified a trend that 
Dutch innovating firms increasingly cooperate with different types of partners, within one 
time period. And yet, even in 2004, almost one third of the innovating firms rely exclusively 
on internal innovation capabilities. Such firms may miss out on ideas and opportunities that 
emerge outside the firm and are likely to lose competitive power. However, as Gassman (2006) 
proposes, open innovation is not an imperative for every firm and every innovator. Or, as Laursen 
and Salter (2006) conclude, there may be an optimum in the level of openness, as a focus on 
the external environment comes with certain costs. It would be interesting to know if, and, 
if so, to what extent firms that pursue an open innovation strategy perform better than firms 
with a closed innovation strategy. This issue could be an area for further research and will be 
tackled in Chapter 3.
Secondly, we analyzed whether the adoption of open innovation differs amongst different 
technology classes. As expected, firms in high-tech industries are more inclined to pursue 
open innovation strategies than firms in lower-tech industries, but this statement is challenged. 
Interestingly, the results indicate that firms in low- and medium-tech industries increasingly 
pursue an open innovation strategy. To date, empirical evidence for the relevancy of open 
innovation has mainly been derived from high-tech industries (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003b; 
Christensen et al., 2005; Dittrich and Duysters, 2007). Only anecdotal evidence exists from 
low- and medium-tech industries (e.g. Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006). Our study clearly 
suggests that open innovation is also becoming a crucial aspect of managing innovation in low-
tech industries. In a way, and surprisingly, low-tech firms are closing the gap with high-tech 
firms in adopting an open innovation strategy. Therefore, it suits the evidence to direct more 
research at the management of open innovation in lower-tech industries. In-depth case studies 
and observational research allows for a fuller description of how firms in low-tech industries 
manage open innovation, for instance how they cope with open innovation when intellectual 
property is difficult to protect through regular mechanisms such as patents.
Thirdly, in this study we investigated to what extent open innovation has been adopted by 
small-, medium- and large-sized firms. In line with our expectations, the results indicate that 
large firms are more open with respect to innovation than small- and medium-sized firms. 
Interestingly, however, the increase in adoption of open innovation is most apparent for small- 
and medium-sized firms. Whereas in 1994-1996 only a very small share of the small innovating 
firms used external knowledge acquisition strategies, this share has doubled for licensing-in 
and cooperation. Thus, we must conclude that small- and medium sized firms are catching up 
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large firms in adopting elements of open innovation. We argue, therefore, that open innovation 
researchers should not overlook small- and medium-sized firms, as small- and medium-sized 
firms probably face particular challenges if they want to adopt an open innovation strategy 
and if they engage in different knowledge acquisition strategies. 
Finally, our results indicate that there are clear ‘pre- and post-adoption modes’ (West et al., 
2006: 292) instead of gradual increases in open innovation adoption. More specifically, for 
inter-organizational cooperation, we identified the year 2000 as a turning point, as from that 
year on the share of firms engaged in cooperation increased dramatically. For technology 
licensing-in this turning point was in 2002. Only for R&D outsourcing did we identify a 
trend towards a more gradual increase in adoption. One would have to speculate for possible 
explanations for this turing point. One explanation could be that especiallty since around 2000 
innovation policy instruments started promoting innovation in cooperation and networks. In 
that case, innovation policy in the Netherlands seems to be effective. Another explanation 
could be the economic downturn in the EU right after the turn of the century. Economic 
recessions are characterized by lower levels of investments, also in innovation, which would 
urge firms to take new routes and team up with other organizations in order to share costs.
2.5.2 Limitations and suggestions for further research
We are aware of the limitations of our study. First, large-scale firm level surveys miss certain 
subtleties, as questions may for instance not always fit within the context of all sectors 
involved. As a consequence, we used rather basic indicators of open innovation with limited 
sophistication. For instance, a limitation of the CIS data is that it was not possible to assess 
the importance of cooperation (e.g. with a particular type of partner) for the focal firm’s 
innovation process, or to assess the importance of cooperation for specific innovative output 
(e.g. a successful new product). Moreover, CIS did not allow us to provide insights into the 
firm’s motives for engaging in specific organizational forms for innovation. In order to acquire 
a more detailed understanding of the motives and relative importance of open innovation for 
firms, complementary research is needed that takes a more in-depth look at firms’ innovation 
processes. Such research could take individual innovation projects as the unit of analysis. 
An obvious limitation is that secondary data is not fully under the control of the researcher. 
Despite the huge potential that came with 5 subsequent community innovation surveys, some 
variables were left out in later surveys (most notably the one on the acquisition of firms), 
something we would have liked to see happen differently. As a consequence, we were forced 
to abandon investigations on the developments with respect to M&A activity of innovating 
firms, as a means to acquiring knowledge. Finally, restricted by the possibilities of CIS, our 
study only focused on how external sources of innovation enter the firm. Future research may 
also focus on how internal sources of innovation leave the firm, as this is also an important 
aspect of the open innovation model (Chesbrough, 2003b). Perhaps future CIS can cover 
this topic. 
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2.5.3 Concluding remarks
Our findings provide sector-wide evidence of the relevance of open innovation. Open 
innovation, as coined by Chesbrough (2003), truly is a phenomenon that has infiltrated 
the mindset of innovation managers, not only of high-tech and large firms, but increasingly 
also of low- and medium-tech firms and SMEs. In fact, our results indicate that nowadays 
for most firms innovation management has an inter-organizational dimension. It therefore 
becomes crucial for firms to have the adequate capabilities to manage innovation in an inter-
organizational context, as there are typical management challenges associated with, for 
instance, inter-organizational cooperation. The firms for whom open innovation is something 
new, most notably the small- and medium-sized firms, may in particular lack such capabilities. 
These firms could set up learning trajectories for teams to work in an inter-organizational 
context. Moreover, they should try and reap the rewards of the learning trajectories of other 
organizations (this is one of the issues dealt with in Chapter 4).
Since the Lisbon Agenda was laid down in 2000, European policy makers have really begun 
to emphasize that innovation is crucial for a modern economy and that different actors must 
interact and cooperate to foster innovation and entrepreneurship. This has resulted in several 
policy measures, including those to stimulate cooperation. The results of this study indicate 
that since the turn of the century innovating firms have become more open with respect to 
innovation and that many firms have started to cooperate for innovation. Apparently, at least 
part of the ambition stated in Lisbon has been fulfilled, although further policy instruments 
may be directed more specifically at small- and medium-sized firms.
To conclude, this study answers calls for up-to-date assessments of open innovation 
(Chesbrough, 2006; West et al., 2006) by presenting the case of Dutch industrial sectors. Such 
an assessment was especially needed outside the US, because to date most empirical evidence of 
open innovation has been from the US (Chesbrough, 2006). The 5 longitudinal Community 
Innovation Surveys in the Netherlands, covering the period of 1994-2004, offered a good 
opportunity to do so. Clearly, it would be interesting to know whether similar trends to those 
found in this study arise in other countries. Finally, future CIS editions will show whether 
the trends identified in this chapter will continue, or not, or whether the adoption of open 
innovation has reached its peak. 
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3.  The impact of different knowledge acquisition 
strategies on innovation performance. An 
empirical assessment of the Netherlands
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 aims to answer the second research question:
RQ2: What is the impact of different external knowledge acquisition strategies on the short-term and long-
term innovation performance of innovative firms? 
In the introduction we explained that innovation has become extremely important in 
determining the competitive advantage of firms in a growing number of industries (Christensen 
et al., 1998; Hult et al., 2004). Firms constantly look to improve existing products and processes, 
but they also develop radically new products, that in turn may make existing products obsolete 
(Christensen, 1997). Innovation scholars have come up with different taxonomies of novelty of 
innovation that span from incremental innovations, which involve the adaptation, refinement 
and enhancement of existing products, to radical innovations, which involve technological 
breakthroughs leading to entirely new products, processes and services (Freeman and Soete, 
1997; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Although it may be 
extremely difficult to develop a radically new product, the rewards can be enormous, with a 
potential increased competitive advantage and an upturn in sales (Christensen et al., 1998; 
Utterback, 1974; Utterback et al., 1988). 
In fact, modern innovating firms are often engaged in a diversity of innovation projects, ranging 
from incremental to radical innovation. These firms try to innovate rapidly to leave behind 
competitors, but they also engage in long-term projects to support strategic goals. To this respect, 
firms engage in exploration, which refers to innovation activities oriented at inventing new 
technologies, and/or in exploitation, which refers to innovation activities oriented at making 
refinements in existing technologies (March, 1991). To cover this broad range of innovation 
activities, firms may need different sorts of knowledge and capabilities. Therefore, innovating 
firms may engage in diverse external knowledge acquisition strategies simultaneously, each 
with different (dis)advantages and management challenges (Faems et al., 2005; Van de Vrande 
et al., 2006). As a consequence, the way the different knowledge acquisition strategies impact 
the performance of innovations can be different. It may be surprising to learn that to date 
there is little empirical research examining the performance and competitive implications of 
firms’ knowledge acquisition strategies, or, as they are often called, firms’ governance decisions 
(Leiblein et al., 2002; Van de Vrande, 2007; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). Therefore, in 
our study we concentrate on the impact of knowledge acquisition strategies related to open 
innovation (licensing-in, outsourcing, and cooperation), as well as major firm acquisitions, on 
the innovation performance of innovating firms. Moreover, we are interested in the innovation 
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performance of firms that choose not to profit from external knowledge and that carry out all 
their innovation activities exclusively within their own organization.
Our study builds on the work of Laursen and Salter (2006) who empirically assessed the 
impact of using multiple sources of knowledge in the innovation process on innovation 
performance. They concluded that searching information from external actors widely and 
deeply is curvilinearly (taking an inverted u-shape) related to innovation performance, which 
provides empirical evidence of the relevance of open innovation. The added value of our study 
over the one by Laursen and Salter (2006) is that we analyze how companies profit from 
external knowledge in terms of knowledge acquisition strategy. Moreover, in contrast to the 
study of Laursen and Salter (2006) our study considers both short- and long-term innovation 
performance effects. 
The present study is based on a statistical analysis of two successive Dutch community 
innovation surveys (CIS), which explore the innovation process inside firms. We selected 
a large cross-section from Dutch industry (686 innovating firms) to analyze the impact of 
different knowledge acquisition strategies on a firm’s innovation performance. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in the next section (Section 3.2) we 
provide a theoretical background and develop propositions on the relationship between 
different knowledge acquisition strategies and a firm’s innovation performance. We make 
a distinction between licensing-in, outsourcing, and cooperation (all considered as open 
innovation strategies), mergers and acquisitions, and in-house innovation. Section 3.3 explains 
how we selected our sample from the Dutch CIS data. Furthermore, Section 3.3. describes 
the dependent, independent, as well as the control variables used in this study, and it details 
the methods for testing the propositions. Section 3.4 reports the results, and details to what 
extent our propositions have been confirmed. The final section (Section 3.5) contains the 
discussion and conclusions.
3.2 Theoretical background
We briefly indicated in the introductory chapter (Section 1.1) that in the (innovation) 
management literature the strategies for external knowledge acquisition are often referred to as 
‘governance modes’ (e.g. Fey, 2005; Van de Vrande et al., 2006). Governance modes for external 
knowledge acquisition can be placed on a continuum between market-based transactions and 
hierarchical modes of full integration (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Hagedoorn and Sadowski, 
1999; Powell, 1990; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Williamson, 1985), with hybrid governance 
modes like inter-organizational cooperation in between (see Figure 3.1). In the case of market-
based governance modes there is little organizational integration and little organizational 
control, whereas in the case of a hierarchy the focal firm possesses full control of the acquired 
knowledge and capabilities. In addition, with market-based governance modes the level of 
flexibility is high, which implies that it is a temporary transaction which is relatively easy and 
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inexpensive to stop. With a hierarchical governance mode, such as an acquisition, the acquired 
firm is often integrated into the acquirer’s organization which implies low flexibility, since it 
is difficult and expensive to stop or undo the acquisition once the acquired firm is integrated. 
As a consequence, in situations where the outcomes of the effort are highly uncertain, e.g. in 
the early stages of research an development (R&D), flexible governance modes may be the 
best alternative (Van de Vrande et al., 2006). Moreover, when the focal firm’s resources and 
capabilities concerning a specific technology are weak, licensing-in or outsourcing may be the 
preferred option (Tidd & Trewhella, 1997). 
In the inter-organizational context it is important to divide knowledge into information 
and know-how (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Information is easily codifiable and transmittable 
knowledge, without loss of integrity, and is associated with facts, proposition and symbols 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992). Know-how, on the other hand, is tacit, sticky and residing in 
individuals (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kogut and Zander, 1992). Technological know-how is 
often tacit which implies it is difficult to transfer from one firm to another (Larsson et al., 
1998) and requires the direct participation of specialists (Grant, 1996). When it is necessary 
to transfer or combine highly tacit or socially complex knowledge, governance modes of 
substantial organizational integration, such as the acquisition of a firm, may therefore be the 
best alternative (Bresman et al., 1999).
In the present study we focus on four fundamentally different knowledge acquisition strategies, 
covering the total spectrum of governance modes for external knowledge acquisition (see 
Figure 3.1) and analyze the performance differences of choosing between the different 
strategies. The first is licensing-in, which is a typical example of a market-based governance 
mode. The second and third are outsourcing and inter-organizational cooperation, which can 
both be regarded as a hybrid governance mode. In Section 2.2.2 we explained that licensing-in, 
outsourcing and cooperation are typical open innovation strategies, as there is an emphasis on 
a flexible innovation process, which allows for the transfer of knowledge across organizational 
boundaries. The fourth is the acquisition of a firm, which can be regarded as a hierarchical 
governance mode. It should be noted that many sub-modes exist (Granstrand et al., 1992), 
related to the modes we concentrate on, and that scholars use different labels for the same 
mode. In addition to the knowledge acquisition strategies, we include in-house innovation 
as another mode of innovation, because a firm can also decide not to engage in external 
knowledge acquisition and to innovate completely by itself.
Licensing-in Cooperation M&As
Degree of organizational integrationLow (Market) High (Hierarchy)
Outsourcing 
Figure 3.1. Governance modes for external knowledge acquisition and the degree of organizational 
integration.
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3.2.1 Open innovation
Whereas in Chapter 2 we identified that innovating industrial firms are increasingly applying 
an open innovation strategy, especially in the form of cooperation and outsourcing, we are 
here concerned with the question as to whether open innovation actually contributes to the 
innovation performance of innovating firms. Given the emphasis of innovation management 
scholars on the importance of open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003b; Christensen et al., 2005; 
Dittrich and Duysters, 2007; Gassmann, 2006; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2007; West and Gallagher, 
2006), we formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 1 
P1: Open innovation; licensing-in (P1a), outsourcing (P1b), cooperation (P1c), is positively related to the 
innovation performance of innovative firms.
In the sections below, we detail the logic of this proposition by elaborating on the three 
knowledge acquisition strategies associated with open innovation: licensing-in, outsourcing, 
and cooperation.
Licensing-in
Licensing-in knowledge or technologies, also referred to as inward licensing (but hereafter 
called licensing-in), is placed on the left side of the continuum as it involves relatively little 
organizational integration. Licensing-in can be defined as the purchasing of (product or 
process) technology, designs or marketing expertise (adapted from Lowe and Taylor, 1998). 
As such, licensing-in is a means for innovating firms to exploit the innovation capabilities or 
intellectual property of another firm, which are readily available in the market. Foremost, 
licensing-in enables firms to rapidly establish positions in new technological areas (Hagedoorn, 
1990; Tidd and Trewhella, 1997). Usually, the licensee pays a fee and/or a royalty based on 
sales or a reciprocal flow of knowledge rights over a specific period of time (Lowe and Taylor, 
1998). The main advantage of technology licensing is that a firm does not need to make upfront 
capital investments for building or buying the assets in question (Teece, 1986). Moreover, the 
innovating firm can profit from subsequent improvements to the technology. 
An important disadvantage of licensing-in can be that the technology is often not exclusively 
licensed to the buying firm (Grandstrand et al., 1992), unless the buying firm obtains the 
exclusive rights. As a consequence, in many cases competitors may profit from the knowledge 
that is available on the market, so that licensing-in is not likely to lead to a sustainable 
competitive advantage. Another disadvantage is that the knowledge or technology involved in 
the agreement is not specifically developed for the licensee, which implies that it may still have 
to be adjusted to its specific requirements. Finally, licensing-in typically involves technologies 
of limited sophistication (Hagedoorn, 1990), or knowledge that is easily codifiable and seems 
less appropriate for tacit and socially complex knowledge. 
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Nevertheless, in the 1990s licensing-in had already been identified as an important way for 
firms to profit from external knowledge (Tidd and Trewhella, 1997). Moreover, in a study of 
128 manufacturing firms in the UK, it was found that licensing-in could be associated with 
sectors in which the pace of technological change is high, i.e. with highly competitive and 
uncertain markets (Lowe and Taylor, 1998). However, studies on the direct impact of licensing-
in on innovation performance at the firm level are still scarce. Only a recent longitudinal 
study of 341 Taiwanese electronics-manufacturing firms provided evidence for the positive 
effect of licensing-in on innovation performance, as long as the firm has sufficient internal 
R&D to absorb the knowledge at stake (Tsai and Wang, 2007). In line with the emphasis of 
open innovation scholars on the importance of licensing-in knowledge and technologies to 
complement internal R&D (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003a; Chesbrough, 2003b), we expect that 
licensing-in positively impacts innovation performance. 
Outsourcing
The second governance mode for external knowledge acquisition on the continuum is 
outsourcing (see Figure 3.1). In the case of outsourcing, a particular part of the innovation 
process is carried out by another organization, the sub-contractor - e.g. a research organization, 
or another firm. The sub-contractor delivers particular knowledge or a technology specifically 
developed for, and to be controlled by the focal firm (Granstrand et al., 1992; Hagedoorn, 
1990). In contrast with licensing-in, outsourcing can involve clear-cut pieces of research and 
development and may as a result be better absorbed by the outsourcing firm. For instance, an 
innovating firm may pay a university to carry out fundamental research and develop a new 
technology, which the firm can utilize in future products and processes.
Outsourcing is primarily a strategy for firms who prefer to deploy their scarce resources to their 
core competences. Other organizations may just be better equipped for carrying out specific 
types of R&D (e.g. knowledge institutions). From a resource-based perspective, we could argue 
that a firm will outsource those activities in which it is not particularly specialized or that are ‘non 
core’, because the firm is less capable of performing those activities (Barney, 1999; Mol, 2005). 
However, outsourcing can be expensive, e.g. ex ante in terms of search and negotiation costs 
and ex post to execute and enforce the contract (Granstrand et al., 1992; Mol, 2005; Veugelers 
and Cassiman, 1999). Finally, outsourcing may lead to the ‘hollowing’ of firms (Leiblein et al., 
2002), especially when they comprise business critical functions such as innovation. 
The relationship between outsourcing and a firm’s innovation performance has so far not 
received a lot of attention in the innovation management literature. Some empirical studies 
have shown that outsourcing is associated with firms that have sufficient internal R&D (Mol, 
2005; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999) and that R&D outsourcing is positively associated with a 
firm’s R&D spending (Veugelers, 1997). Surprisingly, however, the amount of empirical testing 
of the direct impact of R&D outsourcing on a firm’s innovation performance is scarce. A rare 
example is a study by Fey (2005), who found in a sample of 107 large R&D intensive firms 
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that R&D outsourcing was negatively associated with R&D performance. However, it is well 
established in the innovation management literature that R&D outsourcing is an important 
strategy in supplier-dominated industries (Pavitt, 1984). In line with the principles of the open 
innovation model, we can argue that even the most innovative firms will need to outsource 
some parts of the innovation process to organizations that are better equipped for it. Therefore, 
we expect a positive relationship between R&D outsourcing and innovation performance.
Cooperation
Moving further along the continuum towards more integrated governance modes, we arrive at 
cooperative modes (in this chapter referred to as cooperation), such as research partnerships 
or joint development agreements (Granstrand et al., 1992; Hagedoorn, 1990). Several sub-
modes of cooperation exist with different levels of organizational integration, but most modes 
can be characterized either as contractual agreements or equity-based ventures (Hagedoorn 
et al., 2000; Sampson, 2007). Moreover, the majority of cooperative activities in the context 
of innovation are based on contractual agreements, whereas to a lesser extent cooperative 
modes exist that include equity investments such as Joint Ventures (Hagedoorn et al., 2000). 
Cooperation implies that different partners work together and pool their resources and 
capabilities for the purpose of collaborative R&D, crossing organizational boundaries, while 
remaining autonomous organizations (Sampson, 2007). In this way, firms can obtain access 
to and exploit resources and capabilities necessary for the creation of value that are not readily 
available in the market, or that require time to build up (Ahuja, 2000; Becker and Dietz, 
2004; Das and Teng, 2000; Kogut, 1988; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). Moreover, inter-
organizational cooperation may help firms to reap economies of scale in R&D and shorten 
development time while spreading the costs of such new developments (Hagedoorn, 2002; 
Nooteboom, 1999b; Sampson, 2007). 
Contrary to licensing-in or outsourcing, cooperation entails considerable levels of 
organizational integration and enables mobility and/or contact between R&D and (other) 
technical employees (Sampson, 2007). Such interactions are an important prerequisite for 
transferring and combining tacit and socially complex knowledge (Grant, 1996; Larsson et 
al., 1998). 
Although there are several potential benefits associated with inter-organizational cooperation, 
there are also some intrinsic problems (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Hamel, 1991; Larsson et al., 
1998; Nooteboom, 1999b; Sampson, 2007). For instance, inter-organizational cooperation 
involves some degree of competitiveness among partners which may lead to ‘learning races’ 
(Hamel, 1991; Larsson et al., 1998). There are similar concerns about the risk of unwanted 
knowledge spill-over to the partner (Omta and Van Rossum, 1999; Sampson, 2007). Other 
typical problems with cooperation are appropriation concerns (Gulati and Singh, 1998) 
and cultural differences between the partners (Nooteboom, 1999b; Omta and Van Rossum, 
1999). 
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Nevertheless, several empirical studies, that take into account various number of characteristics 
(e.g. sector, the type of firms or type of cooperation), identified in general a positive relationship 
between inter-organizational cooperation and innovation performance (Faems et al., 2005; 
Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Negassi, 2004; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Sampson, 2007; Van 
de Vrande, 2007). This positive relationship was also confirmed in a literature review on the 
relationship between alliances and innovation performance (De Man and Duysters, 2005). 
3.2.2 Mergers and acquisitions
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are placed on the far right side of the continuum of 
governance modes for external knowledge acquisition (Figure 3.1), since they involve the highest 
levels of organizational integration. Firms increasingly acquire or merge7 with other firms in 
order to get access to and full hierarchical control over innovative products, technologies and 
capabilities (Chakrabarti et al., 1994; Coff, 1999; Graebner, 2004; Granstrand et al., 1992; 
Hitt et al., 1996). 
In contrast to the other knowledge acquisition strategies discussed in this chapter, M&As 
typically involve the processes and resources of a complete firm, including perhaps ‘unwanted 
resources’ (Barney, 1999; Gerpott, 1995), which implies that more than just the innovative 
products, technologies and capabilities are part of the deal. Moreover, it should be noted 
that innovation is often not the main motive for a merger or acquisition, especially for major 
M&As. But even then, M&A can have a substantial (positive or negative) impact on the 
innovation processes of the firms that are combined (Cassiman et al., 2005). For instance, 
M&As are associated with many types of integration problems affecting the innovation 
process negatively, such as cultural differences (e.g. Brock, 2005; Epstein, 2004), the loss of key 
inventors (e.g. Ernst and Vitt, 2000) and loss in productivity of R&D employees (e.g. Paruchuri 
et al., 2006). As a consequence, the costs of acquiring and integrating a firm often exceed the 
benefits, which implies that many M&As should be considered as a failure (Cartwright and 
Schoenberg, 2006; Schenk, 2006). In addition, it may take substantial time, often years, before 
integration has completed and (innovation) synergies are realized (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991; Puranam et al., 2006).
It is perhaps therefore not surprising that several empirical studies showed that, on average, 
firms engaging in mergers or acquisitions experience a neutral effect on or even a decline in 
innovativeness (De Man and Duysters, 2005). However, a recent study of pharmaceutical firms 
(Van de Vrande, 2007) found that acquisitions have a positive effect on innovation performance 
measured as patent counts, but a negative effect when patents referred to radical innovations or 
so-called pioneering technologies. Moreover, in high-tech sectors and in the case of moderate 
7 Scholars often do not distinguish between mergers and acquisitions, as in reality most mergers are in fact 
acquisitions with one firm controlling the other. Driven by the possibilities with the CIS data, the focus in this 
study is on large / major firm acquisitions: firm acquisitions that resulted in at least 10% growth in turnover (See 
also the operationalization, Section 3.3.3).
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relatedness (with respect to the relevant technologies and knowledge) between the two firms, 
acquisitions do have a positive effect on innovation performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Cloodt et al., 2006). Apparently, there is greatest potential for learning and innovation when 
the knowledge bases of the firms to be integrated are diverse enough to encourage creativity 
and novel solutions, but also have sufficient overlap to be able to understand and assimilate 
each other’s specific knowledge. Nevertheless, as said, most studies on the impact of M&A 
on innovation performance found a neutral or negative impact (De Man and Duysters, 
2005). Especially when analyzing a cross section of the industry, and when including both 
technological and non-technological motivated M&As, it is even likely that M&As have a 
negative impact on innovation performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). 
We formulate Proposition 2 accordingly. 
Proposition 2
P2: M&As are negatively related to the innovation performance of innovative firms.
3.2.3 In-house innovation
Carrying out R&D and other innovation activities internally is regarded as crucial for 
innovating firms, so that they have sufficient ‘absorptive capacity’, which is the ability to 
recognize and adapt externally acquired knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Therefore, 
in itself, in-house innovation activities are important for firms that want to innovate in an 
open setting. In Section 2.4.1 we showed that many firms do not engage in licensing-in, 
outsourcing and/or cooperation, which suggests that these firms carry out all innovation 
related activities exclusively in-house (here labeled in-house innovation). In-house innovation 
can be contrasted with open innovation, as firm’s that innovate in-house focus on control and 
assume that all required knowledge and capabilities are available within the organization. We 
argue, however, that firms that rely exclusively on their internal R&D and internally possessed 
knowledge perform less on innovation compared with firms that acquire external knowledge 
and capabilities, because those firms innovating in-house will miss opportunities and because 
they will be not able to catch up with the fast technological developments (Chesbrough, 
2003b). Moreover, firms exclusively relying on in-house innovation may suffer from the Not 
Invented Here (NIH) syndrome (Katz and Allen, 1982), as employees from the firms may 
become suspicious about external ideas and prefer own ideas. Therefore, and in line with the 
earlier propositions, we expect that innovating in-house (which implies that the firm is not 
engaged in any of the external knowledge acquisition strategies discussed in this chapter) 
is negatively related to the innovation performance of innovating firms. Consequently, we 
formulate Proposition 3 as follows:
Proposition 3
P3: In-house innovation is negatively related to the innovation performance of innovative firms.
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3.3 Data and methods
3.3.1 Data
For the present study we use data from two subsequent Community of Innovation Surveys 
(CIS) in the Netherlands8,9. The first of the two surveys (generally abbreviated as CIS-3) was 
implemented in 2001 and refers to innovation activities in the three-year period 1998-2000. 
Similarly, the second survey (CIS-4) was implemented in 2005 and refers to 2002-2004. 
The questionnaires were postal and voluntary and firms were promised confidentiality. For 
the CIS-3, a random sample was taken from firms with 10-49 employees, whereas all firms 
with 50 or more employees received a questionnaire. CIS-4 was implemented in a similar 
way, although a random sample was also taken from the category ‘50-249 employees’. As a 
consequence, large firms are more likely to be included in two successive surveys. Unlike CIS-
4, CIS-3 contained firms with 10 employees or less, but these firms were excluded from the 
sample. The CIS-3 was sent to 4,890 and CIS-4 to 4,146 industrial firms, with response rates 
of 54% and 71% respectively. The response rates for different sectors and size classes are largely 
consistent with the overall response pattern (CBS, 2002, 2006). 
From the CIS-3 sample with industrial firms we selected all innovating firms: industrial firms 
that claimed they had innovated and/or who specified a positive innovation budget in the 
previous 3 years. We selected only innovating firms, because the focus in our study is exclusively 
on the questions on innovation activities (like the ones on external knowledge acquisition), 
which were not answered by firms without innovation activities and innovation output. 
Including these so called non-innovators in the sample would increase the probability of finding 
significant relationships in regression analysis, whereas for a sample of innovating firms the 
same relationships may be not evident, or in a worst case even have a different direction. By 
only selecting innovating firms, we were able to perform our analyses with a more representative 
sample than some previous studies using CIS (for instance, Laursen and Salter (2006) who 
analysed the total sample of firms in the UK-CIS), including non-innovating firms. We arrived 
at an initial sample of 1,654 innovating firms from Dutch industry in CIS-3. 
To enable assessment of the impact of different knowledge acquisition strategies on innovation 
performance over a longer period, we restricted our sample further by selecting only the 
innovating firms in CIS-3 that were also present in the CIS-4 sample. As said in Section 3.2, 
it may take some time before acquired knowledge is integrated in the focal firm’s innovation 
process and results in innovative output, especially for the knowledge acquisition strategies 
8 The empirical part of this research was executed at the Centre for Economic Micro data (Cerem) at Statistics 
Netherlands (CBS). The views expressed in this book, however, are those of the author only.
9 General information on CIS data has been provided in Section 2.3. Here we will only discuss the characteristics 
of the data and other information that are relevant for the study presented in Chapter 3.
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involving more organizational integration, especially the acquisition of a firm. After eliminating 
the cases with missing values, we came to a final sample of 686 firms for which we could track 
the innovation performance over a longer period of time. We checked to what extent the 
longitudinal sample of 686 firms is similar to the original selection of innovating firms in CIS-
3 in terms of the variables used in this study. This check indicates that the longitudinal sample 
is similar to the original CIS-3 sample of innovating firms on the dependent, independent, and 
control variables, except for firm size (see Table A2.1 in Appendix 2). It turned out that the 
longitudinal selection contains larger firms than the original CIS-3 sample of innovating firms. 
We have already explained that large firms are more likely to be included in two subsequent 
surveys. 
3.3.2 Dependent variables
Following a recent stream of innovation studies (e.g. Laursen and Salter, 2006; Miotti 
and Sachwald, 2003; Negassi, 2004; Raymond et al., 2006) the indicator for innovation 
performance in this study is the ‘share of sales derived from new products developed in the last 
three years’. Patent counts are regarded a good proxy for innovation performance in high-tech 
sectors (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2005). However, patent counts do not necessarily capture 
the (commercial) success or effect of the innovation and are less applicable for firms from low-
tech sectors. After all, not all innovations are patented. The variable ‘share of sales from new 
products’ not only measures whether a firm has been innovating, but also the impact of these 
innovation activities on its sales. More in particular, in line with Laursen and Salter (2006) 
we distinguish between the fraction of sales from new products new to the market (associated 
with radical innovation), and the fraction of sales from new products new to the firm only 
(associated with incremental and imitative innovation). 
For firms engaged in a major acquisition in particular, the innovation performance may only 
improve a considerable time after the official deal, as it often takes years to integrate the two 
innovation functions (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; De Man and Duysters, 
2005). Hence, we analyze the impact of different governance modes for external knowledge 
acquisition on both short- and long-term innovation performance. Therefore, we use variables 
for short-term innovation performance (measured in CIS-3) and long-term innovation 
performance (measured in CIS-4). Thus, the short-term innovation performance relates to the 
share of sales of 2000 from innovations introduced in the years 1998-2000, whereas the long-
term innovation performance relates to the share of sales in 2004 from innovations introduced 
in 2002-2004.
3.3.3 Independent variables
The indicators for the different knowledge acquisition strategies were all taken from CIS-
3. Firms had to indicate whether they had been involved in licensing-in (of knowledge or 
technologies), outsourcing, and cooperation for their innovation activities in the period 
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1998-2000. It was explicitly stated in the questionnaire that pure outsourcing of R&D was 
not regarded as inter-organizational cooperation. Furthermore, we included an indicator for 
M&As. A question in the CIS asked whether the firm undertook a major acquisition, i.e. an 
acquisition resulting in an increase in the total turnover by at least 10%. It should be noted 
that, unlike with the other knowledge acquisition strategies, this question was not specifically 
addressed in the innovation context. We constructed binary variables for each of the knowledge 
acquisition strategies. These variables have the value 1 when the firm had indicated that it used 
the strategy in question, and 0 if the firm did not. We also constructed a new variable based on 
a combination of other variables, indicating whether the firm does not make use of any of the 
strategies for external knowledge acquisition. This variable has the value 1 when the firm is not 
involved in either licensing-in, R&D outsourcing, inter-organizational cooperation, or firm 
acquisitions. In this way, our new variable is used as an indicator for ‘in-house innovation’.
3.3.4 Control variables
In line with existing empirical studies analyzing determinants of innovation, and driven by 
the possibilities of the CIS, we included a number of control variables. First, we included firm 
size, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of employees. In general, larger firms 
are more likely to introduce innovations, although the relative effect of such innovations on 
turnover is expected to be lower, compared to smaller firms (Batterink et al., 2006; Mohnen 
and Dagenais, 2002). Second, we included a measure of innovation intensity, measured as 
the firm’s total innovation expenditures divided by its turnover. Innovation intensity is a 
slightly broader concept than R&D intensity, as it captures both pure R&D expenditures and 
other innovation expenditures, such as costs for introducing or implementing an innovation. 
Innovation intensity is, therefore, a good indicator for the relative extent to which the focal 
firm is engaged in innovation. Third, we check whether a firm is part of a group, as firms 
belonging to a group (or conglomerate) may be able to benefit from innovation activities 
from elsewhere within the group. The variable has the value 1 if the firm is part of a group, 
and 0 if not. Fourth, we check the level of ‘openness’ of the focal firm towards external sources 
of information required for innovation activities. Firms can be classified according to their 
‘openness’ towards external knowledge, and may have several search strategies for relevant 
information (Laursen and Salter, 2004; Laursen and Salter, 2006). It is expected that the 
more open a firm is, the more different types of knowledge acquisition strategies are required 
to facilitate external knowledge acquisition. Therefore, we constructed a variable, in line 
with Laursen and Salter (2006), that captures the extent to which the focal firm searches 
for innovative ideas and relevant information from different external sources (labeled search 
breadth). The CIS contains a question about the importance of drawing from a number of 
different information sources, such as suppliers, customers, competitors, universities and other 
(public or private) research institutes, or other types of sources (like fairs, magazines, existing 
patents). The firms were asked to indicate the degree of use for each source (0= not used, 1 = 
limited importance, 2 = important, 3 = very important). We coded each of the sources with 
1 when the firm in question reported that the information source was ‘important’ or ‘very 
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important’. Consequently, the search variable gets the value 0 if the firm indicated there was 
no important external information source and 6 if the firm considered each of the 6 identified 
external information sources important or very important. Finally, we included 15 sector 
dummies to check for a difference in sector propensities to innovate. Moreover, checking 
for sector differences is important because the share of sales from new products is largely 
influenced by the Product Generation Life Cycle (PGLC) of the firm’s sector. The PGLC 
concept refers to the sum of the product life cycles of all related products belonging to one 
product generation (Maidique and Zirger, 1985), something which may vary among sectors 
(Fortuin, 2006). It is therefore necessary to check for the sector when using the indicator ‘share 
of sales from new products’ as dependent variable. The furniture sector, which consisted of 
the most firms in the sample, was used as the reference category. A further description of the 
variables is provided in Table 3.2.
3.3.5 Methods
The dependent variable in the analysis is the percentage of innovative sales, which ranges 
between 0 and 100. Since this variable is (double) censored, a Tobit regression analysis is 
applied (Green, 2003). The assumption of normality of residuals in the standard Tobit 
models is not satisfied in our case, because the variables reflecting innovation performance 
are somewhat skewed. Other studies facing similar problems with respect to skewness and 
departure from normality, have proposed a log-transformation of the Tobit model (Kemp et 
al., 2003; Klomp and Van Leeuwen, 1999; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Raymond et al., 2006). 
We apply this approach and make the following transformation of the dependent variables: 
innovative sales transformed = ln(1+ innovation sales). 
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptive results
In Table 3.1 we present the key variables across industrial sectors. Overall, we find that the 
shares of sales from new products from incremental innovations of both 2000 and 2004 are 
substantially larger than the shares of sales from new products from radical innovations. 
Obviously, it is much more demanding for firms to invest in radical innovation, i.e. products 
that are truly innovative and new to the market. Surprisingly, however by 2004 the shares of 
sales from incremental innovations have dropped substantially till 12% compared with 21% 
in 2000. The decrease in the share of sales from incremental innovation may be explained by 
the economic downturn in the EU right after the turn of the century. With respect to the 
variables for knowledge acquisition strategies, we see that in 2000 outsourcing was used by 
the largest percentage of innovating firms (40%), followed by cooperation (33%), licensing-in 
(13%), and the acquisition of a firm (5%). This low percentage of firms making acquisitions is 
not surprising as this governance mode is the most far-reaching with respect to organizational 
integration and often the most expensive one. We conclude from this that innovating firms 
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are more likely to engage in flexible governance modes for acquiring external knowledge than 
governance modes with a more permanent character. Moreover, sectors traditionally associated 
with high levels of innovation (e.g. pharmaceutical, electrical) have a relatively high share of 
firms engaged in licensing-in and cooperation. Interestingly, in the food and drink and the 
petrol sector there was no licensing activity at all in 2000. Finally, 42% of the firms in the 
sample are not involved in any knowledge acquisition strategy, as they innovate completely 
in-house.
Descriptive information on the variables used in the regression models is provided in Table 3.2. 
It presents the means of the dependent (after the transformation) and independent variables 
(that we discussed before). The mean firm size is 323 employees (which corresponds to 4.94, 
after a natural log transformation). The average innovation intensity of the innovating firms 
in our sample is 2.7. It is somewhat surprising that 80% of the firms in the sample belong to a 
holding or other legal grouping of firms. Such firms may be able to capitalize on innovation 
activities carried out elsewhere in the organization. Dutch innovating firms indicated that 
on average they search for about two different types of external information sources that are 
important for their innovation activities. A closer look at the data reveals that customers and 
suppliers are the most important sources of information, followed by competitors and lastly 
knowledge institutions.
Finally, Table 3.3 shows that there is relatively little correlation between the main independent 
variables, which indicates there are no problems with multicolinearity (Hair et al., 1998). 
However, as explained in Section 3.3.3, the indicator for in-house was constructed from the 
indicators of the different knowledge acquisition strategies. Consequently, there is a relatively 
high correlation between the indicator for in-house innovation and the indicators for the 
knowledge acquisition strategies. To avoid problems with multicolinearity, we should run 
separate analyses including the in-house innovation indicator and excluding the indicators for 
the different knowledge acquisition strategies (see the next section).
3.4.2 Results of the statistical analyses
We ran separate Tobit regression analyses to assess the impact of different knowledge 
acquisition strategies on short-term innovation performance (Models 1 and 2) and long-
term innovation performance (Models 3 and 4), and distinguished between incremental 
innovation (Models 1 and 3) and radical innovation (Models 2 and 4)10. Table 3.4 presents 
the results of the Tobit regression analysis. The table provides the coefficients, standard 
10 In addition to the models presented in Table 3.4, we analyzed similar models including additional variables to 
test for interaction effects between the knowledge acquisition strategies. For Models 1-4 (with the same dependent, 
independent and control variables) we constructed three variants, with one interaction variable per comparable 
model. As none of the interaction terms turned out to have a significant impact on innovation performance, and 
they do they influence the relationships in the Models 1-4, we do not present the models with interaction terms 
here.
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Table 3.2. Descriptives and explanations of the variables (N=686).
Variable Description Value 
(range)
Mean SD
Dependent variables (innovative sales)
Incremental 2001 The share of sales derived from new or 
significantly improved products that were new 
to the firm (LN transformation)
metric 0.18 0.16
Radical 2001 The share of sales derived from new or 
significantly improved products that were new 
to the market (LN transformation)
metric 0.05 0.09
Incremental 2005 The share of sales derived from new or 
significantly improved products that were new 
to the firm (LN transformation)
metric 0.10 0.15
Radical 2005 The share of sales derived from new or 
significantly improved products that were new 
to the market (LN transformation)
metric 0.05 0.10
Control variables
Size (LN employees) Total number of employees in 2000 (LN) metric 4.94 1.18
Innovation intensity Total innovation expenditures in 2000 divided by 
the total turnover in 2000
metric 0.027 0.24
Firm part of group Is the firm part of a group? (1=yes, 0 = no) ordinal 0.80 0.40
Search breadth Number of different types of external information 
sources used for innovation that were 
important (possible sources are 1 customers, 
2 suppliers, 3 competitors, 4 universities, 5 
research organizations). Value range: 0-6
ordinal 2.08 1.52
Independent variables
Licensing-in Firm active in technology/knowledge licensing in 
the period 1998-2000 (1=yes, 0 = no)
ordinal 0.13 0.34
Outsourcing Firm active in R&D outsourcing in the period 
1998-2000 (1=yes, 0=no)
ordinal 0.40 0.49
Cooperation Firm active in inter-organizational cooperation 
aimed at innovation in the period 1998-2000 
(1=yes, 0 = no)
ordinal 0.33 0.47
Acquisition Firm acquired (at least) one firm in 1998-2000, 
which resulted in at least 10% turnover growth 
(1=yes, 0 = no)
ordinal 0.05 0.22
In-house (no external 
linkages)
This variable has the value 1 in the case the firm 
is not active in both licensing-in, outsourcing, 
cooperation, and acquisition
ordinal 0.42 0.49
62 Profiting from external knowledge
Chapter 3
errors and significance levels of the control and independent variables for each model. The 
most important model parameters are provided as well. For instance, Model 1 was based 
on 686 observations, from which 130 were left-censored (that is, 0 percent share of sales 
from incremental innovations), and 3 were right-censored (share of sales from incremental 
innovations of 100%). The Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi2-statistics provide the best indication 
of the predictive power of a model, as it indicates the improvement over the ‘constant only’ 
model. Table 3.4 shows that the four models provide better predictive power than the 
‘constant only’ models, because the Chi2 statistics are highly significant. Furthermore, Table 
3.4 provides a Pseudo R2 which also gives an indication of the predictive power of the models. 
In addition, Models 5-8 are comparable with Models 1-4, but they contain the composite 
variable ‘in-house’ instead of the knowledge acquisition strategies variables (see Table 3.5). 
As we explained, this variable is composed of the other independent variables, so in-house 
innovation could not be included in the original models including the different knowledge 
acquisition strategies. Hence, the additional Models 5-8. Note that the Models 1-4 with 
specific indicators of knowledge acquisition strategies show better predictive power (see LR 
Chi2 statistics) than the comparable Models 5-8 with one independent variable (in-house 
innovation) that is composed of the knowledge acquisition strategies variables. 
The independent variables are relevant for the proposition testing. We find strong support 
for Proposition 1a, stating that licensing-in is positively related to the short-term innovation 
performance. Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.4 show there is a positive, significant relationship 
between licensing-in and the short-term performance of both incremental and radical 
innovation. Interestingly, especially the relationship with radical innovation is highly significant 
(P<0.01). In contrast, Models 3 and 4 show that there is no significant relationship between 
licensing-in and long-term innovation performance. A market-based governance mode 
Table 3.3. Correlations among the independent and control variables (N=686).
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
1 Firm Size 1
2 Innovation intensity 0.06 1
3 Firm part of group 0.11 * 0.03 1
4 Search breadth 0.13 * 0.03 0.01 1
5 Licensing-in 0.07 0.02 0.08 * 0.16 * 1
6 Outsourcing 0.21 * 0.08 * 0.10 * 0.24 * 0.20 *
7 Cooperation 0.28 * 0.01 0.10 * 0.24 * 0.18 * 0.32 * 1
8 Acquisition -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.03 1
9 In-house -0.20 * -0.06  -0.13 * -0.27 * -0.33 * -0.70 * -0.60 * -0.2 * 1
* P-value <0.05.
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like licensing-in appears to be a beneficial way to acquire external knowledge that is readily 
available in the market and that can be promptly integrated into existing innovation activities. 
Moreover, the competitive advantage of licensing-in seems to be temporary, probably because 
the standardized knowledge or technology at stake is available on the market, and thus also 
available to competitors. 
Proposition 1b stated that outsourcing is positively related to a firm’s innovation performance. 
Models 1 and 2 show that outsourcing is significantly, positively related to the short-term 
performance of incremental innovations in 2000, but not of radical innovations (see Table 3.4). 
In contrast, when we look at the innovation performance in 2004 we see a highly significant 
relationship between outsourcing and the performance of radical innovations (see Model 4), 
whereas the positive relationship with the performance of incremental innovations is significant 
at the 10%-level (see Model 3). Apparently, for radical innovation it takes some time before 
the outcomes of outsourced R&D become visible in terms of innovative sales, whereas for 
incremental innovations companies also benefit in the short term from outsourcing. In sum, 
we find partial support for Proposition 1b.
We find strong support for Proposition 1c, asserting that there is a positive relationship between 
cooperation and innovation performance. There is a significant and positive relationship with 
the performance of both incremental and radical innovation performance in 2000 (Models 1 
and 2) and 2004 (Models 3 and 4, see Table 3.4). Cooperating with other organizations for 
innovation activities seems to be a successful way for developing both incremental and radical 
new products, as the innovations of cooperating firms contribute substantially to the sales of 
the firm. Interestingly, this holds for both short-term and long-term innovative sales.
The combined results with respect to licensing-in, outsourcing, and cooperation, provide 
substantial evidence that open innovation is positively related to the innovation performance 
of innovating firms, thereby providing support for Proposition 1.
We found no support for Proposition 2, which predicted a negative relationship between 
the acquisition of a firm and innovation performance. Whereas, Models 1 and 2 show there 
is no significant relationship between acquisitions and short-term innovation performance 
(indicating a neutral relationship), acquiring a firm has a significant positive impact on 
long-term innovation performance (Models 3 and 4, see Table 3.5). Thus contrary to our 
expectations, there is no negative relationship between a firm acquisition and innovation 
performance, rather in the long term there is even a significant positive relationship. This 
result would be in line with the literature on M&A (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Puranam et 
al., 2006), which suggests that it takes quite a while before the post-acquisition integration 
process has been completed and innovation synergies are realized. Moreover, the coefficients in 
Models 3 and 4 indicate that, compared with the other two knowledge acquisition strategies, 
in the long run, acquiring a firm has the largest positive impact on innovation performance. 
To conclude, Proposition 2 is partly rejected.
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Proposition 3 stated that there is a negative relationship between in-house innovation and a 
firm’s innovation performance. Models 5-8 provide strong support for this proposition (see 
Table 3.5). This result implies that firms that do not engage in any strategy for knowledge 
acquisition (licensing-in, outsourcing, cooperation, or firm acquisition) perform worse on 
both incremental and radical innovations, both at the short- and long-term. Thus, Proposition 
3 is confirmed.
Table 3.6 summarizes the results of the analysis focused at the proposition testing. Now, 
we discuss the control variables. First, firm size has no impact on innovation performance 
measured as sales from new products, except for short-term radical innovations. In Model 
7 firm size was positively related to the long-term performance of incremental innovation 
(significant at 10%). Whereas previous studies using CIS data found no relationship between 
firm size and innovation performance (e.g. Faems et al., 2005; Mohnen and Dagenais, 2002; 
Raymond et al., 2006), our study suggests that in the short term, large firms perform better in 
radical innovation than smaller firms. Large firms are more likely to have structural R&D and 
deep pockets for realizing radical innovations quicker. 
Table 3.6. Outcomes of the analysis (proposition testing).
Propositions Innovation performance 
2000
Innovation performance 
2004
Incremental 
innovation
Radical 
innovation
Incremental 
innovation
Radical 
innovation
P1a – Licensing-in positively 
related to innovation 
performance 
Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed
P1b – Outsourcing positively 
related to innovation 
performance
Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Confirmed
P1c – Cooperation positively 
related to innovation 
performance
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 
P2 – Acquisition of a firm 
negatively related to 
innovation performance 
Not confirmed Not confirmed Rejected 
(positive)
Rejected 
(positive)
P3 – In-house innovation 
negatively related to 
innovation performance
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed
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Second, there is a significant, positive relationship between innovation intensity and the short-
term performance of incremental innovation (Model 1), which does not occur in the other 
models. Apparently, dedicating a substantial part of the firm to innovation is not enough for 
a consistently high innovation performance. 
Third, interestingly, there is a significant, positive relationship between being part of a 
group and long-term innovation performance (see Models 3 and 4). Firms that belong to a 
conglomerate are able to draw on innovation resources from or activities carried out in, for 
instance, a sister firm, which enables them to innovate more consistently. 
Fourth, the search breadth variable is significantly and positively related to innovation 
performance in most models, in particular for incremental innovations. Search breadth is 
positively, though not significantly, related to short-term performance of radical innovation. 
The overall positive relationship between search breadth and innovation performance confirms 
that successful innovating firms are externally oriented, open to useful information that is 
available outside the firm (Laursen and Salter, 2006). This does not automatically imply that 
firms can just stick to searching for information that is available to anyone. All eight models 
show that if firms really want to benefit from external knowledge and technologies, they have 
to establish formal linkages with other firms in the form of either licensing-in, outsourcing, 
inter-organizational cooperation, or acquiring other firms.
Lastly, the sector dummies show some significant relationships. Most notably out of the 
total of 15 sectors, we found that the chemical end-products, machine manufacturing, and 
electronics are the sectors that are consistently positively associated with the share of sales 
from new products. 
3.5 Discussion and conclusions
3.5.1 Conclusions
In this chapter we analyzed the impact of different knowledge acquisition strategies on a firm’s 
innovation performance. A unique contribution of our study is that, instead of analyzing 
one period only (e.g. Laursen and Salter, 2006), this study considered both the short- and 
long-term impact of knowledge acquisition strategies on innovation performance. Using a 
large cross-section of industrial innovative firms in the Netherlands we estimated the direct 
impact of the knowledge acquisition strategies, on both short-term and long-term innovation 
performance. Moreover, we analyzed the impact of the different knowledge acquisition 
strategies on incremental and radical innovations performance, measured as the share of 
sales from products new to the firm only and products new to the market, respectively. The 
differences are managerially relevant. Moreover, we contribute to a recent stream of literature 
that investigates innovation processes of firms in an inter-organizational context (Chesbrough, 
2003b; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Van de Vrande, 2007). 
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Our study shows that different knowledge acquisition strategies are positively related to the 
innovation performance of innovating firms, and this relation differs among the different 
strategies. First, our results provide new insights into the impact of licensing-in on innovation, 
something which has so far hardly been studied. For example, Tsai and Wang (2007) found 
that in electronics licensing-in had a positive impact on a firm’s added value, as long as the firm 
has sufficient internal R&D to absorb the knowledge at stake. We found new and more wide-
ranging evidence, using the cross-section of Dutch industrial innovative firms, that licensing-
in positively contributes to the short-term innovation performance. In the case of licensing-
in, an innovative firm buys knowledge and technologies that are relatively rapidly applicable 
for creating innovations. However, we found that in the longer run licensing-in turned out 
to have no impact, probably because the knowledge at stake may also be available to other 
organizations (Granstrand et al., 1992). The first thing that firms should learn from our results 
is that licensing-in may bring temporary but not sustainable competitive advantages. 
Second, our study indicates that outsourcing is a successful way to improve innovation 
performance. This finding is in conflict with the finding by Fey (2005) that among large R&D-
intensive firms outsourcing was negatively associated with R&D performance. The positive 
impact of outsourcing was most clear for short-term performance of incremental innovation 
and long-term performance of radical innovation. This result could be an indication that 
firms have two distinct outsourcing strategies. Outsourcing (e.g. to suppliers) for quick 
improvements on existing products, and outsourcing of more basic research (e.g. to knowledge 
institutions) for radical innovation, or for monitoring new or emerging technologies. Further 
research is needed to gain better understanding of the multifaceted knowledge acquisition 
strategy of outsourcing.
Third, firms gain from inter-organizational cooperation for both incremental and radical 
innovations, which is in line with most existing studies on the impact of cooperation on 
innovation performance (De Man and Duysters, 2005; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Sampson, 
2007; Van de Vrande, 2007). But our study adds to this literature by showing that cooperation 
also has a positive impact on innovation performance on the long-term. Firms may therefore 
cooperate with other firms to achieve both short-term and long-term goals. Taking the results 
with regard to licensing-in, outsourcing and cooperation together leads us to conclude that 
open innovation holds significant potential for improving the innovation performance.
Fourth, this study leads us to the conclusion that acquiring a firm has a positive impact on 
innovation performance, providing original and important, industry-wide evidence on the 
impact of M&As on the innovativeness of acquirers. To date, most studies on the impact 
of M&A on innovation performance found a neutral effect at best, or even negative effects 
(De Man and Duysters, 2005). Studies found a positive relationship between M&A and 
innovation performance only in specific circumstances, for instance, in high-tech sectors 
with moderate relatedness between the merging firms, or when the acquirer has sufficient 
experience with M&As (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Hagedoorn and 
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Duysters, 2002a). In contrast, our analysis of a cross-section of industrial firms shows that the 
acquisition of a firm has a substantial, positive impact on long-term radical and incremental 
innovation performance. Apparently, it takes a considerable time to integrate a firm, let alone 
the innovation function (Gerpott, 1995; Schweizer, 2005), but when the integration is 
complete, there are considerable innovative gains. Our results also suggest that firm acquisition 
has, compared with other knowledge acquisition strategies, the strongest impact on long-term 
innovation performance. So for firms in doubt as to how to formalize the external knowledge 
acquisition this research shows that although acquisitions can be demanding and expensive, 
they can really bring substantial innovation benefits in the longer term. 
Fifthly, the results of this study show that in-house innovation, i.e. firms that do not engage 
in any of the knowledge acquisition strategies studies here, has a highly negative impact on 
the innovation performance of innovating firms. This does not imply that firms should not 
conduct any innovation activities in-house. Substantial levels of R&D are important for 
innovating firms to maintain sufficient absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), 
which is essential to recognize and absorb knowledge residing in other organizations. Our 
results suggest, however, that firms should not rely exclusively on in-house innovation, but 
instead should complement internal R&D and other innovation activities with knowledge 
and capabilities.
Finally, the results of this study strongly suggest, like Laursen and Salter (2006), that being 
open to external knowledge from different types of sources can be very beneficial to firms. 
However, considering the positive relationships found between the knowledge acquisition 
strategies and innovation performance, we can amend this conclusion to reflect the fact that 
searching for information for innovation is more effective when specific knowledge acquisition 
strategies are used. 
3.5.2 Limitations and suggestions for further research
Obviously, our study is subject to several limitations. The first limitation regards the problem 
that comes with subjective firm-level data. The data used in our study are self-reported and 
have limited levels of sophistication. Therefore, we agree with Laursen and Salter (2006) 
that (preferably in-depth) case studies are needed to investigate how organizations manage 
innovation given different knowledge acquisition strategies. Furthermore, driven by the CIS 
data, we distinguished between only four, clearly identifiable and fundamentally different, 
knowledge acquisition strategies. Further research may also investigate sub-forms of inter-
organizational cooperation, such as (non-) equity alliances or Joint Ventures, or other 
strategies, such as Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) investments. Both from a managerial and 
scientific point of view it would be interesting to investigate the impact of different knowledge 
acquisition strategies on innovation performance at the project level. Another limitation is 
that we did not investigate how firms manage the portfolio of external relationships needed 
for innovation. In this respect, studies of best practices as well as lessons from failures could 
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complement our research, and could contribute to the existing knowledge on external 
knowledge acquisition strategies. A limitation of a different kind is the way we selected firms 
for the longitudinal dataset from the original CIS-3 sample of innovating firms. We explained 
in Section 3.3.1, for instance, that the longitudinal sample consists of significantly larger firms 
than the original CIS-3 sample, although both samples are similar in terms of the dependent 
and independent variables. A suggestion for further research would be to analyze the impact 
of different knowledge acquisition strategies on the innovation performance within samples 
of different size categories. Cooperation may be, for instance, especially beneficial for SMEs, 
whereas licensing-in could be a preferred strategy for large firms. Such an approach requires 
substantially large datasets, with a sufficient amount of innovating firm in each of the size 
classes.
Finally, restricted by the CIS data, our study focused on how external knowledge and capabilities 
enter the firm. Future research may also focus on how internal sources of innovation leave the 
firm, for instance how firms (can) profit from ideas or knowledge developed in-house that are 
further developed and implemented in other organizations.
3.5.3 Concluding remarks
In discussing the main findings of our study, we came across a number of interesting results, 
such as the consistently negative relationship between in-house innovation and innovation 
performance, and the positive impact of large M&As especially on the radical innovation 
performance. The results of our study may be of interest for managers of innovating firms. 
In view of the rapid growth in inter-organizational linkages for the sake of innovation, this 
study may guide managers when choosing the appropriate knowledge acquisition strategy. 
For instance, firms can learn from our results that licensing-in may bring temporary but not 
sustainable competitive advantages, whereas cooperation with other firms is beneficial for 
achieving both short-term and long-term goals. Managers intending to acquire another firm 
with the (sub) aim of improving the innovativeness of the firms should realize that it can take 
a substantial time before a positive impact is felt.
Finally, there is an important message for innovating firms that have so far not been engaged 
in external knowledge acquisition, and that have relied exclusively on internal knowledge and 
capabilities. These firms should ask themselves whether they are pursuing the best innovation 
strategy. In the current highly dynamic business landscape, where technological progress 
is rapid, firms must promote partnerships with other organizations or other knowledge 
acquisition strategies in order to profit from the knowledge and capabilities available there. 
Firms for which external knowledge acquisition is a new strategy, could set up training 
programmes for innovating in an inter-organizational context. In addition, these firms can try 
to valorize the learning from organizations that have experience in pursuing external knowledge 
strategies (see, for instance, Chapter 4 which presents the case of innovation brokers that assist 
inexperienced SMEs to innovate in a network). 
Part II 
Qualitative analyses
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4.  Orchestrating open innovation. The case of 
innovation brokers in agri-food SME Innovation 
Networks
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 presents an in-depth study on the orchestration of open innovation within SME 
innovation networks11. The study was primarily set up to analyze how innovation brokers 
orchestrate SME innovation networks in the context of the agri-food sector. 
RQ3: How do innovation brokers orchestrate SME innovation networks in the agri-food sector?
In recent years EU, national and regional policy makers have focused on enhancing the 
innovativeness of their economies by stimulating inter-organizational cooperation by Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises (Freel, 2003; Howells, 2005; Oughton et al., 2002). Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) often lack the essential knowledge and capabilities to 
successfully innovate exclusively by means of in-house activities (Narula, 2004; Nooteboom, 
1994), making inter-organizational networks essential for SMEs that want to innovate. 
Nevertheless, when SMEs want to establish and benefit from innovation networks, they face 
several obstacles (Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001; Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2002; Van Gils 
and Zwart, 2004). 
The literature that employs the Systems of Innovation perspective (Dosi et al., 1988; Malerba, 
2002; Nelson, 1993) increasingly pays attention to several types of innovation intermediating 
organizations that support SMEs by eliminating obstacles for cooperation and innovation 
while stimulating and facilitating these processes (Howells, 2006; Smits and Kuhlmann, 
2004; Winch and Courtney, 2007). For instance, innovation brokers may support SMEs 
by identifying their innovation needs, articulating their knowledge demands, setting up 
partnerships and managing the inter-organizational cooperation processes (Howells, 2006). 
The literature on this topic has provided an overview of the functions that these organizations 
may fulfil (Howells, 2006; Johnson, 2008; Pollard, 2006; Winch and Courtney, 2007), how 
they are organized in terms of funding, organizational model, mandate and scope (Klerkx 
and Leeuwis, 2008b; Kolodny et al., 2001; Van Lente et al., 2003; Van Looy et al., 2003), 
and how they are embedded within SME networks and the innovation system (Huggins, 
2000; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008a; Laschewski et al., 2002). However, as Sapsed, Grantham 
and DeFillippi (2007) and Pollard (2006) state, more empirical and theoretical knowledge is 
needed on what defines a useful innovation broker in terms of its organization-level impact on 
11 This Chapter is based on: Orchestrating Innovation Networks: The Case of Innovation Brokers in the Agri-
Food Sector. Batterink, M.H., Wubben, E.F.M., Klerkx, L and S.W.F. Omta. Forthcoming in Entrepreneurship 
and Regional Development.
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the innovation process. Moreover, in their review of SMEs and innovation networks, Pittaway 
et al. (2004) concluded that the role of such ‘third parties’ in innovation networks has been 
under-researched. 
Besides the Systems of Innovation literature, management literature has also focused attention 
on network orchestration processes aimed at innovation (e.g. Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). 
These studies typically take the position of the commercial firm as the focal actor in knowledge 
acquisition processes, and in the establishment of R&D consortia (e.g. Doz et al., 2000). Yet, 
research still has to tease out the unique contributions a ‘network orchestrator’ makes, despite 
its lack of hierarchical authority (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). Or as Winch and Courtney 
(2007) stated, the question is still open to identify how innovation brokers operate, and under 
which conditions they function most effectively. Therefore, in this chapter we aim to analyze how 
innovation brokers orchestrate SME innovation networks.
In order to analyse the network orchestration processes of innovation brokers, this chapter 
presents four in-depth case studies of innovation brokers, specifically in the agri-food sector. 
In the agri-food industry, firms capable of networking are associated with a larger innovative 
capacity (Bertolini and Giovannetti, 2006; Gellynck et al., 2007; Pannekoek et al., 2005). 
As in other sectors which have a high share of SMEs, agri-food firms face typical constraints 
when it comes to innovation. Moreover, Costa and Jongen (2006) pointed at some general 
barriers to agri-food innovation, such as a lack of concrete knowledge on how to organize the 
innovation process, especially in an inter-organizational setting. Other studies concluded that 
economic considerations and insufficient innovation competencies are important barriers to 
innovation in the agri-food sector (Batterink et al., 2006; Garcia Martinez and Briz, 2000). It 
is perhaps therefore not surprising that intermediary organizations like innovation brokers can 
play a crucial role in the innovation networks of SMEs and agricultural entrepreneurs (Dons 
and Bino, 2008; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008b; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2007).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the relevant literature 
on innovation in SMEs, elaborating on the inter-organizational context of innovation. As 
such, we discuss the importance of SME-driven innovation networks, how these networks 
are managed and the role of innovation brokers in these management processes. Then, in 
Section 4.3, the data and methodology of the empirical research is described. This section 
introduces the four innovation brokers that are investigated, and describes in detail how the 
data was collected and analyzed. Section 4.4 discusses the findings from the cases and derives 
research propositions. These findings are structured according to three main orchestration 
processes conducted by innovation brokers: innovation initiation, network composition, and 
innovation process management. Finally, Section 4.5 provides the discussion of the study, and 
draws the main conclusions, as well as suggestions for further research.
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4.2 Theoretical background
4.2.1 Innovation in SMEs: an inter-organizational process
This chapter deals with the formation and operation of innovation networks of SMEs. As the 
research does not focus on specific innovations, we use the broad definition of innovation as 
given in Chapter 1, i.e. the exploitation of new ideas to produce new products, processes, services 
or business practices (in Pittaway et al., 2004). With networks we are referring to cooperative 
relationships between firms and other actors in which organizations retain control over their own 
resources, but jointly decide on their use (Brass et al., 2004). SMEs are enterprises that employ 
fewer than 250 people, have an annual turnover below €50 million, and/or an annual balance 
sheet which does not exceed €43 million (European Commission, 2005).
The topic of innovation in SMEs has received a great deal of attention from scholars (for a review 
see Edwards et al., 2005). An obvious reason for this attention is that there are many differences 
in the way that large firms and SMEs deal with cooperation and innovation (Hoffmann and 
Schlosser, 2001; Nooteboom, 1994; Rogers, 2004). Nooteboom (1994) addressed a number 
of characteristics of SMEs that can be considered either strengths or weaknesses for their 
innovation processes. Well-known strengths of SMEs are motivated management and labour, 
effective internal communication and little bureaucracy (Nooteboom, 1994). Weaknesses of 
SMEs include limited absorptive capacity (Menrad, 2004), lack of innovation funding (Caputo 
et al., 2002; Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2002), lack of functional expertise, diseconomies of 
scale and the short-term perspective of management (Bessant and Rush, 1995; Kaufmann and 
Tödtling, 2002; Nooteboom, 1994). These weaknesses are typically cited as a justification for 
establishing relations with external actors. 
Research shows that some SMEs experience positive effects from cooperation to achieve 
innovations, but other SMEs experience major problems. The positive effects of cooperative 
innovation include increased turnover, higher profit rates and expansion of the product range 
(De Jong and Vermeulen, 2006; Van Gils and Zwart, 2004). Nevertheless, there are several 
reasons why many SMEs find it difficult to establish and benefit from inter-organizational 
innovation projects. First, SMEs are often managed by their owners. These entrepreneurs 
are accustomed to operating independently and within a certain region. Cooperation with 
other organizations does not come naturally to them (Wissema and Euser, 1991). Second, 
cultural differences and the lack of joint research experience hamper cooperation (Hoffmann 
and Schlosser, 2001). For instance, most SMEs are unfamiliar with research organizations 
(Caputo et al., 2002; Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2002). Third, smaller firms cannot enforce their 
will upon others. Therefore, SMEs must be confident that the results of cooperative efforts 
will be allocated fairly (Van Gils and Zwart, 2004). Fourth, typically for SMEs, knowledge 
may unintentionally spill over to other organizations, while intended efforts for knowledge 
valorization may remain underutilized. Finally, inter-organizational innovation projects may 
involve organizations with divergent institutional and cultural backgrounds. An increase in 
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the number and diversity of the organizations involved adds to the complexity within the 
project, which in the absence of related expertise among the SMEs, quickly lowers the success 
rate of an inter-organizational innovation project. 
There have been several studies investigating the critical success factors for innovation in SMEs 
(Edwards et al., 2005) and the related inter-organizational cooperation between SMEs. Most 
notable is a study by Hoffmann and Schlosser (2001) of 164 Austrian SMEs, which identified 
the following key success factors for inter-organizational cooperation in SMEs:
precise definition of rights and duties; •	
each partner contributes specific strengths; •	
required resources are established; •	
alliance objectives are derived from business strategy; and •	
speedy implementation and fast results. •	
Typically, most key success factors relate to the early stages of the cooperative endeavour 
(Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001). Another key success factor is the need for both roughly equal 
and non-conflicting interests in the project (Wissema and Euser, 1991). SMEs, however, often 
lack the capability to fulfil such key success factors for successful coordination and network 
management (Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001). So how are such networks managed, and who 
is driving them?
4.2.2 Innovation networks
Innovation networks can be viewed as cooperative relationships between firms and other 
actors who seek innovation. We have focused on a subset of innovation networks in which a 
‘network orchestrator’ (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006) or ‘network broker’ (Snow et al., 1992) 
is the primary actor engaged in the design and management of the innovation network. We 
adopted the framework of Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) who defined ‘network orchestration’ 
as the set of deliberate actions undertaken by a network orchestrator as it seeks to create value 
with and extract value from the network. The framework of network orchestration processes 
focused on innovation networks that are characterized by a small number of participants. 
Keeping the orchestrator in mind, we must distinguish between network design activities and 
ongoing network management activities and processes (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Snow et 
al., 1992). In terms of designing a network (the network recruitment process), the network 
orchestrator has to detail the following three aspects (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006): network 
membership, network structure and network position. Network membership is specified by 
the size of the network (number of firms) and the diversity of its participants (a homogeneous 
or heterogeneous group). Network structure is typified by the density of the networks and 
their autonomy. Network position relates to the centrality of a firm and its status. 
Once the network has been created, the orchestrator may deploy orchestration processes 
to realize network output. They do this by (1) managing resource mobility, (2) managing 
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value creation and appropriation, and (3) managing network stability and development 
(Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). Managing resource mobility, especially knowledge, includes 
processes of knowledge absorption, network identification, reinforcing a shared identity 
(Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000) and inter-organizational socialization in order to increase social 
and relational capital. Through exchange forums and formal and informal communication 
channels, a network orchestrator can enhance socialization and promote knowledge mobility 
within the network. Managing value creation and appropriation relates to the idea that in the 
innovation network equitable distribution of value must be ensured and the related concerns 
must be mitigated. A network orchestrator can facilitate these processes by focusing on trust, 
procedural justice and joint ownership (Uzzi, 1997). Therefore, organizations engaged in 
network orchestration must provide leadership in building trust levels and in communicating 
clear, pre-established sanctions for trust violation. Managing network stability refers to 
preventing isolation, migration, cliques and attrition. A network orchestrator can enhance 
a network’s stability by using its reputation, by lengthening the shadow of the future, and by 
building multiplexity (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006).
Although Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006), in detailing their useful framework, had in mind 
an orchestrator that takes the position of a so-called commercial hub firm, we would like 
to show that their framework of innovation network orchestration processes also fits other 
facilitative intermediary organizations that are not part of the original network, i.e. specialized 
independent innovation brokers. These innovation brokers may facilitate the design and 
management of innovation networks.
4.2.3 The rise of specialized innovation brokers
In management literature, the firms that are described as fulfilling a role as network orchestrator 
are typically large and dominant firms, e.g. the hub firm that is part of the original network. 
In the context of innovating SMEs, the situation is rather different as SMEs do not have all 
the relevant capabilities for fulfilling an orchestrating role successfully. Systemic brokers as 
network orchestrators have been studied from an innovation systems and network perspective. 
From a network perspective, for instance, systemic brokers can be considered important 
for SMEs for they may enable the exploitation of opportunities that arise from ‘weak ties’ 
(Granovetter, 1973; Granovetter, 1985), or because they may provide brokerage in cases of 
a lack of connections in or between networks, i.e. exploiting ‘structural holes’ (Burt, 2004). 
Existing studies on systemic brokers cover inter-organizational SME networking and clustering 
(e.g. Cooke and Wills, 1999; Major and Cordey-Hayes, 2000; Malecki and Tootle, 1996), and 
the interaction between research institutes and SMEs (Isaksen and Remøe, 2001; Izushi, 2003; 
Johnson, 2008; Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2001; Kolodny et al., 2001). Such systemic brokers 
have been labelled, for example, as bridging organizations, third parties, brokers, technology 
transfer brokers, infrastructures or organizations, and boundary organizations. By way of 
synthesizing the various definition terms, Howells (2006, p. 720) proposed the broad term 
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‘innovation intermediary’, defined as an organization or body that acts as an agent or broker in 
any aspect of the innovation process between two or more parties. 
Although innovation intermediation and network orchestration can also be fulfilled as a 
side rather than a core activity (Howells, 2006), the literature indicates that in recent years 
there has been a rise in the number of intermediaries who concentrate exclusively on network 
orchestration (Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004; Van Lente et al., 2003; Winch and Courtney, 
2007). In this study we follow Winch and Courtney (2007: 751), who coined the term 
innovation broker for this dedicated type of innovation intermediary, which they defined as an 
organization acting as a member of a network of actors in an industrial sector that is focused neither 
on the organization nor the implementation of innovations, but on enabling other organizations 
to innovate. Such dedicated and independent innovation brokers, which principally focus on 
facilitating innovation by fulfilling the role of broker or mediator between cooperating SMEs, 
are also a growing phenomenon in the innovation arena of agri-food SMEs (Dons and Bino, 
2008; Hartwich et al., 2007; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008b). 
Although the literature has outlined several detailed functions of innovation brokers (see 
e.g. Howells, 2006; Snow et al., 1992; Winch and Courtney, 2007), there appear to be three 
basic, aggregate functions for innovation brokers (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008b; Van Lente et 
al., 2003): demand articulation, network composition and innovation process management. 
Demand articulation comprises diagnosis and analysis of problems and articulation of the 
needs (latent or otherwise) of SMEs (Boon et al., 2008; Howells, 2006). Network composition 
refers to making external relations available to SMEs (Cooke and Wills, 1999), i.e. scanning, 
scoping, filtering and matchmaking of sources of complementary assets such as knowledge, 
materials and funding (Howells, 2006; Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2002; Kolodny et al., 2001). 
Innovation process management primarily relates to enhancing communication, learning, and 
other forms of interaction and alignment among partners, facilitate intellectual property rights 
attribution and commercialization of innovation outcomes (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008b). 
As regards the roles of such an innovation broker in the network of SMEs, the literature 
identifies a number of central ‘values’ or ‘design requirements’ that are needed to obtain 
and maintain a good and credible position in the network. A key premise of the facilitator 
role of innovation brokers is an impartial and independent position (Hanna and Walsh, 
2002; Hassink, 1996; Isaksen and Remøe, 2001), i.e. one that does not adhere to certain 
‘preferred suppliers’ or ‘preferred development strategies’. In the context of the provision of 
innovation intermediation services to SMEs, Kolodny et al. (2001) formulated a number of 
design requirements that seem essential for proper functioning of innovation brokers: (1) 
visibility and accessibility to SMEs, (2) trustworthiness for SMEs, (3) access to appropriate 
sources of knowledge and information relevant to the innovation process, (4) credibility of 
the innovation broker with these sources, (5) quick response to the requests of SMEs, and (6) 
complementarity to the weaknesses of the SMEs it serves. 
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4.2.4 Towards a research framework
Our research framework was inspired by the innovation network orchestration framework of 
Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006), which was primarily developed with a so-called ‘hub firm’ as the 
network orchestrator. In this study we are concerned with the network orchestration processes 
of innovation brokers. 
The set of network design activities, as defined in the network orchestration framework, 
corresponds to the network composition function of innovation brokers. It is here that 
strategic, complementary partners are scanned and selected, a partnership is developed and 
procedures and tasks are established. Therefore, we included this process in our research 
framework. However, we refer to it as the function of network composition, because it 
emphasizes the specific function of getting the suitable organizations willing to cooperate 
within a new network. 
In addition, Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) referred to the innovation network management 
process, which comprises the facilitation of knowledge mobility, innovation appropriability 
and network stability. In this manner, the innovation network management process 
corresponds to the innovation process management function of an innovation broker (Klerkx 
and Leeuwis, 2008b; Van Lente et al., 2003). Innovation process management is the process of 
creating an atmosphere that stimulates knowledge sharing and learning (knowledge mobility), 
enabling a fair distribution of the costs and benefits between innovation network members 
(innovation appropriability) and anticipating and resolving conflicts between the members 
(network stability). 
Demand articulation was not put forward as a network orchestration process by Dhanaraj and 
Parkhe (2006), although it is evidently one of the most important functions of innovation 
brokers (Howells, 2006; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008b). It appears to be a core task of such 
organizations to independently validate new ideas (Winch and Courtney, 2007) and to 
present good options for SMEs. Therefore, we included demand articulation in our research 
framework of network orchestration processes and will refer to this as innovation initiation. 
In total, we arrive at three main functions of network orchestration that we include in our 
research framework: innovation initiation, network composition, and innovation process 
management. The underlying assumption of the research framework is that innovation 
brokers must have excellent practices for those three functions when they want to orchestrate 
innovation networks successfully.
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4.3 Data and methods
Because the question under study – how do innovation brokers orchestrate SME innovation 
networks in the agri-food sector – is a recent one, a detailed approach is called for. Miles and 
Huberman (1994) suggested that researchers should use qualitative research designs when 
there is a clear need for in-depth understanding, local contextualization, causal inference, and 
exposing the points of view of the people under study. More specifically, Hoang and Antoncic 
(2003) argued in favour of more qualitative, inductive research into the development of 
networks of entrepreneurs to stimulate further work by introducing new theoretical ideas. As 
a consequence, we chose a qualitative and inductive approach in order to arrive at theoretical 
propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989) and to identify best practices of innovation brokers.
The sampling of the case studies is generally regarded as a crucial element in the case study 
method (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). Our first selection criteria was that stimulating 
innovation (through cooperation) and economic development of SMEs was a prime objective 
of the innovation broker. The comparability of our cases was enhanced by two additional 
features of the sample: all of the innovation brokers are mainly active in the agri-food sector 
and are relatively similar in size (between 5 and 9 Full Time Equivalents, FTEs). Given these 
selection criteria, we further relied on a convenient sampling strategy. Some innovation brokers 
that we approached declined participation because of firm policy and time pressures.
Furthermore, by their nature, innovation brokers are involved in several and sometimes 
many inter-organizational processes. By accessing these brokers, we were able to extract tacit 
knowledge from the people with ample experience in inter-organizational cooperation, 
involving more than 100 inter-organizational innovation projects of SMEs. The general 
characteristics of the four innovation brokers in our analyses are provided in Table 4.1. See 
Appendix 3 for a more detailed description.
Internal validity was handled by conducting multiple iterations and follow-ups during the 
analyses. We addressed the problem of reliability by drawing up detailed case study protocols 
and by following the required documentation and transcription standards. External validity 
was increased by studying multiple organizations and analyzing multiple findings. To enhance 
the external validity further, we investigated the processes and practices of innovation brokers 
from different EU countries: two from the Netherlands, one from France and a German-
Dutch cross-border organization. Construct validity was enhanced by triangulation of 
the data sources. We therefore conducted 18 in-depth interviews (using semi-structured 
questionnaires) with key actors (innovation brokers, project leaders, and technical experts). 
We interviewed at least the director or general manager of the organization, and two other 
employees who act in the innovation networks as innovation brokers. In doing so, we were 
able to get both an in-depth and a broad picture of the organization, and to contrast views 
from within one organization. The first interview with each innovation broker – in all cases 
the interview with the director or general manager – had a much more open character than 
Profiting from external knowledge 83
 Orchestrating open innovation
Ta
bl
e 
4.
1.
 D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
of
 t
he
 in
no
va
tio
n 
br
ok
er
s 
co
m
pr
is
in
g 
th
e 
sa
m
pl
e.
In
n
o
va
ti
o
n
 
b
ro
k
er
Y
ea
r 
o
f 
in
it
ia
ti
o
n
R
eg
io
n
S
iz
e 
in
 
F
T
E
L
eg
al
 
st
at
u
s
M
ai
n
 s
o
u
rc
e(
s)
 o
f 
fu
n
d
in
g
T
yp
e 
o
f 
p
ro
je
ct
s
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s
K
no
w
H
ou
se
 
20
03
So
ut
he
as
t 
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
9
Pu
bl
ic
-
pr
iv
at
e
St
ar
tin
g 
lo
an
 fr
om
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s.
 
C
ur
re
nt
ly
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
en
tir
el
y 
on
 t
he
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
fr
om
 p
ro
je
ct
s
Ve
ry
 d
iv
er
se
. T
he
re
 is
 
co
op
er
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
se
ve
ra
l 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
4
m
y 
ey
es
20
05
M
ai
nl
y 
th
e 
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
, 
no
t 
of
fic
ia
lly
 
lim
ite
d 
to
 
on
e 
re
gi
on
5
Pr
iv
at
e
B
as
ic
 c
ap
it
al
 c
ol
le
ct
ed
 t
hr
ou
gh
 
sh
ar
e 
em
is
si
on
. M
os
t 
ea
rn
in
gs
 a
re
 d
ir
ec
tl
y 
fr
om
 
pr
oj
ec
ts
, m
an
y 
of
 w
hi
ch
 h
av
e 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n-
ba
se
d 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
m
od
el
s
Ve
ry
 d
iv
er
se
. P
ro
je
ct
s 
in
 ‘n
ew
 
co
m
m
er
ce
’, 
pa
rt
ne
rs
hi
p 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t,
 e
nt
re
pr
en
eu
ri
al
 
in
no
va
tio
n,
 s
ta
rt
-u
ps
, e
tc
.
5
G
IQ
S
20
01
M
ai
nl
y 
G
er
m
an
-
D
ut
ch
 b
or
de
r 
re
gi
on
5
Pu
bl
ic
-
pr
iv
at
e,
 
cr
os
s-
bo
rd
er
H
ar
dl
y 
an
y 
st
ru
ct
ur
al
 fu
nd
in
g.
 
M
os
t 
fu
nd
in
g 
is
 p
ub
lic
, m
ai
nl
y 
ba
se
d 
on
 la
rg
e 
EU
 fr
am
ew
or
k 
pr
oj
ec
ts
M
ai
nl
y 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n-
ba
se
d 
R
&
D
. 
R
el
at
iv
el
y 
la
rg
e 
pr
oj
ec
ts
, o
ft
en
 
su
bd
iv
id
ed
 in
to
 w
or
k 
pa
ck
ag
es
 
or
 s
ub
-p
ro
je
ct
s
4
PE
A
C
R
IT
T
20
01
R
ho
ne
 A
lp
es
 
(F
ra
nc
e)
7
Pu
bl
ic
Fu
nd
in
g 
by
 t
he
 r
eg
io
n 
an
d 
st
at
e 
(8
5%
) 
an
d 
th
e 
EU
 (1
5%
)
In
di
vi
du
al
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
ai
m
in
g 
at
 
st
ar
ti
ng
 in
no
va
ti
on
 a
t 
fir
m
s;
 
O
PT
Ir
és
ea
ux
 -
 fo
r 
st
im
ul
at
in
g 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
tr
an
sf
er
 t
o 
fo
od
 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 S
M
Es
; E
U
 p
ro
je
ct
s
5
84 Profiting from external knowledge
Chapter 4
the follow-up interviews, normally with the project leaders and technical experts active in the 
innovation networks. The more structured follow-up interviews allowed better comparison 
between the cases (Yin, 2003). The interviews lasted for about 1 to, in some cases, 2 hours. 
In addition to the interviews, we collected internal documents, annual reports, information 
from the websites, newsletters, etc. For the analysis of the innovation brokers, we combined 
interview data with collected documents. All interviews were tape recorded and fully 
transcribed. For each innovation broker a detailed within-case description was developed, 
drawing from the interviews and collected documents. After this, the cross-case analysis 
utilized a matrix technique for comparative analysis. In these matrices, exemplary quotes and 
other research findings from the cases were sorted per topic. Doing so enabled us to visually 
identify differences and similarities in the processes of innovation brokers. In order to provide 
in-depth understanding and contextualization, we have included examples from the data in 
Tables 4.2-4.8. These tables provide information on each case from the created matrices beyond 
that outlined in Table 1 and serve as the basis for the case discussion in the next section.
4.4 Results
This section primarily deals with the results from the cross-case analysis, but it also provides 
relevant information on all the individual cases. We focus on how innovation brokers create 
and extract value from their networks by trying to detect commonalities and differences in 
organizational characteristics and their roles and practices in the innovation networks. As 
such, the following sections present results from the qualitative data analysis to explain best 
practices of innovation brokers in orchestrating their innovation networks. The experiences 
of the innovation brokers found in this study form the basis for the formulation of the 
propositions. Our results focus on three main functions of innovation brokers from our 
research framework (see Section 4.2.4): innovation initiation, network composition, and 
innovation process management.
4.4.1 Innovation initiation
Incorporating innovation needs of SMEs
There are several ways innovation can be initiated. A fundamental aspect is the prime driver 
of a project. An innovation project involving SMEs can be driven by the entrepreneurs, by 
the availability of certain technologies following research, or by the availability of sources of 
funding. Hence, innovation projects can be characterized as ‘SME driven’, ‘research driven’, 
or ‘subsidy driven’. In particular, research-driven and subsidy-driven projects have several 
drawbacks, most notably that they deliver solutions without a real market potential. 
Both my eyes and KnowHouse acknowledge the importance of what they call the ‘dream 
stage’ (see Table 4.2). During this stage, SMEs or entrepreneurs can independently develop 
their ideas without being immediately influenced by limitations and restrictions imposed by 
Profiting from external knowledge 85
 Orchestrating open innovation
Table 4.2. Examples from the data for innovation initiation and incorporating SME’s innovation 
needs.
Case Quotes and other findings
KnowHouse ‘There is this example of a programme commission who had to decide about some 
40 innovation projects, proposed by an applied research institute. They divided the 
money between 30 projects, which meant that all projects needed to be downsized, 
making them ineffective. Now with KnowHouse, the ideas come straight from the 
sector, and we reduced the number of projects to only a few, but these projects or 
programmes really answered a question from the sector.’
‘We help them (the entrepreneurs) in their ‘dream stage’.’ 
‘Entrepreneurs must be enthusiastic. We are not going to pull endlessly.’
my eyes ‘In traditional innovation projects the first step of an innovation is missing… in 
our projects we take the time for what we call the ‘dream phase’ to better 
conceptualize the initial ideas of the entrepreneurs.’
‘We always look at the ‘sense of urgency’ of an entrepreneur.’
‘We appreciate novel ideas of entrepreneurs and try to keep them authentic. Many 
advisory companies try to standardize everything according to their own business 
models, with the result that the end product is also standard.’
GIQS ‘We actively ask firms to get involved in projects. Sometimes that is difficult. We visit 
them… ask to take a look at the new initiative and ask if they are willing to take part 
in this project. Or, we ask them if they have new ideas for projects. So it basically 
goes from both sides.’
‘They [the SMEs] also need to invest in the project (as with other EU 6th framework 
programmes, only 50%, of the funding is from the EU). So they really must be willing 
to do it, because it is partly their own money.’
‘We have the comfortable situation that at the beginning of a project, we don’t exactly 
know what we will do. We more or less have a topic and a partner structure. Then 
we have about six months to define, analyze and plan the pilot project. That is very 
nice, because there are so many demands, especially since business has different 
problems than science. And these two worlds have to be brought together. My task 
is to manage this whole process from the idea stage, to match science and business.’
PEACRITT ‘PEACRITT provides situation analysis by a technical expert at the entrepreneurial 
firm, free of charge, in order to identify the company-specific problems and related 
knowledge needs.’
‘It costs little or nothing for entrepreneurs to get involved in potential projects.’
‘We help entrepreneurs to develop new ideas.’
‘The added value of the innovation must be self evident for SMEs, it should focus on 
benefits for the companies.’
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funding bodies (governments), research institutes or other organizations. The four innovation 
brokers pointed at the need to assess whether the SME possesses a sufficient ‘sense of urgency’ 
to engage in the innovation. This enables the SME to commit to the innovation network and 
be open to the necessary changes. 
In some innovation projects it can work differently. For instance, many projects of GIQS are 
part of large EU programmes (such as INTERREG) on a specific theme or topic. Within 
such a theme, several sub-projects are initiated by intensively discussing the options within 
the GIQS network. The content of these projects results from iterative talks and negotiations 
between the private and public organizations involved in the project. Then, as the overall 
project progresses, more specific innovation needs of SMEs are included.
We must conclude that each innovation broker in our study is actively concerned with 
incorporating the needs of SMEs in a project idea. They do this by assisting entrepreneurs 
or SMEs with demand articulation, i.e. problem diagnosis and specification, articulating 
innovative ideas, and translating them into knowledge needs and other factors needed for 
innovation. We argue that innovation projects that involve SMEs must truly be SME driven, 
which implies that the needs and problems of SMEs must be the point of departure for any 
innovation project. Therefore we have formulated the following proposition:
Proposition 1a
P1a: To orchestrate initiating innovation, innovation brokers should focus on the needs of SMEs.
Embeddedness of innovation brokers 
Crucial for initiating innovation networks that work on a problem relevant for SMEs is that 
innovation brokers interact with the entrepreneurs. Innovation brokers should also make 
sure that they are sufficiently visible for innovating SMEs (Kolodny et al., 2001). Indeed, 
the innovation brokers in our study organize diverse events in order to meet with SMEs and 
agricultural entrepreneurs, like innovation cafés, workshops or partnership days, and use 
several promotional means (see Table 4.3). Besides, to meet the SMEs the innovation brokers 
rely on the networking capabilities of their staff. As a result, the innovation brokers become 
truly embedded in the networks of SMEs targeted. 
The respondents explained that, in addition to identifying specific innovation needs of SMEs, 
maintaining a large network helps them to identify ‘common problems’, observe connections 
with those that could provide complementary assets (e.g. knowledge, funding) and make the 
necessary links with other actors. For instance, GIQS organizes workshops and meetings with 
several stakeholders to discuss a common problem. Such a problem could be one that is of 
interest for the whole sector and that serves the public as well (e.g. food safety). GIQS then 
uses this information to develop more specific ideas for new projects.
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Consequently, to be able to properly articulate the innovation demands of SMEs, innovation 
brokers must be well embedded in the local business and social networks of the SMEs, as well 
the networks of other stakeholders. We therefore argue that the degree of embeddedness of 
Table 4.3. Examples from the data for innovation initiation and network embeddedness.
Case Quotes and other findings
KnowHouse ‘We meet the entrepreneurs at all kinds of events (social or otherwise) in the region 
in order to understand their problems and needs.’
‘We organize ‘innovation cafés’, where entrepreneurs gather and engage in 
networking.’
‘For entrepreneurs, innovation-related activities take place after office hours, in the 
evenings… KnowHouse visits these companies, also in the evenings.’
my eyes ‘We organize partner days, where we meet different entrepreneurs, but also other 
types of actors.’
‘Sometimes we hear something from two different people in our network and think 
they could be brought together.’
GIQS ‘Especially the director and the other people in the board have a very good network. 
They are able to speak directly to the right individuals.’
‘We have two people at GIQS who travel a lot and talk to our members and other 
stakeholders to search for new ideas or to find motivated partners for existing 
ideas.’
‘We sometimes visit trade fairs and other expert events where we meet businesses, 
but also scientific people.’
‘We organize idea generation workshops where we invite business partners and 
scientific partners and we have an annual meeting where we try to launch a specific 
topic or theme.’
‘We organize a big workshop in September, with all stakeholders. But these activities 
are limited to two or three times per year, due to the lack of structural funding.’
‘We are also becoming more and more involved in newsletters or events organized by 
other organizations. Through these events, where we meet many business partners, 
new ideas reach our organization.’
PEACRITT ‘Many means are used to get SMEs interested in our services, such as PR, newsletters, 
fact sheets, our website, exhibitions and conference days.’
‘PEACRITT organizes a platform day for sharing ideas. This so-called OPTIréseaux 
day is seen as a good opportunity for exchange that encourages enterprises to 
formulate ideas and share them with other enterprises, experts and the regional 
authorities.’
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an innovation broker in the SME’s social and business network, and the network of other 
stakeholders is essential for successful innovation initiation. This brings Proposition 1b:
Proposition 1b
P1b: To orchestrate innovation initiation, innovation brokers should be embedded in the social and business 
network of local SMEs.
4.4.2 Network composition
The second main function for the innovation broker is network composition. We explained in 
Section 4.2.4 that network composition entails scanning and selecting complementary actors, 
and establishing the procedures and tasks for the partnership.
Connecting with complementary actors from the innovation broker network 
Many SMEs find it hard to connect with providers of knowledge (technological and 
otherwise) by themselves. It seems therefore that innovation brokers can be most valuable to 
the innovation process if they have access to and credibility with those sources of knowledge 
(Kolodny et al., 2001). Indeed, all innovation brokers in the study maintain a strong network 
with several suppliers of knowledge, often the research organizations who are also a member or 
even one of the founders of the innovation brokers (e.g. in KnowHouse, GIQS, see Table 4.4). 
The respondents noted that they put a lot of effort into maintaining an extensive network, 
which enables them to quickly connect to other actors and set up goal-oriented innovation 
networks. Moreover, the innovation brokers do not limit their networks to the region or the 
core sector; they also make connections outside the agri-food sector when they are thought 
to be useful. In addition, during the interviews it came to the fore that the innovation brokers 
also maintain strong ties with public authorities, such as local government. 
From the above data, we have ascertained that in order to make the right connections 
for composing an innovation network, the innovation broker must possess a large and 
heterogeneous network. Therefore, we formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 2a
P2a: To orchestrate network composition, innovation brokers should maintain a large and heterogeneous 
network.
Furthermore, the case findings suggest that network membership is not enough for composing 
a successful innovation network. The worlds of research, authorities and industry often have 
different cultures and priorities and are therefore not always easy to connect and keep connected 
( Johnson, 2008; Rasmussen, 2008; Winch and Courtney, 2007). Being in a position between 
the different stakeholders, the innovation brokers play a crucial role here. 
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Table 4.4. Examples from the data for network composition.
Case Quotes and other findings
KnowHouse ‘Our foundation is ‘a knowledge portal’ for entrepreneurs. Wageningen University 
and Research Centre (WUR) is also one of the founders. It is impossible to have a 
holistic picture of all relevant sciences, but our network is far reaching, and then it is 
easy to make phone calls’
‘We often see a broader scope than entrepreneurs, and we see connections… then 
we know somebody and include them.’
‘With research institutions it is important that we already know them… some 
researchers just cannot work together with entrepreneurs.’
‘It can be fruitful to bring entrepreneurs from different sectors together. Since they 
are not competitors, and they don’t need to cope with status, these entrepreneurs 
are much more open towards each other, which in turn results in new ideas.’
my eyes ‘We have a multidisciplinary approach, and we understand all components. We also 
have a strong network with specialists for those components. We can bring things 
together, that is our holistic approach.’
‘Sometimes we hear something from two different people in our network and think 
they could be brought together.’
GIQS ‘We have good connections to people from other departments. But also our 
connections with public authorities are important. It is not difficult for us to find the 
specific people.’
‘At a higher level we also participate in a formal (national) network, called 
‘Kompetenznetze’ (competence network), so we are also visible to business and 
academia through this network. Organizations search these networks for partners 
in projects.’
‘GIQS has excellent access to knowledge sources, especially to sources at the 
universities of Bonn, Wageningen, and Götingen.’
‘You really have to know the people, and from the people you know the connections 
continue.’
‘In North Rhine-Westphalia, we also have good links to government, such as the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Science.’
PEACRITT ‘PEACRITT is well connected to many regional research centres.’
‘As an broker organization, we are closer to the industrial world than most research 
organizations, so we can mediate between industry and research.’
‘SMEs usually look for ways to improve economic performance, e.g. consolidation or 
growth of turnover and jobs. In contrast, academic researchers aim at publication 
in scientific journals, which requires a partnership with enterprises that are 
outstanding in the scientific field. An organization like PEACRITT can bridge the gap 
between the two worlds.’
‘We are a kind of ‘door opener’ for SMEs to collectively analyze a problem and 
facilitate a linkage to technical support.’
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The innovation brokers in this study seem to be aware of the fact that many innovation problems 
require multiple disciplines. The respondents emphasized the importance of possessing the 
skills and the absorptive capacity to understand complex problems, and to find experts on 
each discipline and link up with them. In this respect, innovation brokers can be especially 
valuable when connecting different types of actors who have different interests and cultural 
backgrounds. Previous research also suggested that innovation brokers add value by linking 
up complementary partners, so that each partner contributes specific strengths (Hanna and 
Walsh, 2008). Thus, we formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 2b
P2b: To orchestrating network composition, innovation brokers should link up complementary actors.
Coordination mechanisms
Before an inter-organizational innovation project gets started, appropriate coordination 
mechanisms (e.g. procedures, tasks and property rights) must be settled in order to prevent 
members from shielding off valuable knowledge, and to avoid free riding (Dekker, 2004; Dyer 
and Nobeoka, 2000). SMEs are often unfamiliar with inter-organizational projects, especially 
regarding the appropriate coordination mechanisms, so this is an area where innovation 
brokers can typically be valuable. 
It was put forward during the interviews that, in contrast to the SMEs, innovation brokers 
have ample experience with earlier innovation projects and often have explicit ideas and even 
templates for setting up appropriate coordination mechanisms, such as contracts (see Table 
4.5). For instance, KnowHouse and my eyes perceive a contract as a necessary backup, but they 
also note that in the case of innovation not too many details should be settled in advance. An 
overly detailed contract would decrease the level of freedom and creativity, which is perceived 
as detrimental to innovation. Interestingly, in some projects, my eyes’ solution to this problem 
is to include a small number of scenarios in the contract: a best case, a normal case and a worst-
case scenario. This enables the firms to have a better idea of where they may end up in different 
scenarios. Confidentiality is a common issue often addressed by the SMEs that must be settled 
up-front by the innovation broker. SMEs seem to be afraid that sensitive information will leak 
out through the network.
According to the respondents, formulating contracts can require a lot of effort, especially 
when they comprise many details. This effort can be disproportional to the size of the project. 
Evidently, SMEs are not keen on doing such a job. Moreover, when innovation networks are 
(co-) funded by large bodies, such as the EU, there are many formal issues that need to be settled 
up front. Innovation brokers such as GIQS and PEACRITT typically have the capability to 
deal with the formal coordination and administration procedures imposed by large subsidy 
providers. In this way, innovation brokers make larger EU projects accessible to SMEs. 
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Table 4.5. Examples from the data for network composition and coordination mechanisms.
Case Quotes and other findings
KnowHouse ‘We have our own standard confidentiality agreements. When it concerns more 
financial aspects of the project, we ask for advice from a legal expert.’
‘Contracts are not very important in our projects, as they are typically rather small.’
‘I never refer to the contract during projects.’
‘Planning related issues is not part of these contracts, we also do not formalize the 
method and frequency of communication.’
my eyes ‘In most projects we set up the contract. We have some templates, which can be 
supplemented with requirements from other participants.’
‘Many entrepreneurs don’t feel like writing a contract themselves. They lack the 
experience to do so, and we have templates so we can do it quicker’
‘If it is useful for the process, then it could be necessary to define planning-related 
aspects. When a lot of uncertainty is involved, and interactivity and open 
communication is key, then you should not have too many protocols.’
‘… it is impossible to work without a contract; the examples I have seen of projects 
without contracts are not the successful ones… The mobility of people in firms is 
very high nowadays. So personal agreements are also temporary. Therefore you 
need a safety net.’
‘With new things (innovations) it is always difficult. Together with our partners we 
make sure there is a worst case, best case and normal case scenario. When things 
go wrong, you know where you stand.’
GIQS ‘GIQS often takes the lead in this process. We write the contracts and set up the 
administrative procedures, the project plan, etc.’
‘We are familiar with the complexity that comes with large-scale EU framework 
projects. SMEs don’t like the extensive administration that is often required, GIQS 
makes it easier for them.’
‘The contracts include issues of property rights, patents, publication, the reporting 
procedures and financial issues.’
PEACRITT ‘We provide the enterprises with administrative and financial engineering, which is 
really important and time consuming for the SMEs (who are always in a rush).’
‘PEACRITT brings professionalism to the innovation process of agri-food SMEs.’
‘We focus on the process, other actors are responsible for the content.’
‘Confidentiality has to be settled in a formal way.’
‘PEACRITT simplifies the administrative framework imposed by funding bodies on the 
firms.’
‘We promote group autonomy, by stimulating co-responsibility and joint decision 
making.’
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To summarize, the innovation brokers in our study often take the lead in setting up the 
coordination mechanisms for the innovation network. We learned from the cases that 
compared with other actors in the network, especially SMEs, an experienced innovation 
broker should be capable of establishing the most suitable coordination mechanisms. They 
know what a successful cooperation requires and are consequently best placed to set up 
appropriate arrangements (Hanna and Walsh, 2008). Therefore, innovation networks take 
the lead in setting up the coordination mechanisms, so that innovation networks are less likely 
to face, or will become better prepared for potential problems. Altogether, we arrive at the 
following proposition:
Proposition 2c
P2c: To orchestrate network composition, innovation brokers should take the lead in setting up coordination 
mechanisms.
4.4.3 Innovation process management
The interviews clearly showed that all four innovation brokers are involved in innovation 
process management. The innovation brokers are primarily concerned with the cooperative 
aspects of the innovation process, for instance by resolving conflicts between participating 
actors. Apart from typical cooperation-related issues in innovation process management, 
innovation brokers also take care of other activities of innovation process management, such 
as gate keeping and standard project management and administration. In the context of this 
study, we are primarily interested in innovation process management issues that are typical in 
the inter-organizational context, such as handling conflict, and the stimulation of network 
interactions. 
Conflict handling 
Managing the stability of the network is an important element in managing the inter-
organizational innovation project (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Wissema and Euser, 1991). 
Ideally, projects and networks are composed in such a way that conflicts are unlikely to occur 
(see Section 4.4.2). But when conflicts do occur, it is suggested that innovation brokers can 
play an important role in handling them ( Johnson, 2008; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008b; Winch 
and Courtney, 2007).
The four innovation brokers in our study consider solving problems and conflicts in their 
innovation networks as one of their core activities (see Table 4.6). For instance, KnowHouse 
sees conflict handling in innovation networks as the most valuable service it has to offer. It 
is especially when conflicts occur, that KnowHouse comes further to the fore in the network, 
trying to steer the project in the right direction. 
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Table 4.6. Examples from the data for innovation process management and handling conflicts.
Case Quotes and other findings
KnowHouse ‘Solving problems is actually our core task… we mainly use common sense in that we 
do not use specific models… although we seem to have our own approach as well.’
‘We approach people personally, bilaterally, and sometimes tell them they should 
change their attitude.’
‘If there are problems in the cooperation process, we pull towards a solution. But if 
they really want to stop, we will just stop. But if this is a relational problem, and we 
still see opportunities for the project, we try to solve these problems.’
 ‘You really have to look at what is the real reason of a conflict… often there is some 
distrust. People always expect the other partners to have hidden agendas … I have 
the feeling that conflicts are more about something like that, rather than about 
costs and benefits.’
‘You really have to understand why people participate in a project.’
‘In some circumstances, when everyone agrees, we change the contract. The contract 
often states how and under which conditions things can be modified. Consensus is 
not always required, as long as nobody is against it.’
my eyes ‘This is the essence of my eyes’ working method, a kind of mediation. You have to 
show people the common goals in order to get them back together.’
‘We can be an outsider, which can make it – the innovation network – more stable.’
‘For example, a recent conflict was caused by different expectations. You first have to 
determine that this is the underlying cause of a conflict, and then by mentioning the 
different expectations, you can try and resolve it’
‘We also use the concept of dynamic consensus. That means that you should make 
decisions in a democratic way, but you also have to listen to everybody who has a 
different opinion. Even if it is a conflicting opinion, they have it for some reason and 
you have to understand that reason. You have to find out which fear or experience 
is fundamental to the way they act, and why someone has a different opinion.’
‘You always have to find a solution when there is a conflict, but when a company 
wants to stop, you just have to.’
‘If a partner is dissatisfied about something and there are fair reasons for this 
dissatisfaction, then we change elements in the contract to improve the long-term 
relationship. However, if it is just a matter of shifting the ‘pain’ towards others or to 
us, then we cannot accept that.’
‘There is a large project in which I sometimes refer to the contract, but I realize it can 
look ‘childish’ to use it…’
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In the case of conflicts between the other parties innovation brokers are typically an outsider 
(Hanna and Walsh, 2008; Johnson, 2008). In this outsider role, innovation brokers can be 
considered as a stabilizing factor in the cooperation process. Moreover, it became clear during 
the interviews that when handling conflicts, innovation brokers draw from their experience 
and ‘lessons learned’ from previous projects.
In conflict handling, the innovation brokers emphasize the importance of a personal approach, 
which means that one should focus not on formal organizations, but on their people. For 
instance, my eyes uses techniques such as mediation or dynamic consensus in order to arrive at 
a setting with minimal conflicts. One respondent of my eyes explained that it is important to 
listen carefully to any opinion and to try to understand why people say certain things, or have 
a strong opinion. These techniques help to solve conflicts. 
Some respondents experienced that many problems and related conflicts occur due to the 
existence of hidden agenda’s, different expectations, or a lack of motivation. Partners sometimes 
find it difficult to do tasks that are not primarily in their own interest. In the case of conflicts 
PEACRITT carefully takes into account the goals of entrepreneurs on the one side and the 
research institutes on the other side. It may be a challenge to identify and emphasize common 
goals of the project, but this is typically something in which PEACRITT takes the lead.
Table 4.6. Continued.
Case Quotes and other findings
GIQS ‘In my project, two partners work together who also worked together in a previous 
project. During that previous project they had a conflict. But they tried working 
together again in this new project. We first tried to find out what went wrong, what 
was the problem exactly, without pointing directly at who was responsible. And 
now in this project we try to organize it differently in order to avoid that problem.’
‘A typical conflict is that you have defined a different output in the project. It is often 
difficult to get every output from every partner.’ 
‘Sometimes partners don’t really know what they should do, and then they need more 
support to define the specific output. We give them such support.’
‘We have to deal with that conflict, because it is also our responsibility that the 
projects end successfully’ 
PEACRITT ‘We realize that the objectives of SMEs and researchers are different. In particular, 
very small enterprises do not look for fundamental or complex innovations, but 
instead look for technical solutions already approved and tested.’
‘It is important in a collective setting to have a common problem, so we try to direct 
the projects towards a common objective.’
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In line with earlier studies, we conclude that innovation brokers take the lead in handling 
conflicts. Furthermore, we conclude that innovation brokers are able to do so, because they 
have ample experience with previous innovation networks and because of their neutral position 
in the network innovation broker. 
Proposition 3a
P3a: To orchestrate the innovation process, innovation brokers should take the lead in handling conflicts 
between the network members.
Enhancing transparency
In addition to structural, motivational, and formal mechanisms, informal mechanisms also play 
an important role in preventing conflicts (Dekker, 2004). In the informal context, issues like 
trust, transparency and openness become apparent. Trust is a phenomenon often considered as 
one of the basic requirements for successful cooperation in inter-organizational relationships 
(Bstieler, 2006; Nooteboom, 1999a; Uzzi, 1997; Zaheer et al., 1998). Trust can be defined as 
a psychological state comprising the intention to accept the vulnerability based upon the positive 
expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another (Rousseau et al., 1998). Several facilitators 
of trust exist, such as social interactions and transparency between network partners (Bstieler, 
2006). In this study, transparency refers to timely, accurate, open and adequate communication 
among the people in the network, in order to develop a shared understanding, to improve the 
atmosphere of the relationship and to foster commitment.
The respondents stated that transparency in all processes and openness towards all partners 
are important factors for the stability of innovation networks (see Table 4.7). As the director 
of my eyes put it, problems in innovation networks occur due to differences in expectations (caused 
by an unintended lack of transparency about the expectations), hidden agendas (a deliberate lack 
of transparency) or because of ‘unasked questions’ (lack of openness due to dependencies). 
The innovation brokers in this study deal with transparency in innovation networks in several 
ways. According to one of the respondents of KnowHouse, persons that fulfil the role of 
innovation broker should be open-minded towards everyone in the network, clearly say what 
he or she thinks, and inform others about what is on his/her mind. In doing so, also the other 
network actors are stimulated to enhance transparency. In addition, KnowHouse facilitates 
transparency by making sure that all partners clearly state why they are participating in the 
project and by being open about situations (problems) not directly related to the project. It 
could explain why somebody acts in a certain way in a project. Sometimes a neutral setting 
(which could be at the location of the innovation broker) stimulates entrepreneurs to be more 
open as well. 
KnowHouse believes that the internal organization should also be transparent. According to 
one respondent, the colleagues at KnowHouse are also very open towards each other. Also in the 
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Table 4.7. Examples from the data for innovation process management and enhancing transparency.
Case Quotes and other findings
KnowHouse ‘It is always important that at an early stage parties communicate explicitly why they 
are participating in the project, but normally that takes quite some time. That also 
makes it easier to settle the financial issues.’
‘There was this example in a project where somebody often changed his standpoint, 
without clearly explaining why…we thought it had to do with the company 
succession (father-son). But it was incredibly difficult for this guy to explain 
something like that in the group (with other entrepreneurs). We addressed that 
issue in the group. That helped.’
‘Only by being open towards each other, can you trust each other. You must be 
able to discuss anything, including personal things. As a consequence, we have a 
working method that we included in our projects. But if you want to work like that 
in external projects, you must make sure this openness is also present inside your 
organization,’
‘It starts with people. We are very transparent in everything we do, and we always 
keep our word. You must also trust the other people, that means that you have to 
present yourself in an open way. Being open and transparent means that you have to 
say what you think. Also when we see or hear something strange in a meeting, we 
ask about it straightaway.’
my eyes ‘Unasked questions sooner or later result in problems.’
‘Projects often fail, or fail to get started, because of hidden agendas…it is a challenge 
to be open and fair’
‘If something goes wrong in a project you should look at yourself first to see if you 
have a role in this… And when things go well, people assume it is due to their 
efforts,… but is it really? You should be honest with yourself… but this goes against 
the nature of most people.’
‘You should be able say what you want (in a cooperative project), similar to the situation 
where you are the boss. Often, however, dependence is created between the 
participant with the idea and the financer. That is deadly for a project. The one with 
the idea cannot say what he/she really thinks, which limits the potential of the idea.’
GIQS ‘I ask a lot of questions, because I don’t understand everything. Sometimes that seems 
stupid to them, but with my questions, they also know at the end what the problem 
is. So it helps to define problems as well.’
PEACRITT ‘In the collective efforts it is important that there is a situation where individual 
problems are openly discussed.’
‘We try to valorise success stories by systematically presenting results from projects.’
‘In our framework of collective projects, there are visits to participating companies or 
study trips. The companies become more aware of the possibilities that come with 
the project, and they experience that the project is becoming more realistic.’
‘In reporting as well, you need to be open and honest.’
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projects – each run by one of the co-innovators - the participants should share their problems 
because this leads to new ideas and solutions. In a similar vein, one of the respondents of my 
eyes states that transparency is also about being fair about what you do yourself. If a project 
appears to be going into the wrong direction, anyone should have the courage to acknowledge 
his/her own role in this situation. Similarly, in the case of success one should consider whether 
he/she can really take credit, or whether it was due to something or someone else.
Transparency can also be facilitated by asking questions during project meetings. For instance, 
by asking many questions GIQS forces the various partners to really think about the project 
and explicitly state why they do certain things in certain ways. In this way, GIQS tries to make 
it clear if there are problems, hidden or otherwise. 
Finally, transparency also refers to previous acts and achievements. The innovation brokers 
stated that in ongoing projects it is important to present results at an early stage. By visiting test 
sites, (early) results can be made visible to everyone in the network. Moreover, some innovation 
brokers structurally include small, go/no-go decision moments, which implies that the each 
decision moment concerns relatively little money. As a result, these small go/no-go decision 
moments make the components of innovation effort in innovation networks transparent and 
comprehensive enough for each member. In this way, little-by-little, trust will be enhanced just 
enough to go one step further. At a later stage, when there is more trust, entrepreneurs will be 
more willing to invest, since the partners will have more confidence in the overall project. 
To summarize, the cases revealed that innovation brokers can play a crucial role in the 
innovation process by enhancing transparency in the actions of individual partners and the 
joint innovation activities. Based on the above findings, we have formulated the following 
proposition:
Proposition 3b
P3b: To orchestrate the innovation process, innovation brokers should focus on enhancing transparency 
between the network members.
Network interactions 
In innovation networks, the way partners interact and communicate is said to be another 
important factor for success, because interaction between network partners enhances trust 
(Bstieler, 2006; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Innovation brokers may be very helpful in 
mediating between the two worlds of industry and research, who have different mindsets, 
expectations and time frames. In this regard, innovation brokers may act as a translator or 
mediator ( Johnson, 2008; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008b) to facilitate a situation that enhances 
knowledge mobility (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006) and subsequent learning. 
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The innovation brokers in our study play a leading role in the interactions within the 
inter-organizational innovation networks (see Table 4.8). First, the innovation brokers all 
acknowledge the importance of having face-to-face meetings in the innovation networks. 
These meetings are often organized by the innovation brokers. Face-to-face meetings are 
needed to exchange information in such a way that everybody in the network is up to date, so 
that the more important decisions can be made. In addition, KnowHouse, for instance, calls in 
all participants for a meeting if there is a specific problem in the cooperation process.
During the innovation network meetings, innovation brokers often play the role of moderator. 
This role comes naturally to them, because innovation brokers often have a neutral position 
in the network. Sometimes another independent party is included to chair the meeting, and 
sometimes an external expert is included, who can add a new perspective to the project.
According to several respondents, because meetings take a lot of time, and travel is often 
required, they should not be held too often and be complemented with other mechanisms. 
Meetings must be planned very carefully, with clearly defined goals. Moreover, innovation 
brokers use many other means of communication in the innovation networks, such as 
telephone, e-mail, digital document sharing, video conferencing, or workshops. My eyes has 
developed specific services and tools that facilitate inter-organizational cooperation, based 
on ICT. KnowHouse’s main means of communication remains the telephone, since this seems 
to be most appropriate when dealing with the entrepreneurs. Both GIQS and PEACRITT 
note that it is important that an innovation broker responds quickly to the SMEs, whereas 
to research institutes, the interaction may take more time. It appears that innovation brokers 
are aware of the different practices between different types of partners in communication and 
interaction. Consequently, they are in a good position to stimulate the interaction so that there 
is a good platform for learning. 
To conclude, from the cases we have ascertained that innovation brokers are very concerned 
with interaction processes in the innovation networks and that they take the lead in facilitating 
interactions between the network members, who often represent different types of actors with 
different timeframes and cultures. 
Proposition 3c
To orchestrate the innovation process, innovation brokers should focus on facilitating interaction within the 
network.
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Table 4.8. Examples from the data for innovation process management and interaction.
Case Quotes and other findings
KnowHouse ‘Meetings are about synchronizing, about making some decisions… many things can be 
settled on the phone, but sometimes you just have to sit around the table.’
‘There are regular meetings about the progress, and there are meetings when there 
are problems… then, the agendas and the objectives are totally different.’
‘We just use the telephone a lot… that just seems to work best’
‘Depending on the project, the frequency differs... also, when there are problems we 
make contact several times per day, but if a project runs well, once per week may 
be sufficient.’
‘When a researcher from a research institution is included, he/she needs to 
participate in the process with the entrepreneurs.’
my eyes ‘We use all kinds of interactive means of communication: video, individual, workshops, 
games – whatever may be necessary. In general we have an informal way of 
communicating, but we also realize that formal communication is needed, especially 
with the feedback.’
‘Real physical meetings are also very important, but this requires a lot of time as well. 
You need to find a balance.’
‘Project meetings should always have a goal, which we determine beforehand. It can 
really benefit the meeting if there is an independent party who leads or chairs the 
meeting.’
‘My eyes developed ICT tools especially to facilitate inter-organizational cooperation.’
GIQS ‘You have to respond quickly to SMEs, but you should also be careful with potential 
information overload.’
‘Business partners have a lack of time, so it is really hard to contact them. Often I call 
them on their mobile phone and ask about the project, and I e-mail them.’
‘To a certain extent, I can guide the discussion so that progress is made during the 
meetings. I take minutes, I organize the agenda and the topics, and I try to moderate 
the meetings, to keep the overall aim of a meeting in mind.’
‘It is very important that partners physically meet each other. It is not easy to build 
trust by only communicating by e-mail and telephone. For us it is important to have 
a meeting with all partners at least every six months, so that everybody knows 
what is going on, what the problems are and so on. They just share their knowledge 
better that way.’
‘You can’t compel trust, it grows in time. Meetings and social events are important, 
and it is quite important that all the partners visit each other. But it is sometimes 
complicated to meet each other all together, people need to travel.’
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4.5 Discussion and conclusions
This chapter addressed the problem SMEs have in finding successful ways to innovate in a 
partnership. In particular, we concentrated on the question as to how innovation brokers 
orchestrate SME innovation networks in the agri-food sector (RQ3). Networks are 
increasingly becoming important for the innovation activities of agri-food firms (Batterink et 
al., 2006; Bertolini and Giovannetti, 2006; Gellynck et al., 2007; Pannekoek et al., 2005), but 
especially SMEs have difficulties to profit from it (Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001; Kaufmann 
and Tödtling, 2002; Van Gils and Zwart, 2004). 
Based on three main functions for innovation brokers in orchestrating innovation networks 
– innovation initiation, network composition, and innovation process management – eight 
propositions were developed, each accompanied by best practices and rich insights identified 
from the cases. Our results indicate that innovation brokers successfully orchestrate innovation 
networks when they engage in a number of network orchestration processes (see our framework 
in Figure 4.1). Innovation brokers orchestrate innovation initiation by incorporating the actual 
innovation needs of SMEs in the innovation project (Proposition 1a) and by being strongly 
embedded in the social and business networks of the SMEs (Proposition 1b). Innovation 
network composition can be successfully orchestrated when innovation brokers maintain a 
large and diverse network (Proposition 2a) and by the extent to which an innovation broker 
is really capable of connecting with complementary actors (Proposition 2b). Moreover, 
when orchestrating network composition, innovation brokers take the lead in setting up the 
coordination mechanisms (Proposition 2c). After innovation networks are created, innovation 
brokers play an important role in innovation process management. Innovation brokers should 
take the lead in handling conflicts that accompany the inter-organizational processes, thereby 
orchestrating the actual innovation process (Proposition 3a). Additionally, innovation brokers 
Table 4.8. Continued.
Case Quotes and other findings
PEACRITT ‘The ideal is to answer the SMEs within three days of their request. But it depends on 
the time of year. Some times are more problematic for us than others.’
‘…save time for training and mutual knowledge exchange.’
‘Peacritt offers a platform in which different types of actors interact, analyse common 
problems and consider joint solutions.’
Our role of ‘translator’ is very important in complex partnerships that comprise 
a varied set of actors from different worlds… We build a bridge between those 
worlds and try to develop a ‘common language.’
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orchestrate the innovation process in networks by enhancing transparency (Proposition 3b) 
and facilitating interaction between network members (Proposition 3c).
4.5.1 Limitations and suggestions for further research
The present study has a number of potential limitations. First, it should be noted that our 
theoretical framework for orchestrating innovation networks by innovation brokers may 
not be conclusive. The four in-depth case studies could have overlooked important elements 
of innovation network orchestration. However, our results do confirm the findings from 
existing literature on innovation networks and innovation brokers. For example, we found that 
innovation brokers help to initiate innovation networks by helping SMEs to articulate their 
knowledge demand, by searching for, delineating, filtering and matching cooperation partners, 
and by guiding the actual cooperation during the innovation process. This corresponds with 
the findings from other studies of innovation brokers (e.g. Boon et al., 2008; Klerkx and 
Leeuwis, 2008a; Sapsed et al., 2007). 
Second, the generalizability of the propositions is limited by the relatively small size and 
scope of the sample, which is inherent to this type of exploratory study. Larger-scale empirical 
research is necessary to statistically assess the relationships presented here and to help define the 
contexts in which these relationships vary. Moreover, the results of this study could be context 
specific and vary between different regions and different institutional settings. However, we 
investigated innovation brokers from different European countries, and the results suggest that 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Framework for successful network orchestration by innovation brokers 
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Figure 4.1. Framework for successful network orchestration by innovation brokers.
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there are many similarities in the way innovation brokers orchestrate innovation networks. 
An area for further research could be comparing innovation brokers from different countries 
and/or institutional settings. Possible issues are, for instance, how to orchestrate innovation 
networks in more developing countries? Or how does country culture affect orchestration 
processes among innovating firms?
Third, in our study on network orchestration we concentrated on the innovation brokers 
and were unable to, for instance, interview the SMEs or other members of the networks. 
Evidently, SMEs may have a different view on the role of an innovation broker in network 
orchestration processes. Nevertheless, SMEs would only be able to reflect on one or just a few 
projects, whereas the innovation brokers in our study have experience with a large number of 
innovation projects.
We make a special plea for quantitative studies on innovation brokers, both at the level of 
innovation networks (comparing networks that are being orchestrated by an innovation broker 
with networks that are not) and at the level of the innovation broker (comparing different 
types of innovation brokers and the impact of their specific tools and instruments, and certain 
organizational characteristics on performance). Moreover, the way in which innovation brokers 
function in different types of innovation networks (with respect to structure: density, centrality 
and size) is another theoretical issue that should be investigated further, since the structure of a 
network may impact the network orchestration process (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006).
4.5.2 Concluding remarks 
Our in-depth study of four innovation brokers makes a welcome contribution to the existing 
literature on innovation networks and innovation brokers for it answers the call for studies 
of the actual practices of successful innovation brokers (Sapsed et al., 2007; Winch and 
Courtney, 2007). In addition, our study on orchestrating open innovation has a number of 
implications. First, the study has made explicit several ways in which innovation brokers can 
help SMEs to overcome the typical barriers to innovation as we outlined in Section 4.2.1. In 
line with other studies (e.g. Hanna and Walsh, 2008), we conclude that due to their experience 
with previous inter-organizational processes, innovation brokers have a clear understanding 
of what a successful cooperation requires. As a result, innovation brokers can assist SMEs 
that are inexperienced with inter-organizational processes, so that the SMEs can profit from 
the knowledge and capabilities of other organizations. In addition, innovation brokers can 
make large capital funding available to SMEs by making the strict administrative procedures 
imposed by large subsidy providers more comprehensive for the SMEs. 
Second, the results suggest several ways in which SMEs can improve the performance of 
innovation networks themselves. For example, SMEs must act in an open way, i.e. they must 
be explicit about why they are participating in the project and must be open about situations 
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(problems) not directly related to the project. This is how they can add to an open and positive 
atmosphere that is essential for learning and innovation in an inter-organizational setting.
Third, policymakers can take into account the best practices identified in our study when 
they stimulate SME-driven innovation networks. They may consider investing in innovation 
brokerage as an important instrument for stimulating innovation of SMEs, regional or 
otherwise. Our case study findings are derived from a number of successful innovation brokers 
from different European regions with rich experience in inter-organizational processes. The 
insights provided by this study could therefore serve as a starting point for establishing a new 
innovation broker, especially if focussed on SMEs in the agri-food sector. However, one should 
be careful when using a general template. As was explained during one of the interviews: If you 
want to set up something similar to our organization in a different region, you should make sure 
it is independent from how it is set up here. You really have to consider the dynamics of the region 
and set it up accordingly. This corresponds with arguments forwarded by Tödtling and Trippl 
(2005) that simply copying a successful recipe for innovation support is unlikely to be feasible, 
and that context-specific interventions must be designed. 
To conclude, further research into the multi-faceted orchestration processes in innovation 
networks of SMEs remains essential if we want to fully understand why innovation networks 
succeed or fail.
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5.  The impact of technological relatedness on 
innovation synergy realization. An in-depth study 
of 10 large high- and medium-tech M&As in the 
life sciences
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 is concerned with how firms profit from external knowledge and capabilities by 
acquiring or merging with another firm12, and was set up to answer the following research 
question:
RQ4: What is the role of technological relatedness in realizing innovation synergies in M&As?
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are often cited as an important strategy for firms to gain 
access to technological knowledge and engineering capabilities and to improve a firm’s 
innovativeness (Chakrabarti et al., 1994; Coff, 1999; Graebner, 2004; Granstrand et al., 1992; 
Hitt et al., 1996). Over the years, however, M&As often have been associated with high failure 
rates (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; King et al., 2004; Mueller, 1985; Ravenscraft and 
Scherer, 1987; Schenk, 2006; Seth, 1990) and with high levels of uncertainty when it comes 
to realizing innovation synergies (Bannert and Tschirky, 2004; Chakrabarti and Souder, 1987; 
Chatterjee, 1986). In fact, most empirical studies showed that on average firms engaging in 
M&As experience a neutral effect at best on their innovativeness (De Man and Duysters, 
2005; Hall, 1989; Hitt et al., 1991, 1996; Ikeda and Doi, 1983). Only recently, research found 
that M&As can have a positive impact on innovation (e.g. see the result of our quantitative 
analysis in Section 3.5). The overall disappointing results of M&As are often attributed to 
a poorly designed and implemented Post M&A Integration (PMAI) process (Bakker and 
Helmink, 2000; Epstein, 2004; Gerpott, 1995; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Jemison 
and Sitkin, 1986; Schweiger, 2002). However, there are also strong indications that good 
integration management can dramatically improve the likelihood of achieving integration 
and improve innovativeness as well (Chakrabarti et al., 1994; Chakrabarti and Souder, 1987; 
Gerpott, 1995). 
In addition to the literature on post M&A integration, there is a growing body of research on 
the impact of M&As on innovation which emphasizes that certain context characteristics, 
such as various forms of relatedness between the involved firms, may impact the likelihood 
12 Parts of this chapter are based on: (1) Batterink M.H., Wubben E.F.M., Simonse L.W.L. and Omta S.W.F., 
Realizing innovation synergies through Mergers and Acquisitions, paper presented at AoM Annual conference 
2007, Philadelphia, 3-8 August 2007; and (2) Wubben, E.F.M., Batterink, M.H., Simonse, L.W.L. and Omta, 
S.W.F. Realizing innovation synergies through Post Merger Integration, RADMA conference in Bremen, 4-6 July 
2007.
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that an M&A leads to better innovation performance (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et 
al., 2006; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002a; Prabhu et al., 2005). For instance, for high-tech 
M&As there seems to be a curvilinear (inverted u-shape) relationship between technological 
relatedness and post M&A innovation performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 
2006). This would imply that firms that are moderately related in terms of the knowledge 
and technologies involved have the most positive effect on the post M&A innovation 
performance. 
However, these studies concentrating on the M&A context characteristics in explaining post 
M&A innovation performance, e.g. on the role of technological relatedness, consider the process 
of synergy realization (i.e. through post M&A integration) as a black box. With this study, 
we aim to open this black box of innovation synergy realization in M&As by concentrating 
on the M&A context characteristics as well as the post M&A integration process. The mixed 
results from existing studies on the relationship between M&As and innovation, make it even 
more necessary to investigate in what specific situations innovation synergies can be expected 
from M&As, and how these synergies are realized in terms of integration mechanisms and 
instruments. 
The study builds on the premise that in order to realize innovation synergies in large M&As, 
managers need to apply a dedicated integration approach, which may be different from the 
overall post M&A business integration. A dedicated approach would be in line with recent 
findings by other scholars who have investigated R&D integration in different high tech 
settings. For instance, Schweizer (2005) concluded that large pharmaceutical companies 
apply a hybrid approach when integrating biotech companies, i.e. a quick integration of most 
business functions and a slower integration and more autonomy for the more specific biotech 
R&D. Moreover, the findings of Purunam et al. (2006) in their study of small technological 
acquisitions by large firms, suggests that acquired firms primarily involved in exploration 
should be kept autonomous as much as possible in order not to disrupt ongoing innovation 
activities, whereas for acquired firms mainly involved in exploitation, less autonomy and more 
integration is favorable. Although these studies have come up with important knowledge on 
what kind of integration strategy to choose for the R&D function, they have concentrated on 
relatively small technologically motivated acquisitions by large established firms. When large 
firms acquire or merge with other large firms, the situation can be much more problematic. 
What is the best R&D integration strategy in large M&As, involving firms that are active in 
both exploration and exploitation, and in which technology and innovation is only one aspect 
of the deal? In addition to improving the capacity for exploitation and exploration, large 
M&As in particular may offer substantial potential for optimization, for instance through 
the exchange of best practices.
This study is based on 10 in-depth case studies and analyzes the post M&A integration of 
large (medium) high-tech firms in the life-science industry and develops a conceptual model 
of innovation synergy realization. The high-tech industry setting is especially relevant for 
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studying innovation synergy, because (medium) high-tech firms focus significant attention on 
innovation and R&D, and because research found that especially technologically motivated 
high-tech M&As improve the innovation performance (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001). The 
study specifically concentrates on the role of technological relatedness in, and on the R&D 
integration mechanisms responsible for innovation synergy realization in large horizontal 
(medium) high-tech M&As. In this respect, the study builds on the findings from the study by 
Cassiman et al. (2005), who linked technological relatedness with specific integration efforts 
and subsequent changes in the R&D function. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Sections 5.2 provides a theoretical 
background on innovation synergy realization. This section sets out conceptually what 
innovation synergies are in the context of M&As, discusses the literature on the M&A context 
characteristics that may influence the potential for innovation synergy realization, as well as 
the literature that has investigated the post M&A integration processes within the innovation 
setting. Altogether, the findings from the literature study are integrated into a research model 
(see Figure 5.1). Then, section 5.3 describes the approach of the qualitative research, i.e. the 
data collection and analysis method. In Section 5.4 the results of the empirical investigations 
are presented, with a special focus on technological relatedness and the integration mechanisms 
responsible for realizing innovation synergies. Moreover, Section 5.4 elaborates on a number of 
key success factors for R&D integration in M&As. Section 5.4 closes with an R&D integration 
framework for large high-tech M&As. Finally, Section 5.5 details conclusions and suggestions 
for further research.
5.2 Theoretical background
5.2.1 Innovation synergies in M&As
Synergy is the term used to describe a situation where the final outcome of a system is greater 
than the sum of its parts. The broadest types of synergy associated with M&As that can be 
distinguished are financial synergy, collusive synergy, and operational synergy (Chatterjee, 
1986; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Lubatkin, 1983). Financial synergy refers to reductions 
in the costs of capital, e.g. through coinsurance and risk diversification (Lubatkin, 1983; 
Seth, 1990). Collusive synergy is the result of an increase in market power and the ability to 
dictate prices (Chatterjee, 1986; Singh and Montgomery, 1987). Operational synergy relates 
to efficiencies in functional areas such as production, marketing, R&D, and administration, 
mainly through economies of scale and scope (Harrison et al., 1991; Seth, 1990; Singh and 
Montgomery, 1987) and skill transfer (Harrison et al., 1991; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). 
Larsson and Finkelstein. (1999) also identified managerial synergy, but we regard this type of 
synergy already covered by the other types of synergy. These three types of synergy encompass 
all M&A-related synergy effects.
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We define innovation synergy as the innovation outcomes that can only be realized when 
two firms are combined. M&A-induced innovation synergies are a form of operational 
synergies, although some of the synergistic innovation effects that will be discussed are based 
on diversification and therefore could be considered as financial synergy. To realize operational 
synergies, a certain level of integration is required and resources and capabilities must, to a 
certain extent, be transferred (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). We discard collusive, i.e. market 
power related, synergies in this study, because this type of synergy does not require transfer or 
integration. In contrast, collusive synergy is an externally located appropriability benefit, that is 
extensively investigated in industrial organization literature. Although collusive synergies may 
co-exist with innovation synergy realization, we here exclude it from consideration in detail 
(see for some discussions on the relationship between market dominance and innovation: 
Blundell et al., 1999; Cabral and Polak, 2004; Firth and Narayanan, 1996). Instead, we want 
to focus primarily on straightening out and conceptually model the yet underexplored field 
of innovation synergy realization in terms of actions that can be undertaken by integration 
managers.
So far, the literature on M&As and innovation has not yet defined or made explicit M&A-
related innovation synergies. Different scholars, however, suggested a number of M&A-related 
innovation benefits, such as reduction of innovation costs, innovation lead-time reduction, 
and the realization of more large and more risky innovation trajectories (Cassiman et al., 
2005; Cloodt, 2005; De Man and Duysters, 2005; Gerpott, 1995; Grimpe, 2007; Hagedoorn 
and Duysters, 2002a). Drawing from an extensive literature study, we identified three main 
categories of innovation synergy: (1) innovation cost synergy, (2) innovation process synergy, 
and (3) a new growth platform (Batterink et al., 2007).
Innovation cost synergy
The first type of innovation synergy is innovation cost synergy. The existing literature 
suggests that innovation cost synergies are mainly realized by means of resource re-allocations 
related to economies of scale and scope. Economies of scale can be achieved by eliminating 
duplicate innovation activities (Röller et al., 2006). This can be realized by closing R&D labs, 
terminating R&D programs and firing employees (Cassiman et al., 2005). Savings may also 
be attributed to utilizing more intensively the given expensive innovation related resources, 
such as laboratory resources, computer resources, and libraries (Henderson and Cockburn, 
1996), but also in the administration functions of R&D. Existing resources can be allocated to 
alternative innovation trajectories at little or no additional costs. This case can be regarded as 
economies of scope (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Seth, 1990). Scale economies can also 
be realized when a given cost for innovations are spread over a larger sales base (Cassiman et al., 
2005; Cockburn and Henderson, 2001). In other words, when two firms are combined, there 
is a larger customer base that may be reached with the same innovation, so that it is easier to 
recoup innovation costs. This is, for instance, the case when the merging firms had been active 
on geographically separate markets.
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Innovation process synergy
The second type of innovation synergy identified is innovation process synergy. This is 
innovation synergy related to optimization of the innovation processes, which may in turn bring 
both costs reductions and revenue enhancements. By sharing complementary competences 
and best practices in innovation management the innovation processes can be brought to a 
higher level, resulting in increased productivity (De Man and Duysters, 2005; Griffin, 1997). 
Moreover, M&As increase the possibilities to reorganize R&D teams, especially in terms 
of further specialization in R&D tasks (Cassiman et al., 2005). Furthermore, state-of-the-
art technologies that are present in the merging firms can be shared, enabling incremental 
innovations and/or shorter innovation lead times (Harrison et al., 1991). In addition, due to 
combined innovation-related resources, there is potential for parallel development trajectories, 
better allocation of R&D specialists across projects, reducing innovation lead times (Omta, 
1995). In sum, via this path of optimizing innovation processes, M&As may help firms to 
overcome innovation related weaknesses (Harrison et al., 1991) and leverage its competencies 
and capabilities. Optimization of the innovation process may result in both new products 
being introduced on the market earlier, and additional improvements in existing products 
(Griffin, 1997).
New growth platform
The third type of innovation synergy to be recognized is the establishment of a new product 
platform, creating a growth platform. A growth platform can be seen as a new technology 
development trajectory oriented at creating new products and/or new markets. Such a growth 
platform enables the realization of a breakthrough innovation, followed by a continuous 
flow of new products within the same product family (Meyer et al., 1997; Wheelwright and 
Clark, 1992). A growth platform can be realized in different manners. First, by combining 
and integrating complementary knowledge-based resources and capabilities integrated firms 
may develop new knowledge that would otherwise simply not have been developed (Bresman 
et al., 1999; Ranft and Lord, 2002). When complementary knowledge bases are integrated, 
the new firm may start projects that have become feasible in terms of having available the 
right pool of technological capabilities and knowledge. The second way of realizing a growth 
platform through M&As is when the two combined firms overcome a threshold level in terms 
of scale and scope. M&As enable specific innovation projects with relatively higher costs and/
or higher risks, that were beyond the reach of the individual original firms (Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1996). This is an example of how innovation synergy can be regarded as financial 
synergy. Evidently, for certain types of R&D or other innovation related activities, most 
notably in pharmaceutics, a substantial level of input is required, a minimum efficient scale or 
threshold level (Omta, 1995). Ultimately, the result of a growth platform may be radical or 
breakthrough innovations, which would otherwise (without the combination of firms) not 
have been realized or realized much later, and subsequent incremental innovations.
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Empirical evidence for the existence of innovation synergies in M&As
Although we have identified a number of innovation synergies that could possibly be realized 
in a merger or acquisition, whether on average innovation synergies are actually realized in 
M&As remains unclear. For instance, a literature review by De Man and Duysters (2005) 
revealed that empirical studies on the direct impact of M&As on post M&A innovation input 
and output show at best a neutral, or a negative relationship between M&As and innovation 
performance, suggesting there is no evidence for innovation synergy realization. More 
specifically, the relationship between M&As and innovation input (e.g. R&D expenditures) 
seems to be inconclusive. Hall (1989), for instance, in a sample of 2500 firms, found that firms 
involved in acquisitions seemed to experience permanent declines in their R&D expenditures 
relative to other firms in the industry. In a sample of 22 Japanese manufacturing firms active 
in M&As, most firms increased absolute R&D expenditures following the M&A, although 
with R&D expenditures relative to sales the results were mixed (Ikeda & Doi, 1983). For 
a subset of the 11 largest mergers the results were similarly mixed (Ikeda and Doi, 1983). 
However, a decrease in R&D expenditures does not necessarily cause a decrease in innovation 
performance, as decreases in R&D expenditures may result from economies of scale in R&D 
or other productivity gains (i.e. innovation cost synergy). Due to the limitations of input 
indicators for innovation performance, other studies used innovation output indicators, such 
as patents or the number of new products introductions. For instance, in a cross-industry 
study of 191 acquisitions, Hitt et al. (1991) found a negative impact of M&As on both R&D 
expenditures and patent intensity. These authors conclude also that diversifying acquisitions 
in particular negatively affect patent intensity. Apparently, M&As pursuing a diversification 
strategy are detrimental for post M&A innovation performance. In addition, Hitt et al. (1996) 
found in a study of 250 M&As a negative relationship between M&As and internal innovation 
(a variable composed of R&D intensity and new product announcements). More recently, 
Van de Vrande (2007) found in a sample of 105 pharmaceutical firms that acquisitions have 
a positive effect on innovation performance measured as patent counts, but a negative effect 
when patents referred to radical innovations or so-called pioneering technologies. Finally, in 
Chapter 3 we found a positive impact of acquisition on the performance of especially radical 
innovation, measured as the share of sales from new products new to the market, even when 
controlled for other knowledge acquisition strategies. In sum, empirical research brings us to 
the conclusion that there is mixed evidence at best on the relationship between M&As and 
both innovation input and output indicators, whereas until recent date researchers found a 
prevailing negative relationship between M&As and innovation output indicators. The mixed 
results may be illustrative of the complexity of the relationship between M&As and innovation 
performance in general and innovation realization in particular.
5.2.2 M&A context characteristics determining innovation synergy realization
There is a growing stream of research that focuses on the M&A context characteristics 
determining post M&A innovation performance. M&A context characteristics can be defined 
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as general attributes of the acquiring firm, the target, or the relation among them that may affect 
the amount of value creation potential that exists in a transaction (cf. Gerpott, 1995). Examples 
of M&A context characteristics are absolute and relative size of the M&A, different types of 
relatedness, and previous experience in M&A. We also include M&A motives as an M&A 
context characteristic, because there is an evident link between the M&A motives or objectives 
and the amount of attention (top) management devotes to realizing them.
M&A motives
Obviously, not all M&As are undertaken for the same reasons. Among often cited motives for 
M&As are (Bakker and Helmink, 2000; Chakrabarti et al., 1994; Chakrabarti and Souder, 
1987):
access to new markets;•	
broadening the customer base; •	
increasing market share;•	
product line expansion;•	
access to new technologies and skills;•	
reduction of cost;•	
diversification of risks.•	
It may be evident that technology motivated acquisitions in particular provide potential for 
improving innovation synergy realization (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). In 
general, however, motives associated with innovation (e.g. access to technologies) ranks in 
the middle in terms of importance, with market-related motives prevailing (Cassiman et al., 
2005; Chakrabarti and Souder, 1987). Moreover, the extent to which innovation is a motive 
may vary per industry. For instance, especially high-tech industries and other industries in 
which technological development progresses fast, are associated with technology-motivated 
acquisitions. In other industries, such as pharma, the costs for innovation may be very high, 
which may focus M&A in this sector on enlarging the scale and scope of R&D and increasing 
the productivity in R&D (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). Still, even with M&As that are 
not undertaken primarily for reasons of innovation, management nevertheless mostly faces the 
challenge to ensure some form of synergistic coordination of both firms’ R&D resources (Gerpott, 
1995).
Absolute and relative size
The second context characteristic is the size of the M&A. Several studies showed that the 
absolute and relative size of M&As are a relevant factor in explaining post M&A innovation 
performance. Absolute size refers, in the case of an acquisition, to the firm size or knowledge 
base size of the target firm. Relative size refers to the firm or knowledge base size of the target 
relatively to the acquiring firm, or in the case of a merger to the firm size or knowledge base 
size of one firm, relative to the merging partner. With respect to absolute size of the target 
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firm, it is argued that, generally speaking, the larger the absolute size, the more technological 
knowledge and innovation capabilities are obtained. Hence, M&As with larger absolute sizes 
should offer more potential for synergy realization and improving the innovation performance. 
Indeed, several studies found, in general, a positive relationship between the absolute size of 
the acquired firm (in terms of sales or the size of the knowledge base) had a positive impact 
on post-M&A innovation performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Chakrabarti et al., 1994; 
Cloodt et al., 2006; Prabhu et al., 2005).
With respect to relative size it is argued that the larger the relative size of the acquired target, the 
more effort it will take to integrate the target into the acquirer, the more likely this will disrupt 
ongoing (innovation) activities, and hence the less likely it is to be successful (Chakrabarti et 
al., 1994; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Indeed, some studies showed that the relative size 
of the knowledge bases has a negative influence on innovation output, which means that the 
larger the knowledge base to be integrated, relative to the acquiring firm’s knowledge base, the 
more negative the impact is on post-M&A innovation performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Cloodt et al., 2006). On the other hand, it is also argued that similarity in terms of firm size 
may be an indication of organizational fit, and may thus foster synergy realization. In a study of 
35 M&A-active firms in the computer industry Hagendoorn and Duysters (2002a) found that 
the degree of similarity between the merging firms in terms of firm size (which corresponds to a 
large relative size), have a positive impact on post M&A innovation performance. Furthermore, 
Gerpott (1995) found a positive association between a large relative size and R&D integration 
success. We must therefore conclude that the relationship between relative size and innovation 
performance can be two-fold.
Relatedness
The relatedness between the two firms involved in the M&A is the third context characteristic. 
In fact, studies into the relationship between M&A and innovation have investigated various 
kinds of relatedness between the merging firms, of which technological (or knowledge) and 
market relatedness seem to dominate. Technological relatedness refers to the overlap or 
similarity in firm-specific aspects such as technological disciplines and engineering capabilities, 
and to the technological overlap in the knowledge bases of the merging firms (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Prabhu et al., 2005). The empirical literature seems to 
be consistent in its findings with respect to technological relatedness: firms with moderate 
technological relatedness produce more innovations from M&As than firms with very high 
or very low technological relatedness (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Prabhu 
et al., 2005). Apparently, there is an inverted u-shape relationship between technological 
relatedness and post M&A innovation performance. Such a relationship can be explained by 
the argument that with strong technological relatedness, compared to moderate relatedness, 
relatively little new or complementary knowledge is acquired (Rindfleisch and Moorman, 
2001). As a consequence, there will be little potential for new opportunities and learning. 
With low technological relatedness an M&A brings relatively more novel knowledge, but the 
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knowledge bases may be too distinct, resulting in absorption and integration problems (Ahuja 
and Katila, 2001; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). More specifically, Cassiman et al. (2005) found 
that merged firms that are technologically complementary, maintain or increase R&D inputs, 
while merged firms which are technologically substitutive decrease their R&D inputs after an 
M&A. Finally, some other studies have also looked at other types of relatedness, for instance 
the relatedness in terms of products and markets. Hagendoorn and Duysters (2002a), for 
example, found a positive relationship between market relatedness and the number of patents 
applied for, although they only tested linear relationships. In addition, Keil et al. (2008) found 
that only acquisitions that can be regarded as intra-industry acquisitions (i.e. implying high 
market relatedness) have a positive impact on a firm’s innovation performance, whereas less 
related acquisitions had a significant negative impact. In addition, if the merging firms are 
rivals (which implies high product-relatedness) there are more clear reductions in R&D than 
if they were non-rival (Cassiman et al., 2005).
Previous M&A experience
From an organizational learning perspective it can be argued that firms that have experience 
with integrating the innovation functions following M&As become better able to integrate 
subsequent acquisitions. However, the literature investigating M&A experience in explaining 
post-M&A innovation performance shows somewhat mixed results. Although experience 
in M&A determines the likelihood of firms to enter into subsequent M&As (Hagedoorn 
and Duysters, 2002b; Haleblian et al., 2006), surprisingly, additional acquisition experience 
does not automatically result in better general M&A performance (Bakker and Helmink, 
2000; Barkema and Schijven, 2008; Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Zollo and Singh, 2004). 
Instead, Zollo and Singh (2004) found that M&A experience only contributed to post M&A 
performance when the acquirer tactically accumulates and explicitly codifies M&A experience 
in manuals, systems and other acquisition-specific tools. In addition, M&A experience 
with similar types of targets seems to positively affect subsequent acquisition performance 
(Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999), which also suggests that 
routines and practices built up in prior comparable M&As can be transferred to subsequent 
acquisitions. Surprisingly, however, in his study of R&D integration within 92 acquisitions 
between German firms Gerpott (1995) found that M&A experience negatively influences 
R&D integration success. An explanation for a negative relationship may be that experienced 
firms tend to develop a standardized, often formalized, PMAI approach, with non-dedicated 
management and/or overconfident management which underrates individual and situational 
challenges (Chakrabarti et al., 1994). 
5.2.3 The role of Post M&A integration in innovation synergy realization
Having discussed the studies concentrating on the M&A context characteristics determining 
post M&A innovation performance, we now turn to a second stream of research on M&As 
and innovation. This second stream of research claims that Post M&A Integration (PMAI) 
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itself is an important factor in explaining the performance of M&As (Bakker and Helmink, 
2000; Grimpe, 2007; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Schweiger, 2002; Wubben et al., 2007). 
We define Post M&A Integration (PMAI) as a temporary process, comprising primarily of 
strategic and tactical management decisions and related activities with the aim of fostering the 
integration of two firms, following the formal closure of the deal until it is business as usual 
again. Moreover, post M&A integration should be regarded as an interactive and gradual 
process in which individuals from two organizations learn to work together and cooperate in 
the transfer of strategic capabilities (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 106). Thus, PMAI 
is a temporary process of organizational change. It is during this process that much of the 
(expected) synergy is created, and (too often) a lot of value is destroyed (Bannert and Tschirky, 
2004; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Therefore, PMAI is claimed to be an important 
factor in explaining the performance of M&As (Bakker and Helmink, 2000; Haspeslagh 
and Jemison, 1991; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Schweiger, 
2002). Depending on the different characteristics of the M&A and the different strategic 
goals, different integration levels and integration approaches are suggested (Epstein, 2004; 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Schweizer, 2005). In line with other studies on the PMAI 
of the R&D function (e.g. Bannert and Tschirky, 2004), our study considers that PMAI (i.e. 
both the design and the implementation) has an important influence on the ultimate success 
of the merger or acquisition. 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) distinguish between four corporate integration approaches: 
(1) preservation, (2) absorption, (3) symbiosis, and (4) holding. An absorption integration 
approach implies a unilateral process where one firm is assimilated into the processes, culture, 
and other organizational characteristics of the other firm with the eventual goal of full 
consolidation. With preservation both firms continue to operate autonomously so that their 
processes, culture, and other organizational characteristics remain intact and independent. 
Symbiosis integration requires some degree of initial change to various aspects of both firms’ 
organizational design and processes, as both firms’ leading practices are gradually blended 
together. A symbiosis can be seen as the most complex approach to integration, as considerable 
resource transfers are necessary in both directions. The fourth integration approach, the 
holding, implies that the acquired firm remains autonomous, i.e. like a separate division in 
a holding firm. With a holding integration the firms have no intention of integrating and 
creating value except for financial transfer and risk sharing (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 
146). Which of the 4 integration approaches is most appropriate depends mainly on two 
factors (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991): (1) the need for organizational autonomy, and 
(2) the need for strategic interdependence. Based on 35 M&As, Grimpe (2007) concluded 
that the symbiosis and absorption approaches are most beneficial for post M&A innovation 
performance. Apparently, in order to fully realize the potential benefits from M&As, substantial 
integration between the two firms is required. 
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More specifically, R&D integration can be defined as the changes in R&D and other innovation 
activity arrangements, organizational structures, systems, and cultures, following an M&A 
until it is business as usual again (adapted from Gerpott, 1995). As said in the introductory 
section, it was concluded in several studies that the success of innovation synergy realization 
can be significantly influenced by management interventions concerning R&D integration 
(Chakrabarti et al., 1994; Chakrabarti and Souder, 1987; Gerpott, 1995). Therefore, PMAI of 
the R&D functions should be considered if we want to understand why some firms are better 
than others in realizing innovation synergies. In this respect, we are especially interested in the 
integration mechanisms and integration instruments and key success factors that are relevant 
for R&D integration.
Integration mechanisms
We define integration mechanisms as organizational changes and resource re-allocations in 
the firms involved following an M&A that are aimed at fostering integration and synergy 
realization. Innovation integration mechanisms can include elements of structural linking, 
standardization of systems, and process re-design (Grimpe, 2007). Structural linking refers to 
connecting (R&D) units to provide a basis for synergy realization. Structural linking relates to 
the arrangements for collaboration and transfer, ranging from liaison offices, cross-firm project 
groups, process integrators (e.g. project, brand, program, account managers), up to fully 
integrated departments (Galbraith, 1974; Nadler and Tushman, 1997). Next, standardization 
of systems refers to the harmonization of information, reporting, and control systems, as well 
as career incentive systems, and the employment of expert databases to locate knowledge in 
the new organization (Grimpe, 2007). Finally, process re-design refers to a change within the 
R&D function as well as to the coordination with other business functions and often involves 
reorganization at both firms, including for instance centralization of research and technology 
tasks, or decentralization of development (Grimpe, 2007). Often, process re-design associated 
with M&As include rationalization processes, i.e. the closing of R&D departments or research 
sites (Cassiman et al., 2005; Röller et al., 2006). Moreover, elements of structural linking and 
systems standardization are often part of a process re-design in R&D, i.e. it would be hard 
to specialize and consolidate R&D on one site, without applying structural linking and/or 
systems standardization. Based on 35 M&A cases Grimphe (2007) concluded that structural 
linking and systems standardization were positively associated with post M&A innovation 
success. Process re-design, the most far-reaching integration mechanism, may disrupt ongoing 
R&D so much that innovation synergy is not realized at all. In this respect, it is generally 
acknowledged in the literature that high levels of integration seem to foster the potential for 
synergy realization, whereas low levels of integration (a high level of autonomy) are beneficial 
for not disrupting ongoing innovation activities, especially those of an explorative kind 
(Puranam et al., 2006; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Schweizer, 2005). Firms that aim to realize 
innovation synergies in a merger or acquisition, have to cope with this dilemma.
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Integration instruments and success factors
Within the PMAI literature there have been several studies examining specific factors and 
integration instruments associated with successful integration of R&D functions (Wubben 
et al., 2007). For instance, some studies showed that R&D integration success can be fostered 
when the PMAI process is extensively planned upfront including R&D integration (e.g. Bannert 
and Tschirky, 2004; Gerpott, 1995). Next, the speed and timing of PMAI implementation 
as an important factor for success (e.g. Angwin, 2004; Bakker and Helmink, 2000; Bresman 
et al., 1999; Homburg and Bucerius, 2006). However, the results regarding speed and timing 
are ambiguous: some researchers emphasize the importance of doing the integration fast (e.g. 
Angwin, 2004; Gerpott, 1995), whereas others point at the importance of taking the PMAI 
process slowly, for instance when the merging firms are very different in terms of management 
style and corporate culture (Homburg and Bucerius, 2006), or when the intention is to transfer 
and combine tacit knowledge (Ranft and Lord, 2002). Furthermore, the establishment of a 
dedicated PMAI team is regarded as an important instrument in the PMAI (Bakker and 
Helmink, 2000; Epstein, 2004; Gerpott, 1995; Schweiger, 2002). The PMAI team is involved 
in executing the PMAI process, based on the integration design and integration strategy 
(Epstein, 2004), so that the ongoing activities of important business functions such as R&D 
are hindered as little as possible. The next factor is the retention of key employees, as their 
retention will foster the preservation of the acquired firm’s technologies and capabilities that 
are based on tacit and/or socially complex knowledge (Narin and Breitzman, 1995; Ranft and 
Lord, 2002). Next, PMAI success can be fostered when the PMAI has a focus on preventing a 
culture clash in the new organization (Epstein, 2004). Resistance to changes in structure and 
to the adaptation of different practices and cultures by employees of the firms involved are 
important obstacles to synergy realization (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; 
Weber and Camerer, 2003). Finally, open communication at all levels of the organization (e.g. 
Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Gerpott, 1995), and stimulating interaction between employees by 
organizing cross-firm teams of managers, joint R&D teams, job rotation, frequent face-to-
face meetings, and holding and attending various informal and social events turned out to be 
important factors for successful innovation integration (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Bresman et 
al., 1999; De Noble et al., 1988; Gerpott, 1995; Ranft and Lord, 2002).
5.2.4 Research framework
By integrating the insights from the literature, we can arrive at a research framework for 
innovation synergy realization in M&As. The main constructs of the framework include (1) 
M&A context characteristics, (2) R&D integration mechanisms, (3) integration instruments 
and success factors, and (4) innovation synergy realization. From the literature review we 
may derive that the first three constructs are all related to innovation synergy realization. 
However, key in our mode is the assumption that M&A context characteristics, technological 
relatedness in particular, determine the potential for innovation synergy realization. Based 
on this synergy potential, specific integration mechanisms are put in place to realize specific 
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innovation synergies. Moreover, whether these integration mechanisms actually lead to synergy 
realization, depends on the key success factors of the integration process. The framework is 
presented in Figure 5.1.
5.3 Data and methods
Since the relationship between M&As and innovation performance is a complex one, a detailed 
empirical research approach is called for. An in-depth and integrated analysis of innovation 
synergy realization in the context of M&As may add to a better understanding of how M&As 
are related to innovation performance. Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested that researchers 
should use qualitative research designs when there is a clear need for deep understanding, local 
contextualization, causal inference, and exposing the points of view of the people under study. 
In earlier research on M&As, Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) concluded that investigating a 
complex and multidimensional process like synergy realization requires rich and extensive 
data that the case study method can produce. The use of a case study method is in line with 
several other studies of M&A implementation and PMAI (e.g. Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Ranft 
and Lord, 2002; Schweizer, 2005). Hence, we opt for a case study method (Yin, 2003) to 
analyze the types of innovation synergies realized through M&As of R&D intensive firms and 
the related integration mechanisms and integration instruments. 
The sampling of the case studies is crucial, because the choice of sample influences the results 
of a study (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Eisenhardt (1989) suggest theoretical sampling 
as a base for case selection in order to focus research efforts in theoretically useful cases. In 
addition, for reasons of reproducing logic for external validity, the cases should be sufficiently 
comparable. First, we selected cases within one industry category, the life-science industry. The 
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life-science industry comprises sub-sectors such as agriculture, food processing, agrochemicals, 
biotech, pharmaceutics, and health and medical systems. Within the life-science industry, 
we selected companies from medium high-tech and high-tech industries. In (medium) high-
tech industries firms typically focus on innovation with substantial levels of R&D activities. 
Second, we focused on large horizontal M&As. The researched firms, except one, are multi 
Billion Euro firms and most deal sizes exceeded 0.5 billion Euro. In addition, many of these 
M&As were subject of investigation by European and US merger regulators. This implies 
that the acquisitions can be regarded as typical horizontal acquisitions and that they were 
not marginal but substantial. Especially intra-industry acquisitions seem to be beneficial for 
innovation synergy realization (Keil et al., 2008). Third, to make sure innovation and R&D 
was an issue in the M&As, the sample comprises of acquisitions with each of the merging 
firms having a substantial R&D function. Finally, all the selected M&A cases, except one, 
were implemented at least three years, but in most cases more than five years ago. This time 
frame was chosen because it normally takes some time before the innovative advantages of the 
M&A become evident (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). Selecting M&As with a substantial R&D 
component, and a time frame of more than 3 years enabled us to identify the integration 
mechanisms that have resulted in innovation synergies.
Taking into account the aforementioned selection criteria, we further relied on a convenient 
sampling strategy. One has to realize that the post M&A integration activities and especially 
the (re) organization of R&D activities are highly sensitive topics that are often the subject 
of restrictive information policy (Grimpe, 2007). Moreover, firms typically do not want to 
interfere with ongoing R&D activities. When contacting and informing a substantial number 
of large life-science firms in high-tech industries in the EU, many firms declined participation, 
or declined participation in research at the detailed level we aimed for. In total 5 firms were 
willing to participate, through which we gained access to 10 M&As. Most acquisitions 
exceeded €1 Billion deal size (see Table 5.1). The smallest acquisition had a deal size of about 
€110 Million, the largest was larger than €15 Billion in size. The 10 high-tech M&As selected 
were from life-science sectors ranging from agro chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, to medical 
systems. It turned out that the generally perceived overall success of the M&A cases differs 
between moderately successful to very successful. In each of these successful M&As at least 
to some extent innovation benefits were achieved as a result of the M&A. We were able to 
investigate both 3 isolated acquisitions, and two series of acquisitions carried out by individual 
firms. Including series of acquisitions in this study enabled the researcher to identify how 
a firm learns from its experience in other M&As. The first series was over a six-year period 
and the second was in a shorter period. In this second series, much of the PMAI of the 
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Table 5.1. Overview of the merger and acquisition cases.
M&A Deal size Industry Year of 
transaction
M&A status 2008 Interviews
Case 1a €7.3 billion Agricultural 
chemicals
2001 Firm successfully integrated 2
Case 1b €2.3 billion Health care 2004 Firm successfully integrated, 
even better and faster than 
expected
1
Case 1c €16 billion Pharmaceutics 2006 Firm successfully integrated 2
Case 2 Merger 
(combined 
sales >€20 
billion)
Pharmaceutics 2000 Firms successfully integrated, 
but in the beginning PMAI 
looked a disaster
4
Case 3 €2.3 billion Food ingredients 
and fine 
chemicals
2002 Firm successfully integrated 
and is an independent 
division
2
Case 4a €2.0 billion Health industry 2001 Firm successfully integrated, 
forming a BU1 with 4c
6 *
Case 4b €1.2 billion Health industry 2001 Firm successfully integrated, 
forming a BU1 with 4d
5 *
Case 4c €0.7 billion Health industry 1998 Firm successfully integrated 
at the level of sales and 
business (service) systems, 
like IT, finance and logistics
5 *
Case 4d €0.5 billion Health industry 2000 Firm successfully integrated 
at the level of sales, 
other business remained 
autonomous
6 *
Case 5 €0.11 billion Chemicals and 
life sciences
2004 Acquired firm still running as 
an independent division, 
but now increased linking 
and interaction
2
* In total 8 interviews carried out in firm 4, which covered the total set of acquisitions. The minimum 
coverage per M&A was five interviews.
1 Business Unit.
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individual M&As was part of an overall integration process as the firms were integrated almost 
simultaneously13.
Before we started investigating the cases, we carried out 6 pilot interviews with M&A experts 
(consultancy and academic experts) in order to test and adapt our a priori research framework 
and subsequent interview questions. These interviews focused on the motives of M&As, 
the possible impact of M&As on post M&A innovation performance, and the post M&A 
integration process of R&D.
To investigate the M&As, we carried out 21 semi-structured in-depth interviews, with 
both innovation managers, integration managers, and general managers. These managers 
had sufficient seniority to have a profound knowledge of the PMAI and they were often 
knowledgeable about more than one M&A in the set. A list of the main questions used in the 
interviews can be found in Appendix 4. The interviews, typically taken by two interviewers 
from the research team, lasted for 1 to 2 hours and were recorded and fully transcribed to 
capture subtleties in the qualitative data. Transcripts were offered to the interviewees for review. 
Transcripts were analyzed through cyclic reading and rereading. Although most interviews 
concentrated on one specific acquisition case, often comparison with, and illustrations from 
other acquisitions were provided. One possible weakness in the design is that respondents have 
to report on actions and processes that took place a number of years ago, which could lead to 
the problem that informants may not be able to recall the past, that informants try to present 
a socially desirable picture of themselves or the firm, or that informants distort information to 
fit previously held beliefs and preferences (Miller et al., 1997; Schmidt and Calantone, 1998). 
On the other hand, taking a time lag will reduce direct stakes in M&As, which can make 
interviewees more reflective and open minded. Furthermore, in order to improve the internal 
validity we used triangulation in sources and methods as we collected other data, such as 
annual reports, articles from the business and trade press, press releases and internal documents 
(e.g. presentation slides), which stemmed mainly from the period of M&A announcement 
and implementation. The analysis of the various data sources resulted in the identification 
of the M&A context characteristics, a detailed picture of the PMAI (in terms of integration 
mechanisms and the key success factors) and, finally the innovation synergies, which are the 
main constructs of our conceptual model that formed the basis for the within- and cross-case 
analysis. Then, for each M&A case a detailed within-case description was developed. After 
this, for the cross-case analysis we utilized a matrix technique for comparative analysis (Miles 
13 It should be noted that one acquisition within this second series was left out the analysis. In this acquisition, the 
acquirer managed to acquire only 70% of the shares. As a consequence, the acquirer could not start the intended 
integration and subsequent innovation synergies were not realized. Moreover, employees from the target were very 
resistant to the (perceived) hostile takeover. Together with some additional (legal) problems with the acquired firm 
(that were unrelated to the acquisition) this situation caused that acquirer to divest the firm in 2008, resulting in 
substantial depreciations. As a consequence, this acquisition did not deliver any useful information for our analysis 
of how innovation synergies are realized in terms of integration mechanisms and integration instruments.
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and Huberman, 1994). The resulting matrices allowed visual identification of differences and 
similarities in the cases. 
In our study we concentrate specifically on the role of technological relatedness in, and on 
the R&D integration mechanisms responsible for innovation synergy realization in large 
horizontal (medium) high-tech M&As. As we will see in the next section, such M&As are by 
definition large in terms of absolute and relative size (in contrast with small acquisitions of, 
for instance, biotech companies). Moreover, in such large M&As, innovation and/or access 
to new knowledge is often one of the motives for the merger or acquisition. As a consequence, 
we found these M&A context characteristics were neutral in our study, whereas technological 
relatedness will be a key variable in which the cases differ substantially.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 M&A context characteristics
In detailing the methods and data (see Section 5.3) a number of general attributes of the 
M&As were already provided (see also Table 5.1). In this section, we set the scene of the 
analysis in more detail by discussing the most relevant M&A context characteristics: M&A 
motives, relative and absolute size, relatedness and M&A experience. 
M&A motives
The first M&A context characteristic in our study was the M&A motives. Initial questions 
asked in each interview were used to identify the prime motives of the M&As. The motives 
stated by the interviewees were compared with the objectives stated in the annual reports and 
official press releases of the firms. The most prominent motives for the M&As in our study 
turned out to be strategic repositioning of the business, access to new markets, and completing 
the product portfolio (see Table 5.2). Improving R&D, enhancing innovation or access to 
knowledge and technologies were mentioned in six cases as an important motive for the 
acquisition. Especially in the M&As from sectors in which the costs to develop innovations are 
enormous (e.g. pharma and agricultural chemicals), lowering the (relative) costs of R&D by 
increasing the scale and scope and by improving R&D productivity were important drivers for 
the M&As. In the cases that did not explicitly mention innovation enhancement in the initial 
M&A announcements (e.g. in press releases), the interviews and/or additional documentation 
clarified that innovation enhancement was or became a relatively important aspect of the 
M&A. For instance, for firm 4, it was a precondition for the acquisitions that the target firms 
had a high-end R&D-function. In general, innovation enhancement was an important aspect 
in the 11 cases, though not the dominant motive, which is in line with previous studies (e.g. 
Cassiman et al., 2005). As a consequence, we can conclude that each of the M&As has the 
potential for innovation synergy realization.
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Table 5.2. M&A context characteristics.
Case Formal motives for merger or 
acquisition
Technological 
relatedness
Market 
relatedness1
Relative 
size2
Case 1a Access to new markets; towards more 
complete product portfolio; increase 
R&D scope
high 3-digit equal
Case 1b Towards more complete product portfolio; 
better regional coverage in markets; 
increase R&D scope
high 3-digit equal
Case 1c More balanced product portfolio; better 
filled new product pipeline, improve R&D 
productivity; increase R&D scope
high 3-digit equal
Case 2 To anticipate rapid advances in science 
and technology (increase R&D scope); 
increase market power
high 3-digit equal
Case 3 Strategic repositioning, access to new 
markets / business; increase R&D scope
moderate 3-digit medium
Case 4a Expanding product portfolio; entering new 
markets
moderate 3-digit medium
Case 4b Expanding technology and product 
portfolio; establishing new market 
positions
moderate 3-digit medium
Case 4c Expanding technology and product 
portfolio; establishing new market 
positions
low 3-digit medium
Case 4d Expanding product portfolio; increase 
customer bases
low 3-digit medium
Case 5 Access to new markets; access to R&D 
resources
low 3-digit medium
1 NACE classification: The EC statistical office (Eurostat) classification scheme of economic activities. 
SBI is the Dutch equivalent for NACE. For instance, within the 2-digit sector ‘production of chemical 
products’ there are several 3-digit sectors, such as ‘production of agricultural chemicals’ (242) and 
‘pharmaceutics’ 244.
2 Equal relative size indicates a sales ratio of >70% at the time of the deal. Medium refers to a sales 
ratio of between 10% and 70%.
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Absolute and relative size
The second and third M&A context characteristics are absolute and relative size. With respect 
to absolute size, it was already stated in Section 5.3 that our sample comprises of relatively 
large M&As, especially when compared to existing studies on acquisition implementation (e.g. 
Gerpott, 1995; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Schweizer, 2005). Only Case 5 is substantially smaller 
than the others (see Table 5.1), although still exceeding €100 Million in deal size. Moreover, 
considering the fact that we investigated M&As in (medium) high-tech life science, in which 
innovation plays a substantial role, the M&As involved large knowledge bases. 
In our assessment of relative size we have concentrated on the size of the acquired firm relative 
to the related division of the acquirer, rather than to the total acquiring firm. The reason for 
this is that in fact, most M&As did not affect other business units or divisions of the acquirer. 
Cases 1a, 1b, 1c, and 2 were more or less equal in size in terms of sales (see Table 5.2). The size 
in terms of the total sales of these acquired firms was at least 10% of that of the acquiring or 
other firm. In comparison with other studies using relative size as an indicator (e.g. Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Gerpott, 1995), our sample comprises of large relative sized 
M&As. Taking the learning from the literature study, we can conclude that the (medium) 
high-tech M&As in this study are large in terms of absolute and relative size, so that relatively 
large knowledge bases are acquired, and that the M&A and PMAI have a relatively large impact 
on the acquiring firm. In addition, as the set of M&As are relatively similar in terms of size, 
the involved firms should be relative compatible in terms of organizational fit. In that respect, 
our sample differs from samples in other studies that typically include small acquisitions and 
absorption integration (e.g. Puranam et al., 2006; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Schweizer, 2005).
Relatedness
The third M&A context characteristic in this study is relatedness. In line with previous 
studies (see Section 5.2.2), we concentrate on market and technological relatedness. In order 
to determine the market-relatedness of the M&As, we have looked at the NACE sector 
classification. In all cases, the involved firms were operating in the same sector at 3-digit level 
(see Table 5.2), so they can be classified as horizontal M&As. In that sense, most M&As 
involved the combination of rivals. However, during the interviews it became apparent that, 
although the firms were operating in the same(3-digit) markets, most of the products were 
not direct competitors. This was further demonstrated by the fact that although about half 
of the M&As were subject to in-depth investigations by anti-trust authorities in the EU, only 
in four M&As did some products have to be divested. The impact of these divestments were 
relatively small on average (except for Case 2, in which the product divestments amounted 
to €0.4 billion turnover, which is still relatively little compared to the business sizes of the 
merging firms). In addition, with some M&As the involved firms were active with similar 
products, but in different regions. Since high market-relatedness was positively associated with 
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post-acquisition performance of firms (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002a; Keil et al., 2008), we 
may expect that the cases in our sample may potentially realize innovation synergies.
Interestingly, there was substantially more variation with respect to technological relatedness 
(see Table 5.2). It should be noted that it can be difficult to determine the level of technological 
relatedness between two large firms involved in a merger or acquisition, because these large 
firms from (medium) high-tech industries are often specialized in a number of technological 
areas simultaneously. During the interviews we discussed the most important technological 
areas and R&D trajectories of the involved firms. Similar to the research by Cassiman et al. 
(2005), we cross-checked this interview information against publicly available information, 
and had our research team resolving any conflict through careful re-examination of the available 
information. Nevertheless, it was not possible to eliminate all subjectivity in determining the 
technological relatedness, although we are, as Cassiman et al. (2005), quite confident that the 
information we used is more reliable than the variables based on quantitative data, like patents. 
Examples of technological areas and R&D trajectories are magnetic resonance imaging and 
drug development in oncology respectively. Although the firms involved in the Cases 1a, 1b, 
1c and 2, were specialized in specific technologies, in general many of the technologies in 
place were strongly related – though not comparable. Moreover, the innovation processes 
in those firms were organized in a relatively similar way, which can point to high internal 
relatedness (Homburg and Bucerius, 2006). Therefore, these cases were categorized as M&As 
with a relatively high technological relatedness. In the Cases 3, 4a and 4b a substantial part 
of the technologies were completely new for the acquirer. There was only substantial overlap 
in a specific technological field. Consequently, these cases were categorized as M&As with 
moderate technological relatedness. Finally, in comparison with the other cases, Cases 4c-d 
and 5 showed the lowest level of technological relatedness. For instance, with the acquisitions 
of 4c and 4d firm 4 acquired technologies that were almost completely new to them. In one 
technological area, firm 4 had some related technologies at its disposal, but these were not as 
advanced as those of the acquired firm 4c. For the acquiring firm in Case 5, innovation mainly 
concerned process innovation, dominated by engineers, and focused on cost efficiency to serve 
the commodity market. In contrast, the acquired firm had a strong innovation center oriented 
at developing new technologies to serve the high-end markets. In that respect, R&D and the 
technological knowledge possessed by the two firms were relatively unrelated. Consequently, 
Cases 4c, 4d and 5 were categorized as M&As of low technological relatedness.
On the matter of relatedness we can conclude that, although in all cases the firms involved were 
active in the same 3-digit markets, in terms of technological-relatedness, the firms involved 
sometimes differed significantly, and our sample shows substantial variation.
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5.4.2 Post M&A integration
Corporate and integration approach
The M&As in this study show substantial variety with respect to the corporate integration 
approach (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991) and the general R&D integration approach. It 
appeared that 4 cases (1a-c, 2) can be characterized as a merger of equals and as a symbiosis 
integration (with related division). Cases 1a-c were actually acquisitions (only Case 2 was 
a formal merger of equals), although the M&A was only relevant for a related division. At 
the divisional level, these acquisition could be better characterized as mergers. In these cases, 
substantial levels of organizational integration were realized, with the new organization (or 
division) drawing from the ‘best of both worlds’. Case 5 can be best described as a sequence 
of a preservation and symbiosis integration. The acquired firm was initially kept as a separate 
division (preservation), with only specific functions, such as finance, sales and IT being slowly 
harmonized and integrated with the dominant firm. With Case 3, the integration approach 
was activity specific. A new division was created, comprising predominantly of the newly 
acquired business, although certain parts of the target were fully absorbed by the acquirer. 
For the four acquisitions of Firm 4 (Cases 4a-d), which involved one division and which 
occurred in a relatively short time period, a 4-fold integration approach was used, starting right 
after the final acquisition (Case 4b). The marketing and sales departments of the four firms 
were integrated (centralized) with that of the related division, as well as some other business 
functions such as Human Resources and IT. For R&D, however, a different integration 
approach was used (see next paragraph). 
It should be noted that due to the integration in other business functions, especially in sales 
and marketing, innovations were introduced on the target’s market and vice versa. This was, 
for instance, relevant in the cases where the merging firms had been active in geographically 
separate markets (e.g. Case 1b, Case 5, Cases 4b, 4c and 4d). As a result, by combining each 
other’s markets, there was a larger customer base that could be served with the same innovation. 
This type of economy of scale can be realized when the given cost for an innovation can be 
spread over a larger sales base (Cassiman et al., 2005; Cockburn and Henderson, 2001). 
The respondents perceived this type of synergy more as a market/sales synergy, as it was not 
specifically the result of integration within the R&D functions, but in sales and marketing.
R&D integration approach
In 5 cases (Cases 1a, 1b, 1c, 2 and 3) the idea was to integrate and link the R&D functions of 
the organizations involved, because from the start the intention was to achieve synergistic gains 
in R&D. In contrast, in three cases (Case 4a combined with Case 4c, and Case 5) the idea was 
to keep the acquired R&D autonomous and separate from the acquirer’s R&D. The primary 
reason for doing so was that the acquiring firm did not want to intervene in the ongoing R&D 
activities. In fact, after the acquisition of Case 4c, which was technologically moderately related 
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Table 5.3. Key findings with respect to R&D integration mechanisms and innovation synergies.
Case Technological 
relatedness
Main R&D integration mechanisms
Case 
1a
High Re-design of R&D, focused on specialization and eliminating duplicate R&D
Integration at the department level (physically)
Standardization in R&D practices going in both directions incorporating best of both 
worlds
Case 
1b
High Region-driven re-design of R&D, specialization / consolidation of R&D at 2 sites
Gradual change of the (R&D) organization structure
Standardization in R&D incorporating best of both worlds
Case 
1c
High Re-design of R&D, specialization and consolidation of R&D to 3 sites
Elimination of (many) duplicate jobs and innovation trajectories, mainly in research 
(limited at development)
Integration at the department level (physically)
Standardization incorporating best of both worlds
Case 
2
High Complete re-design of R&D, specialization into 6 dedicated entrepreneurial 
research centers 
Duplicate R&D eliminated (projects stopped)
Integration at the department level (physically and virtually) and virtually integrated 
teams, cross departmental
Standardization incorporating best of both worlds
Case 
3
Medium Department level integration only for new R&D areas
Ongoing R&D stayed separate (preservation)
Impose best practices in R&D (management) of acquirer to the target’s ongoing 
R&D (new organizational structure, more business driven, also new approach in 
R&D in target)
Employees (mainly management) from acquirer to target
Case 
4a
Medium Standardization of (innovation) management (systems and reporting)
Integration of R&D with the (related) 4c R&D (integrated management team (with 
4c), single design manager, and employee exchange
Adoption of project management from acquirer to target
R&D budget of acquired BU’s directed to central Research
Duplicate R&D activities were stopped
Profiting from external knowledge 127
  The impact of technological relatedness on innovation synergy realization
Innovation synergies
Lower innovation costs through cuts in R&D
More efficient and effective innovation process, through mutual exchange of best practices and tools
New breakthrough products resulting from combined technologies
New product/market combinations
Increased critical mass for structural R&D
More critical mass for structural R&D
Benefit from combining capabilities for marketing innovations and product innovations
Some innovation cost synergies
Lower innovation costs through cuts in R&D
More critical mass for R&D
Streamlined R&D, mainly in basic research
Significant cost savings due to cuttings in duplicate R&D
Substantial increase in the productivity in R&D
New innovation trajectories by combining knowledge and by more critical mass in R&D
More effective and efficient innovation process at target (more innovation-driven organization)
New R&D set up in new technological areas based on combining knowledge
Some (minor) innovation cost synergies by eliminating duplicate R&D activities
Exchange of state-of-the-art technologies resulted in improved products
Incremental and breakthrough innovations realized by combining knowledge
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Table 5.3. Continued.
Case Technological 
relatedness
Main R&D integration mechanisms
Case 
4b
Medium Standardization of (innovation) management (systems and reporting)
Parts of R&D combined with 4d to one site
Integrated R&D managers
Some NPD team-level integration
In a later stage, integration with corporate research of the acquirer
Case 
4c
Low/medium Initial preservation of the acquired R&D functions, only ‘quick win’ integration efforts
Standardization of (innovation) management (systems and reporting)
A small amount of duplicate R&D was stopped on the side of the acquirer
After acquisition 4a: 
R&D budget of acquired BU’s directed to corporate research of acquirer
After the acquisition of case 4a, formal integration efforts in R&D with 4a to form a 
separate R&D organization
R&D employees looking beyond their BU (across former firm boundaries) for 
solutions
Focus on standardization of terminology and reporting in R&D, not specifically on the 
actual R&D practices
Exchange of several state-of-the-art technologies, and re-design and standardization 
of products
Case 
4d
Low Initial preservation of the acquired R&D functions, only ‘quick win’ integration efforts
Standardization of (innovation) management (systems and reporting)
After acquisition 4b: 
R&D symbiotically integrated with 4b: integrated R&D management, and cross-
company development groups
Partial R&D integration with corporate research of acquirer – through an integrated 
management team
R&D budget of acquired BU’s directed to corporate research of the acquirer
Focus on standardization of terminology and reporting in R&D, not specifically on the 
actual R&D practices
Exchange of several state-of-the-art technologies, and redesign /standardization of 
products
Case 
5
Low Initial preservation of the acquired R&D functions. Only linking at the level of the top 
R&D management (one cross-company R&D manager) 
In a later stage (3 years), cross-company R&D teams formed
After 3 years acquirer started to slowly adopt the R&D structure of the target and 
innovation management best practices were transferred from target to acquirer
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Innovation synergies
Minor innovation cost synergies by eliminating some overlap in R&D
Improvement of quality of existing products due to complementary skills in R&D
Exchange of state-of-the-art technologies resulted in improved products
New innovation trajectories have been started up, using the combined know-how, which resulted in 
unique new products
Some (minor) innovation cost synergies by eliminating duplicate R&D activities
The exchange of state-of-the-art in technologies resulted in improved products with substantially 
more sales
New innovation trajectories by combining knowledge
The exchange of state-of-the-art in technologies resulted in improved products
Breakthrough innovations realized by combining knowledge, and by overcoming a threshold in R&D
Limited innovation cost synergies
More structured and effective R&D process and shorter time to market on acquirer side
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to Case 4a, the R&D of Case 4a and Case 4c integrated and formed an autonomous R&D 
function. Similarly, after the acquisition of Case 4d, which was technologically moderately 
related to Case 4b, R&D integration of Case 4b and Case 4d took place, and was slowly 
integrated with Firm 4’s corporate research. In some interviews (e.g. in Case 5) it was also 
stated that there was no initial awareness of any synergy potential in R&D, which would make 
integration unnecessary. There, the only integration aimed for was a little standardization of 
some innovation (management) practices and information and control systems.
5.4.3 Integration mechanisms
In the interviews a great deal of the focus was on the PMAI of the R&D functions, more 
specifically on the actual integration mechanisms at place, and on innovation synergy 
realization. Information on PMAI of the R&D functions is typically not available or only 
to a limited extent in more general company documents, such as annual reports. Table 5.3 
summarizes the main R&D integration mechanisms and innovation synergies realized in 
the cases. In Section 5.2.3 we identified 3 general integration mechanisms relevant for R&D 
integration: i.e. structural linking, standardization of systems, and process redesign. We will 
first discuss the most far-reaching integration mechanism, i.e. process re-design, followed by 
structural linking and standardization of systems. 
First we describe the process re-design in the R&D functions. In general, we found that in the 
M&As with high technological relatedness the most far-reaching R&D integration took place, 
which could be characterized as an intense re-design of the R&D process. In Cases 1a, 1b, 1c, 2 
and 3 the focus in PMAI was to increase specialization. For instance, in Case 1a R&D was re-
located in such a way that each remaining location would host one area of R&D (related to one 
business unit). A central issue in the PMAI in Case 1a was where to place Development. In the 
acquired company, Development was part of Marketing, whereas in the acquiring company, 
Development was part of Research. Initially, Development became a separate function, but 
later it was integrated in the research function. In Case 2, new specialized, de-centralized 
research units were created. The research units were supposed to organize the efforts of the 
more than 20 R&D sites across the globe, to work semi-autonomously and compete to attract 
financial resources from the head office and internal users. The research units were established 
to balance the small and large areas of research operations in order to enhance the productivity 
and output of R&D. The idea was to keep the research units small enough to be creative and 
innovative, without the dead-weight associated with the bureaucracy of a large company. In 
Case 3, a new department for R&D in new business areas was created, in which the two 
companies had related activities, combining their knowledge in that new business area in order 
to specialize on that subject.
Apart from specialization, another important aspect of process re-design is rationalization. In 
five cases rationalization processes took place, in the form of closing R&D sites or departments 
(especially in Cases 1a, 1c, and 2), stopping innovation trajectories/projects or firing employees 
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(e.g. Cases 1a, 1c, 2, 4a, 4c). For instance, in Case 1c a number of research sites were closed, as 
R&D was consolidated in 3 remaining locations. Interestingly, in Case 4c, the (small amount of ) 
related R&D activities at the acquirer were completely terminated and some R&D employees 
were transferred to the acquired firm. In contrast, in the cases with low technological relatedness, 
process re-design was not an issue, as there were no or hardly any integration efforts focused at 
specialization or rationalization (e.g. Cases 4d and 5). This finding is consistent with the study 
of Cassiman et al. (2005), who also linked a high technological relatedness with rationalization 
processes. Finally, the momentum of the M&A was often used to evaluate and re-assess the total 
innovation portfolio in order to scrap less promising projects, and reposition more promising 
projects (e.g. in Cases 1a, 1b, 1c, 2 and 3). Especially in Case 2, this type of assessment had led 
to a major short-term drop in pipeline projects.
Interestingly, the results teach us that technological relatedness appeared to be associated with 
the focus in the R&D integration. The data suggests that especially with M&As with a high 
level of technological relatedness, there will be substantial technological overlap and therefore 
much potential for cutting duplicate R&D, further specialization, and re-prioritization. 
M&As with high levels of technological relatedness show the most far reaching forms of 
integration, at the level of the department. It seems that such M&As consolidate their R&D 
activities into a smaller number of R&D sites, often specialized in a particular technological 
area. These integration mechanisms are typical examples of process re-design. With M&As 
with moderate and especially M&As with low technological relatedness, R&D integration is 
not, or is to a much lesser extent focused on process re-design. Accordingly, we formulate the 
following proposition:
Proposition 1a
P1a: With a high level of technological relatedness, R&D integration is focused on process re-design.
In addition, M&As with a high level of technological relatedness and a focus on process re-
design in R&D integration, seem to have realized the most apparent innovation cost synergies. 
Indeed, with regard to innovation cost synergy, our analysis (see Table 5.3) revealed that 
especially Cases 1a, 1b, 1c, and 2 reported significant innovation related cost savings. Some 
of these cases showed that innovation-related cost savings were transferred to other (new) 
innovation programs. In Case 1a, for instance, innovation cost savings due to elimination of 
overlap in R&D were used to increase the R&D budget in other areas. This was also evident 
in Case 2. In this way, cost savings may bring the firms on the road to new innovations that 
would have been out of reach without the M&A. Cases with a moderate level of technological 
relatedness also identified some innovation cost synergy, but in general to a lesser extent. 
Apparently, innovation cost savings are most likely to be realized when there is a strong 
relatedness between the two firms (Cassiman et al., 2005). Moreover, the M&As with a high 
level of technological relatedness also demonstrated that they had realized innovation process 
synergies, mainly as a result of the process re-design (see Table 5.3) and standardization efforts 
as part of the process re-design. In 4 cases (i.e. Case 1a, 1b, 1c and 2), the process re-design in 
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R&D was set up to utilize the best R&D competences from both sides in the new combined 
R&D function. Thus, the process re-designs in those cases were typically a form of symbiotic 
integration. 
Finally, we were also able to identify a number of new growth platforms in the M&As with 
a high level of technological relatedness (Cases 1a, 1b, 1c, and 2), especially as a result of 
reaching a threshold level in R&D. Apparently, process re-design is an integration mechanism 
that potentially leads to different innovation synergies.
Proposition 1b
P1b: Process re-design in R&D integration enables innovation cost synergy, innovation process synergy, 
and new growth platforms.
Second, we detail the structural linking identified in the cases. In each of the cases some kind 
of structural linking took place (see Table 5.3), although in the Cases 4c and 4d structural 
linking took place only after an initial preservation until the acquisitions of Cases 4a and 4b, 
and in Case 5 no structural linking took place initially either. Structural linking occurred 
at different levels in the organization. The most far-reaching level of structural integration 
identified was the permanent integration at the department level. In Cases 1a, 1c, 2, 3 and 4b 
at least a number of R&D departments were integrated. Whereas in most cases, departments 
were integrated and consolidated at one site, in Case 3 the integration was primarily virtual 
organizational. In other cases, structural linking took place primarily by means of integration 
at the R&D management level (Case 1b, 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d and 5). Furthermore, in some cases 
cross-company R&D teams were formed (Case 5 after 3 years, and 4b). Another form of 
structural integration identified in the cases was the re-allocation of (some) R&D budget 
from the acquired business to the acquirer’s corporate research (Cases 4a,b,d,e). In doing so, 
the acquired businesses could determine research directions at acquiring company’s research 
facility for parts of the research originally carried out within the acquired business. Although 
this integration mechanism was initially received with skepticism by the acquired firms’ 
managers, it did facilitate integration and cooperation between the different R&D functions. 
Finally, in some cases there was sufficient freedom created for employees to move through the 
new organization, crossing the original organizational boundaries, in order to find solutions. 
In the M&As with moderate technological relatedness, several forms of structural linking 
could be identified for those cases, whereas process re-design only took place to a limited 
extent. Moreover, in M&As with moderate levels of technological relatedness, integration 
mainly occurred at the R&D management level, or only for the real related technological 
areas at the level of the R&D department. In the latter case (e.g. Case 3), unrelated R&D of 
the acquired firm stayed separate from the acquirer’s R&D. In M&As with low technological 
relatedness, there was only limited (or only in a later stage) focus at structural linking
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Proposition 2a
P2a: With a moderate level of technological relatedness, R&D integration is focused on structural linking.
Interestingly, when evaluating the innovation synergies for the M&As with moderate 
technological relatedness, two types of innovation synergy dominate (see Table 5.3). First, 
structural linking (e.g. at the R&D management level) facilitated the exchange in best practices 
in R&D management, and of state-of-the-art technologies, which resulted in incremental 
innovations (e.g. Cases 3, 4a, and 4b) and a more effective innovation process (e.g. Case 3). In 
such cases, existing products from one firm could relatively easily be improved by incorporating 
the technologies from the other firm. Second, structural linking enabled combining knowledge 
and technologies in a new growth platform, leading to breakthrough innovations (see Table 
5.3). Apparently, structural linking is an integration mechanism that facilitates innovation 
process synergy and new growth platforms. In contrast, innovation cost synergy could not 
specifically be linked to structural linking. Hence, we arrive at the following proposition:
Proposition 2b
P2b: Structural linking enables innovation process synergy and new growth platforms.
The third integration mechanism was the standardization of systems, e.g. the harmonization of 
information, reporting, and control systems. In the cases of more symbiotic-type integration, 
(R&D) systems standardization typically was an integrated part the process re-design, 
and was based on the best of both worlds (e.g. Cases 1a, 1b, 1c, 2). In other cases, system 
standardization was primarily a one-way street (e.g. Cases 3, 4a,b,c,d, and 5). Interestingly, 
whereas process re-design and structural linking occurred either not at all or only to a limited 
extent in the M&As with low technological relatedness, a minimum level of R&D integration 
was identified in the form of standardization of R&D management practices and systems. 
Such a type of integration can be regarded as preservation, followed (some years later) by slow 
symbiotic integration efforts. Consequently, we arrive at the following proposition:
Proposition 3a
P3a: With a low level of technological relatedness, R&D integration will initially be of a preservation type, 
and is focused on standardization of management and systems.
In addition, it seems that standardization of systems by itself, does not lead to concrete 
innovation synergies. The M&As with low levels of technological relatedness show, despite 
standardization efforts, no deliberate synergy seeking. Although substantial synergies were 
realized in other business functions (e.g. in sales and marketing), within R&D this was not or 
hardly the case. Nevertheless, Table 5.3 shows that there are a number of innovation synergies 
for the cases with low technological relatedness, but these innovation synergies were the results 
of more far-reaching integration efforts, i.e. occasional structural linking, mainly realized at 
a later stage (e.g. an integrated R&D manager in Case 5, who started to transfer the R&D 
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organizational structure from the acquired firm to the acquirer after a number of years). 
Consequently, we arrive at the following proposition:
Proposition 3b
P3b: Systems standardization does not enable significant innovation synergies.
5.4.4 Towards a R&D integration framework
Combining the results from the former sub-section on integration mechanisms leads to a Post 
M&A Integration framework for innovation synergy realization (see Figure 5.2). The results 
of the case studies suggest that within R&D integration three generic levels of integration can 
be distinguished. Depending on the level of technological relatedness, different integration 
mechanisms and related R&D activities are carried out. Finally, depending on the level of 
technological relatedness and the subsequent integration mechanisms, different types of 
innovation synergy are realized.
The first level of R&D integration encompasses the standardization of systems such as 
information, reporting, and control system, and is applied even in most M&As with low 
technological relatedness. In such situations, which are often acquisitions, R&D of the 
acquired business is preserved, while the acquiring firm imposes its systems on the acquired 
firm. It should be noted, however, that in our study, the M&As with low technological 
relatedness could not be classified as a preservation or holding (c.f. Haspeslagh and Jemison) 
entirely. In the M&As with low technological relatedness many of the other business functions 
became much more integrated (in contrast to the R&D function), which would be in line 
with a hybrid integration approach (Schweizer, 2005), identified for the specific situation 
of relatively small biotech acquisitions by large pharmaceutical corporations. This hybrid 
integration approach distinguishes between R&D and non-R&D-related business functions 
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and suggests more autonomy for more specific biotech R&D, and more integration for 
more common biotech R&D, as well as other business functions (Schweizer, 2005). Finally, 
standardization of systems by itself should not be regarded as an integration mechanism 
leading to innovation synergies, although it can be seen as a prerequisite or key success factor 
for integration success (Grimpe, 2007). 
The second level of R&D integration involves elements of the first level integration, although 
here it goes further with structural linking up to the level of an integrated R&D management 
team, or one cross-company R&D manager. In this way, R&D units are being linked so that 
knowledge and technologies can be exchanged. Management integration is often succeeded 
by cross-company teams focused on developing a new technology, drawing from the 
complementary knowledge residing in both original firms. This form of structural linking can 
be especially useful in M&As characterized by partially overlapping and complementary R&D, 
and partially unrelated R&D, which can remain autonomous, so that ongoing unrelated R&D 
activities are harmed as little as possible. Finally, structural linking is linked to innovation 
process synergy and new growth platforms, and not innovation cost synergy.
The third and most far-reaching form of R&D integration is process re-design, i.e. a substantial 
and disruptive re-organization at the R&D department level. This level of integration also 
includes the elements of the first two levels of R&D integration, but now includes consolidation 
and specialization. Especially in the M&As with high technological relatedness, there seems 
to be great potential for consolidation and rationalization processes. Duplicate or overlapping 
R&D is reduced for the sake of cost benefits, or re-allocated to other and/or new technological 
areas. This process leads to increased specialization and enables firms to increase the scale and 
scope of R&D, so that it reaches a threshold level for e.g. fundamental research or for new large 
and risky projects. Finally, process re-design can be linked to each form of innovation synergy.
It was also found that as integration moves from the first level towards the 3rd level, integration 
will become a more two-way process (i.e. symbiosis), utilizing the best practices and state-of-
the-art technologies from both sides. In addition, process re-design in particular encompasses 
disruptive changes in the R&D function and organizational trauma, which may hamper 
ongoing innovation activities. Consequently, although process re-design may bring innovation 
synergies, it may also have a negative impact on the innovation capacity. This may be reflected 
in the inverted u-shape relationship between technological relatedness and post M&A 
innovation performance, found in a number of studies (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt 
et al., 2006). Whereas in these studies this finding is attributed entirely to complementarity 
as a pre-requisite for innovation synergies, our findings suggest that an inverted u-shape 
relationship can be caused by the intensity in R&D integration, which is in turn caused by the 
technological relatedness.
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5.4.5 Integration instruments and success factors in PMAI
Although it was not the prime focus in this study, in the interviews with integration and R&D 
managers we came across a number of factors and integration instruments that moderated 
the relation between R&D integration and innovation synergy realization, in our research 
framework labeled integration instruments and key success factors. As these key success factors 
and integration instruments are of great managerial importance, we will briefly discuss them 
here.
First of all, in a number of cases with substantial synergy realization (e.g. Cases 1a, 1b, 2 and 
3) the respondents emphasized that even before the official deal, extensive data gathering of 
the target took place and a detailed integration plan was drawn up. Moreover, in these M&As, 
the management used the time required for the assessments of the anti-trust authorities to 
make a more detailed PMAI schedule. Officially, at such a stage the exchange of information 
is restricted to non-sensitive information. Firms typically used third parties (often consultants) 
and worked with coded information in order to make planning possible, without revealing 
sensitive information. In Case 1c detailed up-front planning was not possible as the acquiring 
firm had to act quickly as it came as a white knight after a hostile bid on the target by a 
competitor. However, as it took some time to squeeze out some last shareholders to reach the 
required level of acquired shares, PMAI managers could use this period to make an in-depth 
schedule for the PMAI process.
The second factor was PMAI pace and timing. Following early planning of the PMAI, the focus 
in the Cases 1a to 3 was on taking PMAI of R&D quickly. However, it should be noted that 
even in cases with a focus on rapid integration, the PMAI of R&D had a dedicated phasing, 
more or less independent from the PMAI of other business functions, which is in line with 
suggestions by earlier studies (e.g. Schweizer, 2005). In other cases (e.g. Cases 4c, 4d and 5), 
initially no R&D integration took place. Whereas, for instance, finance, sales and IT of Cases 
4c and 4d were integrated into the acquirer, management decided not to integrate R&D, for 
the purpose of not disturbing ongoing R&D activities and to retain the R&D employees. At 
a (much) later stage, after the acquisitions of 4a and 4b, and when the firms got to know the 
new business and related R&D better, then attempts (in subsequent PMAI projects) were 
undertaken to slowly link or integrate the acquired R&D function. However, interviewees 
stated that the strong delay in R&D integration caused missing opportunities, and that in 
future they consider starting R&D integration some earlier.
The third key success factor was a dedicated PMAI team. Except for case 5, all M&As had a 
dedicated PMAI team. Such teams typically consisted of representatives from both sides, and 
in some cases an R&D representative was included as well.
Fourth, cultural issues dominated a number of M&As, which were tackled by a number 
of instruments. Although most M&As were international, the main cultural frictions 
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encountered were at corporate level. Firms undertook many actions, such as cultural training 
to overcome cultural barriers and to build a new corporate culture. Furthermore, interaction 
between employees from the different firms was enhanced using integration instruments such 
as exchanging employees (e.g. Cases 1b, 3, 4b, and 5), team building and workshops (e.g. Case 
1a) and setting up career paths exceeding the national and firm boundaries (Case 3). These 
instruments were perceived necessary to build a (new) integrated corporate culture and to 
satisfy and retain employees.
The fifth factor was communication. Cases 1a, 1b, 1c, 2 and 3 in particular paid a lot of attention 
to openly communicating about the PMAI process throughout the whole organization. For 
instance, in Case 1c, the open and positive communication by the top management of the 
acquired firm helped the employees cope with the new and uncertain situation. In addition, 
it was stated in the interviews that communication by top management in particular about 
the PMAI decisions was perceived as positive by the employees. In the four acquisitions of 
firm 4, communication to lower levels in the organization was delegated to the managers of 
the business units. The reason was that the perception in those cases was that PMAI was too 
much top-down organized.
The sixth factor was systematically utilizing and making explicit the experience from previous 
M&As. In at least 5 cases, the experience with previous M&As was used in tools and guidelines 
that were adjusted and improved with each subsequent M&A (e.g. cases 1a, 1b, 1c, 2 and 3). 
Case 3, for instance had been systematically analyzing all acquisitions from the previous 20 
years in order to identify lessons learned and best practices. The learning was made explicit in 
an ‘M&A and integration handbook’, which includes templates, checklist and other tools for 
implementing M&As. It was stated in the interviews that this experience was an important 
factor in the successful and quick integration of Case 3. This finding is in line with what earlier 
studies suggest, i.e. that routines and practices built up in prior acquisitions can be transferred 
to subsequent acquisitions (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999), 
and that the acquirer must tactically accumulate and explicitly codify acquisition experience 
in manuals, systems and other acquisition-specific tools (Zollo and Singh, 2004). It thereby 
conflicts with Gerpott (1995), who found that experience in M&As was detrimental.
A final important factor for the PMAI of R&D is the retention of key employees. Different 
instruments were used to satisfy and retain the employees. In some M&As the emphasize was 
on a fair selection of candidates for the new positions, without looking at the original firm 
(most notably Cases 1a, and 2). Moreover, the perception of fair and equal assessments of 
personnel was facilitated by having an external organization to do this job (e.g. Cases 1a-c, 
and 2). Moreover, in Case 2 it was decided to keep as many R&D locations open as possible, 
in order to retain key personnel. In Cases 4c, 4d and 5, retention of employees was one of the 
reasons for not integrating the R&D too early. Interestingly, financial rewards were rarely 
mentioned as a useful instrument to retain employees. Many managers did not believe in 
financial incentives or stated explicitly that nobody is indispensable.
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5.5 Discussion and conclusions
5.5.1 Conclusions
In this study, we sought to understand how innovation synergies are realized in large horizontal 
M&As. Drawing on the concepts of M&A context characteristics, and the existing literature 
on post M&A integration, we argued that innovation synergy realization is influenced by the 
technological relatedness of the combined firms. In line with earlier studies (e.g. Schweizer, 
2005), our findings show a clear need for a dedicated integration approach, which goes beyond 
simply integrating. Our findings suggest that firms in M&As must tailor the integration 
activities according to the innovation specific synergies sought, which is determined by the 
level of technological relatedness, a practice also suggested by Cassiman et al. (2005). The study 
links different levels of technological relatedness, with specific R&D integration mechanisms 
(Propositions 1a, 2a, and 3a), and subsequently with different types of innovation synergy 
(Propositions 1b, 2b, and 3b). 
Furthermore, we identified three types of innovation synergy (innovation cost synergy, 
innovation process synergy, and new growth platforms) and described a number of integration 
instruments and other key success factors in the PMAI that may moderate innovation synergy 
realization through R&D integration. In doing so, we answered RQ4, and answer calls for 
more research into acquisition implementation and the resource re-allocations that lead to a 
positive performance of M&As (Capron et al., 1998; e.g. Grimpe, 2007; King et al., 2008). 
5.5.2 Implications
The findings from our research amongst 10 large, medium- and high-tech M&As have 
implications for both research and practice. First of all, our study contributes to the academic 
debate on the relationship between M&As and innovation performance. Interestingly enough, 
whereas most of the empirical studies have found a negative or neutral impact of M&As on 
innovation (De Man and Duysters, 2005), the 10 cases from high-tech industries in our study 
revealed that various significant innovative gains can be achieved. It should be noted that our 
sample included (medium) high-tech M&As from life-science industries in which innovation 
had a certain relevancy. Earlier studies already pointed at a positive impact of M&As on 
innovation performance in such settings (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006).
Second, our study has made more explicit the relationship between M&A context characteristics, 
most notably technological relatedness, and innovation performance. Earlier studies 
concentrating on technological relatedness have mainly considered post M&A integration 
as a black box (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Keil et al., 2008). Moreover, 
whereas Cassiman et al. (2005) introduced two categories of technological relatedness (i.e. 
same technological fields versus complementary technological fields), our findings suggest 
that there are three relevant categories, i.e. high (like same technological fields), moderate 
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(like complementary technological fields) and low technological relatedness (which refers to 
only limited or no overlap). These three categories each relate to a different focus in the R&D 
integration process.
Third, our research suggests that studies investigating the impact of M&As on innovation 
performance should take into account the type of innovation synergies focused at, and their 
specific (innovation) performance consequences. For instance, innovation cost synergies may 
lead to reductions in R&D expenditures, but these savings may as well be re-invested in other 
R&D. In such situations, it is not likely that the overall R&D spending decreases, and hence, 
it can explain why it is sometimes difficult to quantify innovation cost synergy in M&As (e.g. 
Cassiman et al., 2005). In addition, researchers focusing on output indicators should be aware 
of the limitations of patent data in the context of M&As. If researchers use patents as a proxy 
for innovation performance (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002a; 
Keil et al., 2008), they miss an important attribute of the M&A, which is that innovations 
(including the ones already in the pipeline) become available for different markets. This 
diffusion of innovations may be improved primarily by the integration of the marketing and 
sales functions. Thus, in addition to the new knowledge created due to M&As, M&As are 
especially useful in increasing the market potential of new technologies as different markets 
are brought together or completely new markets are created. This is in line with some recent 
findings that with M&As, marketing and technology resources positively reinforce each other 
(King et al., 2008). Patents miss this element. Therefore, although patents may function as a 
good proxy for innovation performance in high-tech sectors (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003), 
we opt for using indicators that also capture the commercial success of the innovations, such 
as the shares of sales from innovative products. In doing so, there will be a fairer assessment of 
the impact of M&As on innovation performance in different technology sectors (e.g. in low 
tech). The cases also suggest that optimizations in the innovation process (innovation process 
synergy) lead to quick wins and improved products in the market, which can boost sales of 
existing products. Again, patents would not capture such innovative gains. Instead, researchers 
should focus on developments with respect to R&D productivity and innovation lead times 
(time to market) or on the performance of new and incrementally improved products. 
Our findings also have implications for practice. Innovation managers and integration experts 
alike may benefit from considering more precisely the different types of (innovation) synergy 
realization, and take the required decisions in order to realize them. Considering the high 
failure rates of M&A (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Schenk, 2006), and the seemingly 
small gains from M&As with respect to innovation (De Man and Duysters, 2005), there seems 
to be large potential to improve both the pre-M&A decision making and the post-M&A 
integration process. It is the task of managers to be as explicit as possible about how, why, and 
where acquisitions can be reasonably expected to strengthen the firm (King et al., 2004). Our 
conceptual model of innovation synergy realization that was depicted in Section 5.4.3 may 
be a good starting point for managers to develop and implement a dedicated PMAI strategy 
focused at the R&D function. Depending on the level of technological relatedness, integration 
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managers could opt for different integration mechanisms. In the case of low technological 
relatedness, it is important not to disturb ongoing R&D activities, and the focus in R&D 
integration could be on systems standardization only. In the case of moderate relatedness, 
integration managers should consider which parts to structurally integrate (e.g. by means of 
an integrated R&D team) so that complementary knowledge can be combined. With high 
technological relatedness, integration managers might opt for process re-design, which can 
lead to innovation cost synergy. However, process re-design in particular may disrupt ongoing 
R&D activities significantly, subsequently leading to decreased innovation performance.
Finally, the cases provided examples of how firms can foster the PMAI process of the R&D 
function (see Section 5.4.5). For instance, in line with earlier research (e.g. Zollo and Singh, 
2004) we found that firms really benefit from the previous M&As experiences in subsequent 
M&As by using the same (experienced) people in the new PMAI team, developing M&A 
handbooks and integration templates. Firms that lack this experience may choose not to 
integrate the R&D functions in the first stage, i.e. initial preservation, or use a so-called ‘cool 
down strategy’ (Bakker and Helmink, 2000). In the period of preservation the M&A does not 
harm or foster innovation and the acquirer can start to learn the acquired business including 
the R&D function. As time progresses, R&D managers can start to look across the original 
organizational boundaries and shop on both sides for new solutions, applying a more symbiotic 
integration approach. However, our results also suggest that acquiring firms should not wait 
too long with integrating R&D as they miss important opportunities.
5.5.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research
The study presented in this chapter also has a number of limitations. First, due to the small 
sample size, the generalizability of our findings is limited to large (medium) high-tech M&As 
in the life-science industry. For example, the extent to which our conceptual model and research 
propositions hold for smaller M&As (e.g. among medium-sized firms), or in low-tech sectors 
remains an empirical question. Larger-scale empirical efforts are necessary to statistically assess 
the relationships presented in our study and may help define the contexts in which these 
relationships are valid. In addition, although related to this issue, several factors in our research 
framework (Figure 5.1) were more or less constant for the cases in our study. Whereas our 
study focused on technological relatedness in particular, further research could concentrate 
more on (variations in) other context characteristics, most notably relative and absolute size. 
Relatively small acquisitions in particular may follow an absorption integration approach 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991), which was not found in our sample of large M&As.
Second, our study mainly relied on subjective assessments of the innovation synergies and 
integration mechanisms. Although this may raise questions concerning validity, it should be 
noted that as far as possible we triangulated our interview findings with formal company 
documents (e.g. annual reports) and we interviewed at least two managers (except for one case 
that did not allow us to). In most cases the interviewees represented both original firms, which 
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further enabled us to critically analyze the M&As. Moreover, so far this subjective approach 
seems to be the only way of getting in-depth information on acquisition implementation and 
innovation synergy realization (e.g. Cassiman et al., 2005; Grimpe, 2007). 
5.5.4 Concluding remarks
With this study, we answered calls for more research into the intersection of M&As and 
innovation research (e.g. Cassiman et al., 2005), and the impact of acquisition implementation 
on post M&A innovation performance (Capron et al., 1998; Grimpe, 2007; King et al., 2008). 
More in-depth investigations in particular were called for, to provide integration managers 
with more discretion to detail the actual decisions they make and to see how they affect the 
R&D function (Cassiman et al., 2005; Gerpott, 1995). In summary, we help managers by 
making more explicit how, why, and where M&A-related synergies can be reasonably expected 
(King et al., 2004) and by suggesting how to reach these synergies through a structured PMAI 
process.
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6. Discussion and conclusions
In this chapter we will discusses the main findings of the different studies presented in this book. 
To do so, we recap in Section 6.2 how the studies have answered the research questions and 
formulate the main conclusions. Next, in Section 6.3 we summarize the main contribution to 
literature provided in this book. Finally, this chapter closes with Section 6.4 on the managerial 
implications. 
6.1 Main findings and conclusions
The overall objective of this book is to analyze how firms can profit from external knowledge, 
by using different knowledge acquisition strategies. In order to meet this objective we addressed 
four research questions, which we tried to answer in the Chapters 2 to 5.
Part I presents two quantitative studies on the relevance of external knowledge acquisition 
for Dutch innovating companies. These studies use data of industrial firms from the Dutch 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The first quantitative study combines data from 5 
subsequent surveys covering the period of 1994-2004 to analyze trends with respect to the 
adoption of open innovation. The second quantitative study is based on a statistical analysis of 
two Dutch community innovation surveys (CIS), from which we selected a large cross-section 
from Dutch industry (686 innovating firms) to analyze the impact of different knowledge 
acquisition strategies on a firm’s innovation performance. 
In Chapter 2 we have looked at how industrial firms profit from the knowledge and capabilities 
residing in other organizations. More specifically, we addressed the Research Question 1.
RQ1: To what extent do different types (size and technology classes) of innovating firms pursue an open 
innovation strategy? 
For the Netherlands, we identified a trend that has seen, especially since the turn of the 
century, an increasing share of innovating firms pursue an open innovation strategy, i.e. using 
external knowledge acquisition strategies, such as cooperation, outsourcing, and licensing-in 
(see Figure 6.1, which is based on Table 2.1). 
In addition, we found an increase in cooperation for different types of cooperation partners, 
such as suppliers, customers and research institutes. The most prevalent cooperation partners 
are actors from within the supply chain, i.e. suppliers and customers. Finally, the results in 
Chapter 2 show that in the period 2002-2004 on average innovating firms work together with 
more different innovation partners than in 1994-1996 (see Section 2.4.4, Table 2.3).
We conclude that there is a clear break in the trend in the application of open innovation 
around the year 2000. Interestingly, our longitudinal analysis showed that low- and medium-
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tech firms in particular are clearly catching up (see Figure 6.2, which is based on Table 2.1). 
That open innovation could also become an important strategy for firms residing in low-tech 
sectors has already been suggested by some qualitative studies (e.g. Chesbrough and Crowther, 
2006), but it has never been tested in a large-scale, quantitative study before. Moreover, we 
concluded in Chapter 2 that SMEs increasingly pursue open innovation strategies. Yet, in 
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Figure 6.1. Adoption of open innovation in Dutch industry.
Figure 6.2. Adoption of open innovation in the Netherlands across technology sectors.
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general, large firms and firms from high-tech industries are still the most inclined to adopt 
open innovation strategies.
To answer Research Question 1, we conclude that the different knowledge acquisition 
strategies associated with open innovation are increasingly practiced, especially since 2000, 
amongst innovating firms from different size and technology classes. Most notable is the rise 
in adoption of open innovation strategies by SMEs and by firms from low- and medium-tech 
industries, and that cooperation has become the dominant open innovation strategy.
Chapter 3 concentrates on the performance consequences of different knowledge acquisition 
strategies. We concluded in Chapter 2 that open innovation has become more common, but 
is it also more successful? In Chapter 3 we addressed Research Question 2.
RQ2: What is the impact of different external knowledge acquisition strategies on the short-term and long-
term innovation performance of innovative firms? 
To answer this question, we first analyzed the impact of licensing-in, outsourcing, cooperation 
(each open innovation strategies) on the short-term and long-term performance of incremental 
and radical innovation. We found that firms that acquire knowledge and capabilities from 
other organizations perform better on innovation than companies that innovate exclusively 
in-house. More specifically, we found that licensing-in contributes significantly to short-term 
innovation performance of both incremental and radical innovations, but not to long-term 
innovation performance. Furthermore, we found that outsourcing has a positive impact on a 
firm’s short-term performance of incremental innovations, and on the long-term performance 
of incremental, but especially radical innovations. Inter-organizational cooperation was found 
to have a positive impact on incremental and radical innovation, both in the short and long 
term. The results suggest that there may be several sub-modes of outsourcing and inter-
organizational cooperation that facilitate innovation in different ways. For instance, in the case 
of outsourcing one strategy may be aimed at quick improvements on existing products (e.g. 
outsourcing to suppliers), whereas another outsourcing strategy may involve basic research 
for radical innovation, or monitoring new or emerging technologies (e.g. outsourcing to 
knowledge institutions). 
In addition to the knowledge acquisition strategies associated with open innovation, we 
then looked at the performance consequences of major firm acquisitions and of in-house 
innovation. We concluded that the acquisition of a relatively large firm boosts the innovation 
performance significantly, but only after a substantial number of years. Apparently, it takes 
considerable time and effort to integrate the acquired firm in such a way that it improves the 
innovation performance. Several studies (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; De 
Man and Duysters, 2005) already suggested that it normally takes considerable time before 
M&As impact the innovation performance positively. However, the results also indicate that, 
compared to other knowledge acquisition strategies, in the long run acquisitions have the 
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biggest impact on radical innovation performance. Finally, exclusive in-house innovation 
turned out to be a sub-optimal strategy, as we found that exclusive in-house innovation had 
a consistently significant negative impact on the performance of both short and long-term 
performance of incremental and radical innovation. 
In answer to Research Question 2 we conclude that knowledge acquisition strategies associated 
with open innovation have an overall positive impact on a firm’s innovation performance, but 
that, in contrast to earlier findings, major acquisitions can also be beneficial for improving 
the innovation performance, though only in the long term. Exclusive reliance on in-house 
innovation is clearly an sub-optimal strategy for innovating firms.
Part II presents two qualitative studies of knowledge acquisition processes. In Chapter 4 
we focus on cooperation processes in open SME innovation networks and asked Research 
Question 3.
RQ3: How do innovation brokers orchestrate SME innovation networks in the agri-food sector?
We concluded in Chapter 2 that innovating in an open setting is a fairly new phenomenon 
for SMEs, especially in low-tech sectors. In Chapter 3 we learned that inter-organizational 
cooperation has a positive impact on innovation performance. For SMEs, however, it can be 
a major challenge to cope with all the issues stemming from inter-organizational cooperation, 
such as cultural differences (e.g. between academics/researchers and entrepreneurs), 
appropriation concerns, motivational problems, leakage of sensitive knowledge, etc. (Caputo 
et al., 2002; Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001; Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2002; Van Gils and 
Zwart, 2004). Drawing from the rich experience of four innovation brokers in the agri-food 
sector, we substantiated the network orchestration processes that are important for successful 
innovation of SMEs (see also Figure 4.1 in Section 4.5). First, innovation brokers assist SMEs 
in the early stage of the innovation project, to develop ideas independently of large institutional 
actors, and to find complementary partners such as other SMEs, or research institutes. In 
contrast to an individual SME, an innovation broker can typically draw from a large and 
diverse network, in order to compose a network of complementary actors. Second, innovation 
brokers take the lead in setting up appropriate coordination mechanisms to facilitate the inter-
organizational cooperation within the new innovation network. Third, innovation brokers 
often are involved in the network during the whole innovation trajectory, in order to manage 
the inter-organizational cooperation between the different parties. Especially in the case 
of conflict between the parties, innovation brokers are of added value in SME innovation 
networks. Being in a neutral position in an innovation network in which all other parties 
have a commercial stake, and having ample experience with inter-organizational innovation 
processes, enables innovation brokers to do so. 
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To answer Research Question 3, we refer to the above listed network orchestration processes 
and the illustrations provided in Section 4.4, which provide in-depth insights into best 
practices of how innovation brokers orchestrate SME innovation networks. 
Chapter 5 addresses Research Question 4. 
RQ4: What is the role of technological relatedness in realizing innovation synergies in M&As? 
In Chapter 3 we concluded that major acquisitions have a positive impact on the long-term 
performance of radical innovation. In Chapter 5 we analyze how major M&As can contribute 
to innovation performance. To do so, we first conceptualized the M&A derived innovation 
synergies: innovation cost synergy, innovation process synergy, and new growth platforms. 
Some earlier studies already pointed at some potential innovative gains from M&As (e.g. 
Cassiman et al., 2005; Cloodt, 2005; Gerpott, 1995; Grimpe, 2007; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 
2002a), but these studies have hardly made explicit how these innovative gains are realized in 
terms of Post M&A integration (PMAI), and how these synergies are related to different M&A 
context characteristics. The case studies of large, medium- and high-tech M&As in life-science 
industries showed that these different innovation synergies are realized in different ways, and 
that synergy realization is determined by the level of technological relatedness between the 
involved firms. 
The results suggest that depending on the level of technological relatedness, firms apply 
different integration mechanisms. In highly technological related M&As, firms focus R&D 
integration on process redesign, i.e. rationalization processes (eliminating duplicate R&D), 
specialization, and re-prioritizing of innovation projects. Process re-design is associated with 
each of the three types of innovation synergy, innovation cost synergy, innovation process 
synergy, and new growth platforms. In moderately technological related M&As, firms focus 
R&D integration mainly on structural linking, e.g. in terms of integrated R&D management, 
R&D teams, or even R&D departments. Structural linking turned out to be associated with 
innovation process synergy, new growth platforms, but not with innovation cost synergy. 
Finally, in the case of lowly technological related M&As, firms tend not to integrate the R&D 
functions, but focus on standardizing systems, such as the harmonization of information, 
reporting, and control systems. In principle, system standardization could not be associated 
with specific innovation synergies, although it can be regarded as an important success factor 
in the integration process. It should be noted that process re-design included also elements of 
structural linking and systems standardization, and structural linking included also elements of 
systems standardization. This suggests that there are three levels of R&D integration, starting 
with system standardization (in cases of low technological relatedness) up to the most far-
reaching, and thereby most disruptive integration mechanism, process re-design (in cases of 
high technological relatedness).
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On the issue of organizing the PMAI, we conclude that there are several factors that enhance 
innovation synergy realization. First, we found that the integration of the R&D functions 
often gets a dedicated PMI pacing. A considerable number of M&A scholars already suggested 
that firms should have dedicated approaches to the integration of different business functions/
areas (e.g. Homburg and Bucerius, 2006; Puranam et al., 2006; Schweizer, 2005). We found 
that especially in M&As with low technological relatedness, unlike other business function, 
the acquired R&D functions were preserved even for a few years to get to know the acquired 
R&D better, before they started some form of integration. Second, firms with a track record 
of similar acquisitions, draw explicitly from their experience by using dedicated PMAI tools 
and guidelines. These firms are likely to integrate the R&D functions more quickly than firms 
without relevant experience. Finally, we concluded that, although rewarding, integrating two 
R&D functions was difficult and time consuming. 
To answer Research Question 4, we conclude that there are three prime innovation synergies 
and that these synergies require distinct integration mechanisms. In addition, these different 
integration mechanisms and innovation synergies are determined by the level of technological 
relatedness between involved firms.
6.2 Contributions to literature
In this book we present four empirical studies on how innovating firms profit from external 
knowledge. These studies have made six main contributions to literature.
First, our research showed that, especially since the year 2000, Dutch innovating firms are 
increasingly adopting an open innovation strategy. The general perception was that open 
innovation is especially important for large, and especially high-tech firms (Chesbrough, 
2003b). Moreover, so far most of the empirical evidence was limited to (1) anecdotal evidence 
from a small number of case studies, (2) evidence from high-tech firms, and (3) evidence from 
large firms (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003b; Christensen et al., 2005; Dittrich and Duysters, 2007). 
Our longitudinal research of cross-sectional CIS data of Dutch innovating firms quantified 
the relevance of open innovation for the first time on this scale. Open innovation turns out 
to be relevant across Dutch innovating firms. Moreover, our study clearly shows that open 
innovation is not only important for large firms and firms from high-tech industries, but also 
increasingly for SMEs and lower-tech firms. With our quantitative analysis of industrial firms 
in the Netherlands, the study has substantially advanced the external validity of the open 
innovation model.
Second, we were able to analyze the performance consequences of the different knowledge 
acquisition strategies in one integrated model, within the setting of a cross-section of 15 
industries. Existing studies on this issue concentrated on one particular mode, or has limited 
the analysis to one (high-tech) industry (e.g. Fey, 2005; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Van 
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de Vrande, 2007). The extension on knowledge acquisition strategies and industries brings 
research on open innovation to a higher level.
Third, our research showed that firms profit from licensing-in and outsourcing as we found 
significant positive relationships with innovation performance. So far, only a limited number 
of studies have looked at the performance consequences of licensing-in and outsourcing (Fey, 
2005; Tsai and Wang, 2007). Whereas Tsai and Wang (2007) found that licensing-in has a 
positive impact on innovation performance, as long as the firm has sufficient capacity to absorb 
the knowledge, Fey (2005) found that outsourcing has a negative impact on a firm’s innovation 
performance. Taking a cross-section of Dutch industry, we found that licensing-in has a short-
term positive impact on a firm’s innovation performance. A possible explanation for this finding 
is that licensing-in involves knowledge and technologies that are available on the market, also 
to competitors, so that it does not lead to a sustainable competitive advantage. In addition, we 
found that outsourcing has a positive impact on a firm’s short-term performance in incremental 
innovation and long term performance in both radical and incremental innovations. This 
finding could be an indication that there are distinct outsourcing strategies, e.g. outsourcing 
to suppliers to improve existing products, and outsourcing of fundamental research to 
universities. Our empirical findings on the impact of licensing-in and R&D outsourcing on 
a firm’s innovation performance can be regarded as another contribution to the literature 
on open innovation. However, further research is required in order to fully understand how 
licensing-in and R&D outsourcing contribute to the innovation performance
Fourth, taking a cross-section of Dutch industry, we found that major acquisitions have a 
positive impact on the long-term performance of radical innovations. Interestingly, so far, 
the majority of the empirical studies had found a neutral effect at best, or even a decline, 
in innovation performance (De Man and Duysters, 2005). Only in specific situations did 
researchers find that M&As had a positive effect on innovation performance (e.g. in the case of 
technology motivated M&As in high-tech sectors). An explanation for our surprising finding 
could be that we used a more suitable indicator to assess innovation performance in the context 
of M&As than previous studies. Whereas previous studies(e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt 
et al., 2006; Hitt et al., 1998, 1991) concentrated primarily on innovation input indicators 
(e.g. innovation expenditures), new product announcements, or technological performance 
(measured as patents counts), we used an indicator for innovation performance that also 
captures the commercial impact of innovations. With M&As, next to R&D, complementary 
business functions, such as marketing and sales, are also part of the deal and can enforce 
innovation synergy realization (King et al., 2008). Therefore, an indicator that captures the 
commercial impact of innovations seems to be more appropriate for analyzing performance 
consequences of M&As. To conclude, we believe we provided relevant insight into the ongoing 
discussion within the management literature on whether M&As are beneficial for innovation 
or not (De Man and Duysters, 2005). 
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Fifth, we substantiated the network orchestration processes of innovation brokers active in 
SME innovation networks. We discussed best practices that go one level deeper than codes 
and standard terms (e.g. trust) typically listed. Moreover, whereas research within the Systems 
of Innovation literate (e.g. Howells, 2006; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008b; Winch and Courtney, 
2007) identified a number of functions and roles of innovation brokers in the innovation system, 
we have come up with more specific orchestration processes relevant at the network level.
Sixth and finally, in this book we have further opened the black box of innovation synergy 
realization in the context of M&As. We substantiated the concept of innovation synergies 
and linked them to technological relatedness and the relevant integration mechanisms. 
Most existing studies had either focused on the PMAI process (Bannert and Tschirky, 2004; 
Grimpe, 2007; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Schweizer, 2005), or on M&A context characteristics 
determining post M&A innovation performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 
2006). In line with the ideas of Cassiman et al. (2005), we studied in-depth innovation synergy 
realization, considering both M&A context characteristics (e.g. technological relatedness) and 
the R&D integration mechanisms. In addition, our finding that there are diverse innovative 
gains have important ramifications for further quantitative studies concentrating on the 
relationship between M&As and innovation. So far these studies (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Cloodt et al., 2006) have concentrated on one single aspect of innovation performance (e.g. 
technological success measured as ex-post M&A patent counts), which may, as mentioned, 
provide a very partial analysis of M&As.
6.3 Managerial implications
The business landscape for modern firms has been subject to serious change in the last two 
decades. In today’s business, firms face huge challenges arising from the fast technological 
developments, ever-changing customer demands, scarcity in resources, and changing 
regulations. Achieving innovation success is essential for firms that want to prosper in this 
new business landscape. From a managerial perspective it is then important to know how to 
improve the innovation performance. Based on the results from the different studies in this 
book several implications for managers are extracted.
First, it is important that firms take advantage of the knowledge and capabilities residing in 
other organizations. Managers of firms that have so far not been active in external knowledge 
acquisition should ask themselves whether relying exclusively on in-house innovation is the 
optimal innovation strategy. The results in this book clearly recommend to pursuing open 
innovation strategies i.e. building linkages with other organizations to complement in-house 
knowledge to maximize innovation and commercial performance. Firms must, however, 
be aware of the managerial challenges that come with innovation management in an inter-
organizational context. Managing innovation in an inter-organizational setting requires 
specific capabilities that may be different from the capabilities required for managing in-house 
innovation. Firms that choose to pursue an open innovation strategy should therefore make 
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sure they have specific capabilities for managing it, for instance particular influencing, trust 
building and negotiation skills (Du Chatenier et al., 2008). To get such capabilities, firms 
could get involved in training, and set up specific recruitment criteria for new employees. As 
a result, employees would be better accustomed to innovating in an open setting, increasing 
their chances of competitive advantage. In addition, to get the adequate capabilities for open 
innovation, firms could reap the rewards of the experience and learning trajectories of other 
organizations. For instance, as we showed in Chapter 4, innovation brokers can complement 
SME innovation networks with typical open innovation capabilities.
Second, the following factors that improve the chances of success for cooperative innovation 
projects can be derived from the study of innovation brokers orchestrating open innovation 
in SME innovation networks:
Transparency: participants must be transparent in their processes and actions. For instance, 
firms must be explicit as to why they participate in a collaborative project, what they expect 
from it etc. This will increase the trust among the partners.
Complementary partners: an inter-organizational project should comprise of partners that 
truly add something to the project. In the case of SMEs this can equally be volume, in order 
to reach a minimal scale needed for the innovation.
Business-driven innovation: the starting point of any inter-organizational innovation project 
should be an idea or problem that is relevant for a commercial firm. Subsidy driven projects or 
innovation consortia led by researchers often lead to sub-optimal solutions from a commercial 
perspective.
Adequate governance mechanisms: for each innovation projects there should be tailored 
governance mechanisms set up for the inter-organizational project. Too many formal rules 
and procedures can be detrimental for innovation.
Third, when firms choose between different knowledge acquisition strategies, they must 
consider the different impacts they may have on the firm, especially on its innovation 
performance. For instance, the results in this book indicate that licensing-in can be beneficial 
for both radical and incremental innovation, but only for a temporary competitive advantage 
(see Section 3.4.2). On the long run, firms engaged in licensing-in do not perform better 
than firms that do not. This is probably, because the licensed-in knowledge is also available 
to competitors. Licensing-in should therefore be regarded as a strategy to keep pace with 
technological developments in the market, rather than a strategy to sustainably increase 
competitive advantage.
In strong contrast to licensing-in, our research has shown that M&As impact the innovation 
performance positively only after a considerable number of years. Firms should realize that 
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acquiring or merging with another firm does not instantly result in innovative gains, even if the 
target has clear complementary knowledge and capabilities. Innovation synergies stemming 
from M&As are preceded by intensive integration efforts, i.e. process re-design and structural 
linking, which are complex processes to manage. But, once the firms manage to integrate, the 
rewards may be great: more budget available for innovation, a leaner innovation process and 
ultimately breakthrough innovations that would not have been realized without the integration. 
Our R&D integration framework (Figure 5.2) may help managers to direct the integration 
activities. Firms that are inexperienced with M&As may opt for an initial preservation of the 
acquired R&D function, so that the two firms get to know each other better.
Fifth, in many M&As enhancing the innovativeness is not the prime motive. Nevertheless, 
we argue that firms should pay careful attention to integrating the R&D function. If not 
well managed, post M&A integration may hinder ongoing innovation activities, which 
may seriously delay new product introductions. Moreover, even without an initial focus on 
innovation synergies, firms must think about possible complementarities or overlaps in R&D. 
During our in-depth interviews with R&D and integration managers it came to the fore that 
M&As often offered substantially more innovation synergies than expected. As the synergies 
had a great strategic impact, managers regretted that they had not started dedicated R&D 
integration projects earlier.
Sixth and finally, our research should not be seen as a plea to simply reduce internal R&D and 
other innovation efforts. Although our study clearly shows that firms relying exclusively on in-
house innovation perform significantly worse on innovation than firms that acquire external 
knowledge, firms should maintain substantial levels of internal R&D to posses sufficient 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Only then will firms be fully able to profit 
from external knowledge.
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Table A1.2. Distribution of (innovating) firms across size classes among the different years.
Sectors Size class 
(employees)
CIS-2
1994-1996
(N)
CIS-2.5
1996-1998
(N)
CIS-3
1998-2000
(N)
CIS-3.5
2000-2002
(N)
CIS-4
2002-2004
(N)
Industry
 
10-50 655 734 475 325 440
50-250 970 979 760 722 653
>250 277 290 231 199 214
Total 1902 2003 1466 1246 1307
High-tech
 
10-50 109 110 57 38 65
50-250 86 87 66 64 66
>250 35 34 36 30 29
Total 230 231 159 132 160
Medium high-
tech
 
10-50 183 203 140 127 141
50-250 336 322 254 264 217
>250 85 85 76 61 60
Total 604 610 470 452 418
Medium low-
tech
 
10-50 148 180 129 91 112
50-250 238 272 221 194 175
>250 45 57 36 41 35
Total 431 509 386 326 322
Low-tech
 
10-50 215 241 149 69 122
50-250 310 298 219 200 195
>250 112 114 83 67 90
Total 637 653 451 336 407
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Table A1.3. Distribution of (innovating) cooperating firms across size classes among the different years.
Sectors Size class 
(employees)
CIS-2
1994-1996
(N)
CIS-2.5
1996-1998
(N)
CIS-3
1998-2000
(N)
CIS-3.5
2000-2002
(N)
CIS-4
2002-2004
(N)
Industry
 
10-49 122 135 85 86 171
50-249 309 292 231 304 345
>250 174 157 137 140 171
Total 605 584 453 530 687
High-tech
 
10-49 24 27 13 19 30
50-249 34 35 26 36 46
>250 25 23 27 21 24
Total 83 85 66 76 100
Medium high-
tech
 
10-49 31 46 30 41 52
50-249 102 111 77 119 113
>250 53 47 48 42 52
Total 186 204 155 202 217
Medium low-
tech
 
10-49 39 29 19 17 44
50-249 90 82 65 79 94
>250 32 34 23 30 27
Total 161 145 107 126 165
Low-tech
 
10-49 28 33 23 9 45
50-249 83 64 63 70 92
>250 64 53 39 47 68
Total 175 150 125 126 205
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Table A1.4. Share of innovation firms engaged in licensing-in.
Size class 
(employees)
1994-
1996
a 1996-
1998
a 1998-
2000
a 2000-
2002
a 2002-
2004
b
Total industry 10-49 8% ** 13% 10% 12% ** 22% **
50-249 14% 17% ** 12% ** 17% ** 28% **
>250 28% 27% * 19% 27% 35%
 Total 14% ** 17% ** 12% ** 17% ** 27% **
High-tech 10-49 10% 14% 14% 21% 22% *
50-249 23% 18% 15% 14% * 29%
>250 49% 38% 31% 40% 48%
 Total 21%  19%  18%  22%  29%  
Medium high-tech 10-49 10% 14% 11% 13% 17%
50-249 20% 19% 13% 16% ** 35% **
>250 24% 26% 21% 26% 35%
 Total 17%  18%  14%  16% ** 29% **
Medium low-tech
 
10-49 7% ** 17% 13% 9% ** 23% **
50-249 12% ** 21% ** 11% 18% 22% **
>250 29% 35% 28% 24% 29%
Total 12% ** 21% ** 13%  16% * 23% **
Low-tech 10-49 5% 10% 5% 10% * 25% **
50-249 7% 11% 10% * 19% 25% **
>250 24% 19% * 8% * 22% 33%
Total 9%  12% * 8% ** 18% ** 27% **
a Reports z-test whether the percentage changes significantly between the two periods.
b Reports z-test whether the percentage in 2004 changes significantly from 1996.
* P-value <0.05, ** P-value <0.01.
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Table A1.5. Share of innovating firms engaged in outsourcing.
Size class 
(employees)
1994-
1996
a 1996-
1998
a 1998-
2000
a 2000-
2002
a 2002-
2004
b
Total industry 10-49 24% * 29% * 24% 27% 31% *
50-249 40% 41% ** 34% ** 43% ** 51% **
>250 64% 62% 60% 64% 72% *
 Total 38%  40% ** 35% ** 42% ** 48% **
High-tech 10-49 25% 35% 30% 39% 40% *
50-249 43% 44% 42% 47% 59% *
>250 80% 74% 69% 53% 72%
 Total 40%  44%  44%  46%  54% **
Medium high-tech 10-49 26% 31% * 21% * 33% 30%
50-249 41% 44% 39% * 48% * 59% **
>250 62% 66% 59% 67% * 87% **
 Total 39%  43% * 37% ** 47% * 54% **
Medium low-tech 10-49 26% 27% 30% 22% 32%
50-249 39% 40% * 30% 38% * 49%
>250 69% 61% 75% 76% 63%
 Total 38%  38%  34%  38%  44%  
Low-tech 10-49 22% 26% 18% 14% * 27%
50-249 36% 39% * 29% * 40% 39%
>250 61% 55% 49% 58% 67%
 Total 36%  37% ** 29% ** 38%  42%  
a Reports z-test whether the percentage changes significantly between the two periods.
b Reports z-test whether the percentage in 2004 changes significantly from 1996.
* P-value <0.05, ** P-value <0.01.
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Table A1.6. Share of innovating firms cooperating with customers for innovation.
Size class 
(employees)
1994-
1996
a 1996-
1998
a 1998-
2000
a 2000-
2002
a 2002-
2004
b
Total industry 10-49 12% 10% 12% 15% ** 23% **
50-249 15% 18% 18% ** 27% ** 34% **
>250 36% 33% 32% ** 45% 52% **
 Total 18%  17%  18% ** 27% ** 33% **
High-tech 10-49 15% 15% 12% * 32% 32% **
50-249 21% 25% 21% 34% 41% **
>250 49% 47% 42% 47% 48%
 Total 22%  24%  23% * 36%  39% **
Medium high-tech 10-49 10% 11% 16% 16% 23% **
50-249 17% 20% 17% ** 29% 36% **
>250 38% 35% 33% 43% * 65% **
 Total 18%  19%  19% ** 27% ** 36% **
Medium low-tech 10-49 18% 12% 11% 12% * 23%
50-249 21% 19% 19% * 29% 33% **
>250 36% 30% 44% 56% 49%
 Total 22%  18%  19% ** 28%  31% **
Low-tech 10-49 6% 4% 8% 9% 18% **
50-249 11% 12% 16% 22% * 30% **
>250 36% 27% 23% * 39% 47%
 Total 14%  12%  15% ** 22% * 30% **
a Reports z-test whether the percentage changes significantly between the two periods.
b Reports z-test whether the percentage in 2004 changes significantly from 1996.
* P-value <0.05, ** P-value <0.01.
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Table A1.7. Share of innovating firms cooperating with suppliers for innovation.
Size class 
(employees)
1994-
1996
a 1996-
1998
a 1998-
2000
a 2000-
2002
a 2002-
2004
b
Total industry 10-49 8% 9% 10% ** 16% ** 29% **
50-249 16% 17% 16% ** 32% ** 43% **
>250 38% 35% 31% ** 52% ** 65% **
 Total 17%  17%  17% ** 31% ** 42% **
High-tech 10-49 9% 13% 16% * 34% 34% **
50-249 19% 21% 14% ** 41% * 61% **
>250 40% 41% 39% 50% 59%
 Total 17%  20%  20% ** 41%  49% **
Medium high-tech 10-49 7% 8% 9% ** 21% 28% **
50-249 14% 19% 16% ** 33% 41% **
>250 35% 32% 25% ** 48% * 67% **
 Total 15%  17%  16% ** 31% ** 40% **
Medium low-tech 10-49 9% 11% 9% 7% ** 25% **
50-249 21% 18% 18% ** 33% * 44% **
>250 36% 40% 44% 54% 60% *
 Total 18%  18%  18% ** 28% ** 39% **
Low-tech 10-49 7% 7% 9% 10% ** 33% **
50-249 15% 14% 15% ** 27% ** 41% **
>250 39% 32% 28% ** 55% 68% **
 Total 16%  14%  15% ** 29% ** 44% **
a Reports z-test whether the percentage changes significantly between the two periods.
b Reports z-test whether the percentage in 2004 changes significantly from 1996.
* P-value <0.05, ** P-value <0.01.
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Table A1.8. Share of innovating firms cooperating with competitors for innovation 
Size class 
(employees)
1994-
1996
a 1996-
1998
a 1998-
2000
a 2000-
2002
a 2002-
2004
b
Total industry 10-49 5% 6% 5% ** 10% 10% **
50-249 9% 8% 8% ** 13% 12% *
>250 20% 23% 19% * 30% 29% *
 Total 9%  9%  9% ** 15%  14% **
High-tech 10-49 2% * 9% * 0% ** 21% 15% **
50-249 9% 8% 9% 17% 12%
>250 17% 29% 25% 37% 38%
 Total 7%  12%  9% ** 23%  18% **
Medium high-tech 10-49 4% 6% 8% 10% 10% *
50-249 7% 9% 9% 14% 13% *
>250 15% 19% 17% 25% 33% *
 Total 7%  9%  10% * 14%  15% **
Medium low-tech 10-49 5% 6% 3% 7% 9%
50-249 10% 9% 8% 13% 10%
>250 29% 23% 25% 34% 26%
 Total 10%  10%  8% ** 14%  11%  
Low-tech 10-49 5% 5% 5% 6% 10%
50-249 9% * 5% 8% 11% 12%
>250 20% 24% 17% 28% 24%
 Total 9%  8%  8% * 13%  14% *
a Reports z-test whether the percentage changes significantly between the two periods.
b Reports z-test whether the percentage in 2004 changes significantly from 1996.
* P-value <0.05, ** P-value <0.01.
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Table A1.9. Share of innovating firms cooperating with knowledge institutions for innovation.
Size class 
(employees)
1994-
1996
a 1996-
1998
a 1998-
2000
a 2000-
2002
a 2002-
2004
b
Total industry 10-49 8% 8% 8% 11% * 17% **
50-249 14% * 18% ** 13% ** 25% * 31% **
>250 28% 35% 35% * 46% ** 60% **
 Total 16%  17%  15% ** 24% ** 31% **
High-tech 10-49 7% 13% 12% 26% 28% **
50-249 17% 22% 21% * 39% 41% **
>250 54% 47% 56% 57% 66%
 Total 18%  21%  26% * 39%  40% **
Medium high-tech 10-49 8% 10% 11% 15% 16% *
50-249 14% ** 23% ** 11% ** 28% 36% **
>250 36% 39% 36% 48% * 70% **
 Total 15% * 21% * 15% ** 27% * 34% **
Medium low-tech
 
10-49 9% 8% 6% 7% * 16%
50-249 18% 17% 13% * 22% 26%
>250 42% 32% 39% 49% 51%
Total 18%  15%  13% ** 21%  25% *
Low-tech 10-49 6% 4% 5% 1% ** 12% *
50-249 12% 13% 13% 18% 26% **
>250 38% 31% 24% 37% * 54% *
 Total 14%  13%  12% * 18% ** 28% **
a Reports z-test whether the percentage changes significantly between the two periods.
b Reports z-test whether the percentage in 2004 changes significantly from 1996.
* P-value <0.05, ** P-value <0.01.
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Table A2.1. Comparing the longitudinal sample with the original CIS-3 sample of innovating firms.
Longitudinal sample 
(N=686)
Mean
CIS-3 sample 
(N=1654)
Mean
Dependent variables
Innovative sales incremental innovation 2001 21% 20%
Innovative sales radical innovation 2001 5.6% 6.5%
Independent variables
Licensing-in 13% 13%
Outsourcing 40% 36%
Cooperation 33% 31%
Acquisition 5.2% 6.3%
In-house innovation 42% 45%
Control variables (firm characteristics)
Firm size (employees) 323 221
Innovation intensity 0.027 0.023
Firm part of group 80% 75%
Search breadth 2.08 2.04
Control variables (sectors)
Food and drink 13% 11%
Textiles 3% 3%
Paper 6% 5%
Printing and publishing 5% 7%
Petrol 1% 0%
Chemical basic products 4% 4%
Pharmaceutics 3% 2%
Chemical end products 5% 5%
Plastics 6% 6%
Basic metals 3% 2%
Fabric. metal products 13% 14%
Machinery 13% 15%
Electrical 7% 8%
Automobile and transport 4% 5%
Furniture 14% 14%
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A3.1. Description of the four innovation brokers in the study
KnowHouse 
KnowHouse, which began operations in 2003, presents itself as a facilitator of innovation, 
specifically aimed at stimulating innovation in the agri-food sector in the south-eastern part of 
the Netherlands (North Limburg). It can be characterized as a ‘pure’ innovation broker (Klerkx 
and Leeuwis, 2008b). KnowHouse started operations in 2003. As of June 2007, KnowHouse 
employed 9 FTEs, 5 as ‘co-innovators’ involved as brokers in innovation projects, and 4 as 
support staff. KnowHouse is currently involved in about 30 projects, and has been involved 
in more than 100 projects since its beginning. KnowHouse has public shareholders (e.g. 
local governments, universities) and private shareholders (e.g. privatized research institutes, 
banks, agricultural supplies firms). Although KnowHouse obtained starting capital from its 
shareholders to bridge over the first three years, these days the organization’s turnover comes 
directly from the innovation intermediation activities it conducts for its clients. 
my eyes
Officially founded in September 2005, my eyes started operations in April 2006. The company 
is not a ‘pure’ innovation broker, although it carries out specific intermediation functions; my 
eyes also offers specific knowledge intensive services, such as ICT support. As of June 2007, 
my eyes employed 5 FTEs and was involved in about 30 projects (including unpaid projects). 
It is the mission of my eyes to bring producers and consumers closer together by making and 
facilitating the necessary connections. The company is directed by 3 individuals who hold 
some, but not the majority, of the shares. My eyes also has a certificate structure with B-shares, 
which are held primarily by my eyes partners (in projects and networks). Of the 5 FTEs 
currently employed at my eyes, only 2 are on the payroll. The other employees can be seen as 
entrepreneurs who should be able to earn directly from the company’s activities and projects. 
Although the head office is located in the Dutch province of Gelderland, the company does 
not have a specific regional focus. 
GIQS
GIQS (Grenzüberschreitende Integrierte Qualitätssicherung e.V.) focuses on facilitating cross-
border public-private partnerships between Germany and the Netherlands. Its two parent 
organizations are the University of Bonn and Wageningen University. GIQS has 5 employees, 3 
appointed by GIQS and 2 who are ‘virtually appointed’ through the University of Bonn. GIQS 
has about 30 official members, of which most participate or have participated in projects. The 
core funding for GIQS is only €15,000. In terms of funding and cooperation, GIQS is active in 
complex projects such as large EU INTERREG frameworks of cooperation. GIQS ‘translates’ 
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complex projects into smaller projects or work packages that are accessible to SMEs. GIQS is 
involved in the entire life cycle of the projects. 
PEACRITT
The mission of PEACRITT (Le Pôle Européen Agroalimentaire pour la Communication la 
Recherche, l’Innovation et le Transfert de Technologies) is to improve economic development 
of the agri-food sector in Rhône-Alpes (France) through various activities aimed at SMEs 
and other stakeholders. PEACRITT functions primarily as a broker between SMEs and 
knowledge institutes, and in addition, is involved in training SMEs in the fields of innovation 
and cooperation. PEACRITT employs 7 FTEs and is involved in a substantial number of 
regional projects. An important feature of PEACRITT is a programme called ‘OPTIréseaux’ 
(Opti-network), which focuses on themes related to innovation and technical or organizational 
development. An OPTIréseaux programme comprises a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 12 
SMEs. The firms forming an OPTIréseaux programme are supported by at least two experts 
from technical centres or other research institutes. PEACRITT safeguards the OPTIréseaux 
concept, and takes on the role of coordinator and facilitator between the experts and the 
enterprises. The activities of PEACRITT in an OPTIréseaux programme involve individual 
elements (diagnostics of the project for each involved enterprise, technical assistance, training 
in the enterprise, engineering) and collective elements (connecting the enterprises in the 
OPTIréseaux network). PEACRITT is a non-profit organization which relies completely on 
public funding, mainly from the regional and national governments. Members pay a small 
contribution. PEACRITT is also involved in European projects, making them accessible to 
regional SMEs.
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A3.2. General interview questions
What are the main objectives of the organization?•	
Can you explain the kind of projects you are involved in?•	
How is the organization linked to SMEs?•	
How is the organization linked to research organizations?•	
What are the main activities your organization carries out related to the innovation •	
projects?
What are the main activities your organization carries out un-related to the innovation •	
projects?
How do innovation projects get started?•	
How are the innovation networks developed?•	
How are the ‘rules, coordination mechanisms, administrative procedures’ within the •	
network set up?
What kind of conflicts occur in the networks you are involved in? How are such conflicts •	
tackled?
What enhances trust and what erodes trust? / How important is trust and how is it •	
facilitated?
How do network members interact? •	
What is the main contribution / added value of your organization to SMEs?•	
What are the most important lessons learned during your time so far in this •	
organization?
Can you distinguish important events / factors that influenced performance of innovation •	
networks (positively or negatively)?
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List of interview questions
The semi-structured interviews included the following major questions:
M&A motives•	
What was/were the main motive(s) for the M&A?– 
Technological relatedness•	
Can you describe the main technological areas of the firms involved in the M&A?– 
Post M&A integration•	
What post M&A integration approach has been chosen? Can you describe it?– 
How was the post M&A integration organized?– 
(How) was the R&D function integrated?– 
Which mechanisms have been put in place for linking or integrating the original – 
different R&D functions? Please illustrate and indicate why?
What were the main changes in the R&D functions after the M&A?– 
Has there been a transfer of certain R&D/innovation management practices? Can you – 
mention specific practices and how they were exchanged?
What were the main challenges during the Post M&A integration process?– 
Would you judge the acquisition and subsequent integration as having been – 
successful?
Innovation synergy realization•	
Was the firm able to reduce the cost of R&D / innovation as a result of the acquisition? – 
If yes, can you explain how many costs were reduced and how?
Was the firm able to improve the innovation process in terms of efficiency and – 
effectiveness as a result of the acquisition? If yes, can you explain what has improved 
and how?
Was the firm able to gain access to new technological or knowledge resources as a result – 
of the acquisition? If yes, can mention them and describe how?
Was the firm able to set up new innovation or R&D trajectories as a result of the – 
acquisition? If yes, can you explain how many and describe them?
Was the firm able to increase the scale and/or scope of research and development? If – 
yes, can you explain how much and how?
Are there new products/processes or services that are the result of combining the two – 
organizations? If yes, can you explain how these innovations were the result of the 
combination of the organizations?
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In recent years, innovation has become essential for the competitive advantage of firms in 
a growing number of industries. Due to the fast development of technologies, changing 
customer demands, shortening of product life cycles, increased global competition and 
changing regulations, modern firms constantly have to look for new ways to prosper in 
this very dynamic business environment. To survive in this dynamic environment, firms 
increasingly look for ways to profit from knowledge in other organizations, like supply chain 
partners, universities and research institutes, and even competitors. Firms may choose from 
several strategies for external knowledge acquisition, such as inter-organizational cooperation, 
venture capital investments, outsourcing of Research and Development (R&D), licensing-in, 
but also Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). 
When firms try to acquire external knowledge they will face major management challenges. 
Several empirical studies have indicated that acquiring external knowledge can be time 
consuming, expensive and laborious. Moreover, establishing relationships with external 
organizations raises several complex issues, such as appropriation concerns, motivational 
problems, leakage of sensitive information, and partner dependency. In this respect, the 
management of innovating firms should not only strategically consider which knowledge 
acquisition strategy is to be preferred when they want to profit from knowledge developed 
elsewhere, but they should also consider carefully how to manage their external knowledge 
acquisition processes. The main objective of this book is therefore as follows:
To analyze how firms can profit from external knowledge using different knowledge acquisition strategies.
In order to realize this objective, four empirical studies are carried out. The first two studies are 
primarily concerned with the relevance of different strategies for acquiring external knowledge 
(such as licensing-in, outsourcing and cooperation), using a quantitative approach. Both studies 
use data of industrial firms from Dutch Community Innovation Surveys (CIS, 1994-2004), 
which explore the innovation process inside firms. The first study (Chapter 2) concentrates 
on the occurrence of different external knowledge acquisition strategies over time. The second 
study (Chapter 3) complements the first study by analyzing whether the different knowledge 
acquisition strategies have an impact on innovation performance.
Next, the other two studies apply a qualitative approach and concentrate on specific 
management challenges of two different knowledge acquisition strategies, namely inter-
organizational cooperation and M&As. The first qualitative study (Chapter 4) provides in-
depth information on innovation brokers orchestrating innovation networks of Small and 
Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the agri-food sector, in different European countries. 
The second qualitative study (Chapter 5) provides in-depth information on the integration 
processes of the R&D function, following large, (medium) high-tech M&As in life science 
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industries. In this study we link technological relatedness to specific R&D integration 
mechanisms, and subsequently to innovation synergy realization.
In the innovation management literature there is a growing attention for the open innovation 
model, introduced by Henry Chesbrough in 2003. This model emphasizes that the innovation 
process should be flexible and may cross organizational boundaries, so that it enables the transfer 
of knowledge and capabilities from and to other independent organizations. According to the 
open innovation model, firms should not only consider internal, but also external knowledge, 
capabilities and paths to markets. Yet, despite the recent emphasis on open innovation by 
innovation management scholars, the empirical evidence of its relevance to innovating firms 
has so far surprisingly been limited, mainly to high-tech industries. Nevertheless, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that open innovation can be beneficial for low-tech industries as well. An 
important question is therefore whether the concepts of open innovation also apply to lower-
tech industries. In addition, whereas the relevance of open innovation is shown for a number 
of large firms, it remains unclear to what extent open innovation is also relevant for SMEs. The 
research question in Chapter 2 is therefore:
To what extent do different types (size and technology classes) of innovating firms pursue an open innovation 
strategy?
The results show that especially since the turn of the century, an increasing share of innovating 
firms pursue an open innovation strategy, i.e. using external knowledge acquisition strategies, 
such as cooperation, outsourcing, and licensing-in. In addition, we found an increase in 
cooperation for different types of cooperation partners, such as suppliers, customers and 
research institutes. The most prevalent cooperation partners are actors from within the supply 
chain, i.e. suppliers and customers. Interestingly, the results showed that small firms and low- 
and medium-tech firms in particular are catching up large and high-tech firms in pursuing 
open innovation strategies since 2000. Yet, in general, large firms and firms from high-tech 
industries are still the most inclined to adopt open innovation strategies.
We conclude in Chapter 2 that open innovation has become more common, but is it also a 
successful strategy? Chapter 3 concentrates on the performance consequences of different 
knowledge acquisition strategies. In Chapter 3 we addressed the following research 
question:
What is the impact of different external knowledge acquisition strategies on the short-term and long-term 
innovation performance of innovative firms? 
Drawing from a sample of 686 industrial firms from the Dutch CIS database we analyzed 
what the impact is of different knowledge acquisition strategies; both open innovation 
strategies such as licensing-in, outsourcing, cooperation, as closed innovation strategies such 
as M&As and the contrasting case of in-house innovation, on the short-term and long-term 
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performance of incremental and radical innovation. We found that open innovation is often 
a successful strategy. More specifically, cooperation was found to have a positive impact on 
incremental and radical innovation, both in the short and long term. Thus, cooperation is 
not only increasingly practiced (see Chapter 2), it also turns out to be a successful strategy to 
profit from external knowledge. Furthermore, we found that outsourcing has a positive impact 
on a firm’s short-term and long-term performance of innovations, whereas licensing-in only 
contributes to short-term innovation performance. That licensing-in only contributes to the 
short-term innovation performance suggests that licensing-in is especially useful for acquiring 
knowledge and technologies that are relatively rapidly applicable for creating innovations. 
This knowledge is often also available to other organizations, so that licensing-in does not 
lead to long-term competitive advantage. The results suggest as well that there may be several 
sub-modes of outsourcing and inter-organizational cooperation that facilitate innovation in 
different ways. 
Contrary to our expectations, we found that the acquisition of a relatively large firm boosts 
the innovation performance significantly, although only after a substantial number of years. 
Apparently, it takes considerable time and effort to integrate the acquired firm in such a way 
that it improves the innovation performance. Finally, exclusive in-house innovation turned out 
to be a sub-optimal strategy, as we found that exclusive in-house innovation had a consistently 
significant negative impact on the performance of both short and long-term performance of 
incremental and radical innovation.
Chapter 4 presents a study on the innovation networks in which SMEs cooperate. Although 
cooperation can have a positive impact on innovation performance (see Chapter 3), for SMEs 
it can be a major challenge to cope with all the issues stemming from inter-organizational 
cooperation, such as cultural differences (e.g. between academics/researchers and entrepreneurs), 
appropriation concerns, motivational problems, and leakage of sensitive knowledge. In the 
innovation management literature there is a growing attention to intermediary organizations, 
such as innovation brokers, which assist SMEs with the challenges that come with innovating 
in a network. In Chapter 3, we therefore asked the following research question:
How do innovation brokers orchestrate SME innovation networks in the agri-food sector?
Drawing from the rich experience of four innovation brokers in the agri-food sector in The 
Netherlands, Germany and France, we substantiated the network orchestration processes that 
are important for innovation processes of SMEs. First, innovation brokers assist SMEs in the 
early stage of the innovation project, to develop ideas independently of large institutional 
actors, and to find complementary partners such as other SMEs, or research institutes. In 
contrast to an individual SME, an innovation broker can typically draw from a large and 
diverse network, in order to compose a network of complementary actors. Second, innovation 
brokers take the lead in setting up appropriate coordination mechanisms to facilitate the inter-
organizational cooperation within the new innovation network. Third, innovation brokers 
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often are involved in the network during the whole innovation trajectory, in order to manage 
the inter-organizational cooperation between the different parties. Especially in the case 
of conflict between the parties, innovation brokers are of added value in SME innovation 
networks. Being in a neutral position in an innovation network in which all other parties 
have a commercial stake, and having ample experience with inter-organizational innovation 
processes, enables innovation brokers to do so. 
As stated in Chapter 3, we found that major acquisitions have a positive impact on the long-
term performance of innovations. In Chapter 5 we analyze how major M&As can contribute 
to innovation performance. The research question in Chapter 5 is: 
What is the role of technological relatedness in realizing innovation synergies in M&As? 
Our study of 10 large, medium- and high-tech M&As in life-science industries showed that 
there are three categories of innovation synergies: innovation cost synergy, innovation process 
synergy, and new growth platforms. Furthermore, we concluded that depending on the level 
of technological relatedness between the involved firms, different integration mechanisms 
are applied. The results suggest that there are three levels of R&D integration, starting with a 
minimal form integration, which is the standardization of system, such as the harmonization 
of information, reporting, and control systems. Systems standardizing is applied in the case 
of lowly technological related M&As and does not or hardly lead to innovation synergies. 
The second level of R&D integration focuses, in addition to system standardization, on 
structural linking, e.g. in terms of integrated R&D management, R&D teams, or even R&D 
departments. This level of integration is primarily applied in moderately technological related 
M&As and may lead to innovation process synergy and new growth platforms. The third and 
most far-reaching level of R&D integration focuses, in addition to system standardization and 
structural linking on process re-design, i.e. rationalization processes (eliminating duplicate 
R&D), specialization, and re-prioritizing of innovation projects. Process re-design is mainly 
applied in highly technologically related M&As, and is associated with each of the three types 
of innovation synergy.
On the issue of organizing the Post M&A Integration process, we conclude that there are 
several factors that enhance innovation synergy realization, such experience, integration 
planning, and open communication. For instance, we found that firms with a track record 
of similar acquisitions, draw explicitly from their experience by using dedicated PMAI tools 
and guidelines. These firms are likely to integrate the R&D functions more quickly than firms 
without relevant experience. 
To conclude, we found that external knowledge becomes increasingly important for the 
innovation activities of firms. Although it can be difficult to profit from the knowledge and 
capabilities from other organizations, more and more firms manage to do so. This research 
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has shown that companies use different knowledge acquisition strategies and this research has 
arrived at concrete possibilities and guidelines to improve this process.
Finally, this research has made a number of main contributions to literature.
First, we advanced the external validity of the open innovation model. Several studies have •	
pointed at the importance of the open innovation model, but previous studies mainly 
concentrated on a small amount of case studies, or on one sector only. Our longitudinal 
research shows that firms from different industries and size classes increasingly pursue an 
open innovation strategy. In addition, our research shows that open innovation strategies 
contribute to innovation performance. The impact of licensing-in and outsourcing on 
innovation performance in particular has so far hardly been investigated. The extension 
on knowledge acquisition strategies and industries brings research on open innovation to 
a higher level.
Second, we presented new empirical evidence on the socially relevant academic discussion •	
on whether M&As have a positive impact on the innovation performance of firms. With 
our large scale quantitative study we showed that major acquisitions have a positive impact 
on the long-term performance of incremental and radical innovations. Contrary to previous 
studies, which focused on the number of patents as indicator for innovation performance, 
we used an indicator for innovation performance that also captures the commercial impact 
of innovations. In addition, we not only included high-tech, but also lower-tech firms.
Third, we developed a conceptual model for innovation synergy realization in M&As. •	
Although several studies investigated the R&D integration process in M&As, so far it 
has remained unclear if, and if so how, innovation synergies are realized in large M&As. 
In our research we combined insights from the strategic management and the post M&A 
integration literature to gain a better understanding of the process of innovation synergy 
realization. The model shows that depending on the technological relatedness between 
the involved firms, specific R&D integration mechanisms should be applied and that 
depending on these R&D integration mechanisms, different innovation synergies can be 
realized.
Fourth, we substantiated the network orchestration processes of innovation brokers active •	
in SME innovation networks. Previous studies in the innovation management literature 
focused primarily on identifying and describing the functions and roles of innovation 
brokers in the (regional) innovation system. Our research shows specifically which 
contributions innovation brokers make at the innovation network level, and how they 
make these contributions.
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Door de jaren heen is innovatie steeds belangrijker geworden voor de concurrentiepositie 
van bedrijven. Door de snelle technologische ontwikkelingen, de steeds veranderende vraag 
van klanten, de toegenomen wereldwijde concurrentie en de veranderende regelgeving, zijn 
bedrijven steeds meer genoodzaakt om voortdurend te innoveren in producten, processen, 
en andere bedrijfstoepassingen. Om te kunnen overleven in een dergelijke dynamische 
omgeving maken steeds meer bedrijven bij het innoveren gebruik van kennis en middelen van 
andere organisaties, zoals de ketenpartners, universiteiten en onderzoeksinstituten, en zelfs 
concurrenten. Bedrijven kunnen kiezen uit verschillende kennis-acquisitiestrategieën, zoals 
samenwerking met andere organisaties, investeringen in durfkapitaal (in kleine innovatieve 
ondernemingen), uitbesteding van onderzoek en ontwikkeling (R&D), het kopen van licenties 
voor de toepassing van kennis en technologieën, maar ook fusies en overnames (F&Os).
Echter, bedrijven die proberen om externe kennis binnen te halen, om zo het eigen 
innovatievermogen te versterken, worden geconfronteerd met verschillende uitdagingen. Een 
aantal studies hebben aangetoond dat het aangaan van relaties met externe organisaties om 
van hun kennis en middelen gebruik te maken veel tijd kan kosten, en duur en omslachtig 
kan zijn. Daarnaast spelen er nog allerlei kwesties wanneer bedrijven relaties aangaan met 
externe organisaties, zoals toe-eigenings-, en motivatieproblemen, het weglekken van gevoelige 
informatie, en de potentieel (te grote) afhankelijkheid van externe partners. Het is daarom van 
groot belang dat het management van innovatieve bedrijven niet alleen bepaalt welke strategie 
om externe kennis binnen te halen het meest geschikt is, zij moeten ook goed nadenken hoe 
ze het kennis-acquisitieproces moeten besturen.
Het boek heeft de volgende doelstelling:
Antwoord trachten te vinden op de vraag hoe bedrijven kunnen profiteren van externe kennis met als 
oogmerk het verbeteren van hun innovatieve prestatie. 
Om deze doelstelling te realiseren zijn vier studies uitgevoerd. De eerste twee studies zijn 
kwantitatieve studies en zijn voornamelijk gericht op de onderzoeken van de relevantie van 
verschillende kennis-acquisitiestrategieën (zoals licenties, uitbesteding, samenwerking, en 
F&Os). Voor deze kwantitatieve studies is gebruik gemaakt van de Nederlandse innovatie-
enquêtes (CIS) van het CBS. In de eerste studie (Hoofdstuk 2) zijn de gegevens van 5 
opeenvolgende innovatie-enquêtes achter elkaar gezet om zo inzicht te krijgen in hoeverre 
innovatieve bedrijven in de periode 1994-2004 gebruik hebben gemaakt van externe kennis-
acquisitiestrategieën. In de tweede studie (Hoofdstuk 3) is onderzocht of het gebruik van 
verschillende kennis-acquisitiestrategieën in deze periode heeft bijgedragen aan de innovatieve 
prestatie van de bedrijven.
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De laatste twee zijn kwalitatief van aard en richten zich op de specifieke management 
uitdagingen van twee verschillende kennis-acquisitiestrategieën, namelijk samenwerking 
en fusies en overnames. In de eerste studie (Hoofdstuk 4) worden vier innovatiemakelaars 
onderzocht, waarbij met name is gekeken naar hoe deze organisaties innovatienetwerken van 
kleine en middelgrote agrovoedingsbedrijven assisteren bij het gezamenlijk innovatieproces. 
De tweede studie (Hoofdstuk 5) biedt uitgebreide informatie van 10 grote, medium- en high-
tech F&Os in de life sciences industrie over hoe innovatiesynergievoordelen kunnen worden 
gerealiseerd in F&Os. In dit onderzoek wordt specifiek ingegaan op het effect van technologische 
verwantschap tussen de bedrijven op het realiseren van innovatiesynergievoordelen, waarbij 
vooral wordt gekeken naar het integratieproces van de betreffende R&D-functies.
In de innovatiemanagement literatuur is steeds meer aandacht voor het open innovatiemodel, 
in 2003 geïntroduceerd door Henry Chesbrough. In dit model heeft het innovatieproces 
een flexibele structuur waarbij het de organisatiegrenzen kan overstijgen, zodat overdracht 
van en daarmee combinatie met externe kennis en middelen mogelijk is. Volgens het open 
innovatiemodel zijn externe innovatieve ideeën en opvolgende innovatieactiviteiten even 
belangrijk als interne, terwijl in het ‘oude’ gesloten innovatie model bedrijven vooral hun 
eigen ideeën genereren, en alle innovatieactiviteiten intern uitvoeren. Ondanks de grote 
nadruk die in de innovatiemanagement literatuur wordt gelegd op het open innovatiemodel, 
is het empirisch bewijs van de relevantie daarvan tot dusver beperkt gebleven tot een kleine 
groep bedrijven, met name grote bedrijven afkomstig van high-tech industrieën. Alleen uit 
anekdotisch bewijs blijkt dat open innovatie ook gunstig kan zijn voor low-tech industrieën. 
Een belangrijke vraag is daarom of de concepten van open innovatie ook van toepassing zijn op 
low-tech industrieën. Bovendien blijft het onduidelijk in welke mate het open innovatiemodel 
ook relevant is voor kleine en middelgrote bedrijven. De onderzoeksvraag in Hoofdstuk 2 
luidt daarom:
In hoeverre komt open innovatie voor bij innoverende bedrijven uit verschillende grootte- en 
technologieklassen?
De resultaten laten zien dat met name sinds het begin van deze eeuw een steeds groter deel van 
de innoverende bedrijven een open innovatie strategie hanteren, wat wil zeggen dat steeds meer 
bedrijven gebruik maken van kennis acquisitiestrategieën, zoals samenwerking, uitbesteding 
en licenties. Daarbij werken bedrijven in toenemende mate samen met verschillende partners, 
zoals leveranciers, klanten en onderzoeksinstellingen. De toename van het gebruik van open 
innovatie strategieën is na 2000 vooral zichtbaar bij kleine en middelgrote bedrijven, en bij 
bedrijven uit medium- en low-tech industrieën. In absolute zin komt open innovatie het meest 
voor in high-tech industrieën en bij grote bedrijven, de andere bedrijven zijn als het ware met 
een inhaalslag bezig.
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Waar in Hoofdstuk 2 is onderzocht in hoeverre open innovatie voorkomt bij innovatieve 
bedrijven van verschillende grootten en technologie niveaus, staat in Hoofdstuk 3 de volgende 
onderzoeksvraag centraal:
Wat is het effect van verschillende kennis-acquisitiestrategieën op de korte en lange termijn innovatieve 
prestatie van innovatieve bedrijven?
Aan de hand van een steekproef van 668 industriële bedrijven uit de Nederlandse CIS-
database is onderzocht wat het effect is van verschillende kennis acquisitiestrategieën; 
zowel open innovatiestrategieën zoals licenties, uitbesteding, en samenwerken, als gesloten 
innovatiestrategieën zoals fusies en overnames, maar ook in-huis innovatie, op de korte en 
lange termijn prestatie van incrementele en radicale innovatie. De resultaten in Hoofdstuk 
3 laten zien dat open innovatie vaak een succesvolle strategie is. Samenwerking bijvoorbeeld, 
bleek een positief effect te hebben op de prestatie van zowel incrementele als radicale 
innovaties, zowel op de korte als op de lange termijn. Samenwerking wordt dus niet alleen 
steeds meer beoefend door innoverende bedrijven (zie Hoofdstuk 2), het blijkt nu ook vaak 
een succesvolle strategie te zijn om te profiteren van de kennis en vaardigheden van andere 
organisaties. Uitbesteding van R&D bleek positief bij te dragen aan de innovatieve prestatie, 
zowel op de korte als de lange termijn, terwijl het gebruik maken van licenties alleen op de 
korte termijn bleek bij te dragen aan de innovatieve prestatie van de onderzochte bedrijven. 
Dat licenties alleen een positief effect hebben op de korte termijn prestaties van innovaties, 
kan er op duiden dat licenties vooral geschikt is om snel toegang te krijgen tot bestaande 
kennis en technologieën. Deze kennis is of wordt vaak ook beschikbaar voor andere bedrijven 
waaronder concurrenten, zodat er op de lange termijn geen concurrentie voordeel meer is. Dat 
samenwerking en uitbesteding van R&D zowel op de korte als de lange termijn een positief 
effect heeft, kan er op duiden dat innovatieve bedrijven verschillende samenwerkings- en 
uitbestedingstrategieën hanteren. Bedrijven besteden bijvoorbeeld ontwikkeling uit aan 
toeleveranciers om bestaande producten te optimaliseren, maar besteden tegelijkertijd meer 
fundamenteel onderzoek uit aan universiteiten om betrokken te raken bij de meest recente 
technologische ontwikkelingen. In tegenstelling tot wat we op basis van eerdere studies hadden 
verwacht, blijken ook grote bedrijfsovernames een positief effect te hebben op de innovatie 
prestaties, al is dit effect alleen zichtbaar op de lange termijn. Het kost blijkbaar veel tijd om 
het overgenomen bedrijf te integreren, voordat het echt bijdraagt aan de innovatieprestatie. 
Echter, zodra deze integratie is gelukt blijken bedrijven wel in staat om innovatieve voordelen 
uit de overname te halen, wat leidt tot betere innovatieve prestaties in de markt. Er kan tenslotte 
worden geconcludeerd dat bedrijven die geen gebruik maken van de door ons onderzochte 
externe kennis acquisitiestrategieën, ofwel bedrijven die voornamelijk intern innoveren, 
duidelijk minder presteren op het gebied van incrementele en radicale innovaties, zowel op de 
korte als de lange termijn. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt een studie gepresenteerd waarin innovatienetwerken worden 
geanalyseerd waarin kleine en middelgrote bedrijven samenwerken om te innoveren. Hoewel 
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samenwerking een positief effect kan hebben op de innovatieprestaties van een bedrijf (zie 
Hoofdstuk 3), kan het met name voor kleine en middelgrote bedrijven een enorme uitdaging 
zijn om te innoveren in een samenwerkingsverband. Zo is er vaak weinig ervaring met 
samenwerking en ook kan samenwerking verschillende problemen met zich mee brengen, zoals 
coördinatieproblemen, culturele verschillen, het verdelen van kosten en baten, uiteenlopende 
belangen en het vertrouwelijk houden van strategische informatie. In de innovatiemanagement 
literatuur wordt daarom steeds meer de nadruk gelegd op het belang van intermediaire 
organisaties, zoals innovatie makelaars, die kleine en middelgrote bedrijven assisteren bij dit 
soort moeilijkheden in innovatienetwerken. In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt dan ook de volgende vraag 
gesteld.
Hoe organiseren innovatiemakelaars de innovatienetwerken van kleine en middelgrote bedrijven in de 
agrovoedingssector?
Op basis van de ervaring van vier innovatiemakelaars in Nederland, Duitsland en Frankrijk 
in de agrovoedingssector zijn verschillende netwerk-organisatieprocessen geïdentificeerd en 
bestudeerd die door dergelijke innovatiemakelaars worden uitgevoerd, die van belang zijn voor 
het succes van dergelijke innovatienetwerken. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat innovatiemakelaars 
kleine en middelgrote bedrijven assisteren in de beginfase van het innovatietraject, waarbij ze 
die bedrijven zo veel mogelijk hun innovatie-ideeën onafhankelijk van de grotere actoren in 
het netwerk laten ontwikkelen. Daarnaast helpen innovatiemakelaars bedrijven bij het vinden 
van geschikte samenwerkingspartners, waarbij de innovatiemakelaars kunnen putten uit hun 
uitgebreide netwerk. Bovendien spelen de innovatiemakelaars vaak een grote rol in het opzetten 
van adequate coördinatiemechanismen voor de samenwerking. Innovatiemakelaars blijven 
vaak betrokken bij het innovatienetwerk gedurende het hele innovatietraject, met name om 
de samenwerking tussen de verschillende partijen soepel te laten verlopen. Hierbij richten ze 
zich vooral op het open en transparant maken van de acties en bedoelingen van de deelnemers 
in het innovatienetwerk, en op het stimuleren van onderlinge interactie. Door hun neutrale rol 
kunnen innovatiemakelaars een stabiliserende factor zijn in het samenwerkingsproces.
Waar in Hoofdstuk 3 een positief effect van F&Os op de lange termijn innovatieve prestaties 
van bedrijven werd gevonden, wordt in Hoofdstuk 5 ingegaan op hoe innovatieve voordelen 
worden gerealiseerd bij F&Os. De onderzoeksvraag in dit Hoofdstuk 5 luidt:
Wat is de rol van technologische verwantschap bij het realiseren van synergievoordelen in F&Os?
Uit het onderzoek van 10 grote (tussen de 100 miljoen en 20 miljard omvang) horizontale 
(medium) high-tech F&Os uit verschillende life science industrieën blijkt dat er drie categorieën 
van innovatie-synergievoordelen kunnen worden onderscheiden: innovatie-kostensynergie, 
innovatie-processynergie, en nieuwe product/technologieën platforms. Verder bleek de 
aanpak bij het integreren van de R&D af te hangen van de technologische verwantschap van 
de betrokken bedrijven. De resultaten laten zien dat er drie niveaus van R&D integratie zijn 
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te onderscheiden, te beginnen met een minimale vorm van integratie, wat neerkomt op het 
standaardiseren van de informatie- en controlesystemen. Deze vorm van integratie wordt met 
name toegepast in F&Os die worden gekenmerkt door een lage mate van technologische 
verwantschap en leidt over het algemeen tot weinig of geen innovatie synergievoordelen. 
Het tweede niveau van integratie richt zich naast een standaardisatie van systemen ook op 
het structureel verbinden van de betrokken R&D functies, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van een 
geïntegreerd R&D-management, geïntegreerde R&D-teams, of zelfs volledig geïntegreerde 
R&D-afdelingen. Deze vorm van integratie wordt met name toegepast in F&Os die worden 
gekenmerkt door een gemiddelde technologische verwantschap en leidt in het algemeen tot 
innovatie-processynergie en nieuwe product/technologie platforms. Het derde en meest 
ingrijpende niveau van integratie behelst een complete herinrichting van het R&D-proces. 
Bij deze vorm van integratie wordt naast de standaardisatie van systemen en het leggen van 
structurele verbindingen de overlap in R&D weggesneden en wordt er aangestuurd op meer 
specialisatie in R&D, en een her-rangschikking van bestaande innovatietrajecten. Deze vorm 
van integratie wordt met name toegepast in F&Os die worden gekenmerkt door een hoge mate 
van technologische verwantschap en leidt over het algemeen tot alle drie soorten van innovatie-
synergie. Hierbij moet wel worden opgemerkt dat met name bij een herinrichting van het 
R&D-proces, de lopende innovatie-activiteiten van de betrokken bedrijven vertraging kunnen 
oplopen, bijvoorbeeld doordat de betrokken ontwikkelaars minder tijd overhouden voor hun 
onderzoekswerkzaamheden omdat er veel tijd en middelen opgaan aan het integratieproces. 
Verder laten de resultaten zien dat het succes van het R&D-integratieproces kan worden 
bevorderd door een aantal instrumenten. Zo bleek bijvoorbeeld dat bedrijven die 
ervaring hebben met F&Os, deze ervaringen expliciet maken, bijvoorbeeld in speciale 
integratiehandboeken, en deze gebruiken in nieuwe soortgelijke F&Os, beter in staat waren 
om de R&D functie sneller en met minder problemen te integreren dan de bedrijven zonder 
deze ervaring. 
Concluderend kan worden gezegd dat externe kennis een steeds crucialere rol speelt in het 
innovatieproces van bedrijven. Hoewel het lastig kan zijn om de kennis en vaardigheden 
van andere organisaties goed te benutten zijn er steeds meer bedrijven die dit kunnen. Dit 
onderzoek heeft laten zien dat bedrijven verschillende strategieën hanteren om van externe 
kennis te profiteren en dat er concrete mogelijkheden en richtlijnen zijn om dit proces te 
bevorderen.
Tenslotte, dit onderzoek heeft een aantal belangrijke bijdragen aan de literatuur opgeleverd.
In de eerste plaats is de externe validiteit van het open innovatie-model vergroot. Steeds •	
meer onderzoeken in de innovatiemanagement-literatuur benadrukken het belang van 
het open innovatiemodel, maar voorgaande studies hebben zich vooralsnog beperkt 
tot een klein aantal case studies, of een analyse van een enkele met name high-tech 
sector. Ons onderzoek laat aan de hand van een longitudinale analyse van bedrijven uit 
verschillende sectoren en grootteklassen zien dat steeds meer innoverende bedrijven een 
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open innovatiestrategie hanteren. Bovendien blijkt uit ons onderzoek dat verschillende 
open innovatiestrategieën daadwerkelijk positief bijdragen aan het innovatief vermogen 
van bedrijven. Vooral het effect van licenties en R&D uitbesteding op de innovatieprestatie 
was tot nog toe niet of nauwelijks grootschalig onderzocht.
Ten tweede hebben we nieuw empirisch bewijs geleverd voor de maatschappelijk zeer •	
relevante wetenschappelijk discussie of fusies en overnames een positief effect hebben 
op de innovatieve prestaties van bedrijven. Zowel in de strategisch management als de 
industrieel economische literatuur bestaat hier geen consensus over. Met onze grootschalige 
kwantitatieve studie hebben we aangetoond dat gemiddeld genomen F&Os op de lange 
termijn een positief effect hebben op zowel incrementele als radicale innovaties. Wat ons 
onderzoek onderscheidt van de bestaande studies, is dat wij niet octrooien hebben gemeten, 
maar de economische prestatie van innovaties in de markt, en dat we niet alleen high-tech 
bedrijven, maar ook low- en medium-tech bedrijven hebben onderzocht.
Ten derde hebben we een conceptueel model ontwikkeld om innovatie-synergievoordelen te •	
onderzoeken bij fusies en overnames. Hoewel steeds meer studies het R&D integratieproces 
onderzoeken, is het tot nu toe onduidelijk gebleven of en zo ja in welke mate, bij grote 
fusies en overnames innovatie-synergievoordelen kunnen worden gerealiseerd. In ons 
onderzoek zijn de inzichten van studies uit de strategisch management-literatuur en de 
post F&O integratie-literatuur gecombineerd om een beter inzicht te krijgen in het proces 
van innovatiesynergie-realisatie. Het model maakt duidelijk dat afhankelijk van de mate 
van technologische verwantschap tussen de betrokken bedrijven een specifieke R&D 
integratie aanpak vereist is en dat afhankelijk van de integratieaanpak verschillende vormen 
van innovatiesynergie kunnen worden gerealiseerd.
Ten vierde is een analyse gemaakt hoe innovatiemakelaars in drie Europese landen •	
kleine en middelgrote bedrijven assisteren om te innoveren. Voorgaande studies in de 
innovatiemanagement literatuur hebben zich vooral gericht op het beschrijven van de 
functie(s) die deze innovatiemakelaars hebben in het (regionale) innovatiesysteem. Ons 
onderzoek laat heel specifiek zien welke bijdragen innovatiemakelaars hebben gerealiseerd 
op het niveau van de innovatienetwerken en hoe ze deze bijdragen realiseren.
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